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Abstract
This thesis considers the development of policies and practices by trade unions and 
their members in response to changes in the way services are provided by British 
local authorities. The research was conducted in the context of debates about the 
changing fortunes of the trade union movement, and these are outlined. The 
particular set of practices associated with public service trade unionism in the 1970s 
developed during the emergence of the crisis of the ‘Fordist mode of regulation’. 
Drawing on the French regulation school of political economy the study discusses 
the characteristics of the ‘neo-liberal’ path to post-Fordism adopted by the British 
government during the 1980s, and its implications for local government trade 
unions and local government services. Trade union responses to the policies which 
constitute this path are examined at both the national and local level, in the latter 
case through four detailed case studies of Newcastle, Manchester, Wandsworth and 
Milton Keynes. The nature of the trade unions’ response in each case is considered 
in terms of the idea of overlapping networks of ‘locales’ or settings for action, and 
the resulting uneven geographical development of new forms of trade union action 
is highlighted. The concept of ‘locale’ emphasises the way in which aspects of 
settings form part of the resources of action itself. Through a discussion of the 
work of David Harvey, this is considered further in an examination of the ways in 
which ‘place’ and ‘community’ can be sources of radicalism for the trade unions. 
The study concludes with a consideration of the implications of the geographical 
constitution and geographical expression of trade union action for the transition 
from the Fordist mode of regulation.
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Introduction
Focus
British trade unions and trade unionists were on the receiving end of a large number 
of political, economic and ideological assaults during the 1980s. While the trends 
have not always been in one direction the majority of them seem to have worked 
against the organisations of labour. Union membership, economic power and 
political influence all seem to have been eroded. However, the esteem in which 
unions have been held by the public has steadily increased. ^  The causes and 
consequences of many of these changes have been widely debated by academics, 
politicians and journalists. By contrast, rather less attention has been paid to the 
responses of trade unions themselves to the developments.
This is unfortunate for three reasons. Firstly, it understates the degree to 
which economic and political change is actively contested (or supported) by the 
groups affected by it. Secondly, it gives the impression that organisations such as 
trade unions are simply at the mercy of wider processes of structural social change 
over which they have no control.^ Thirdly, it can lead to an inadequate 
understanding of the ways in which institutions actually operate by, for example, 
underpinning a functionalist interpretation of social phenomena in which changes in 
institutions are the result of the ‘needs’ of some wider system.
In this study, therefore, I propose to examine the ways in which trade unions 
and their members actively respond to, and intervene in, some of the processes 
which affect them. The key questions which my research seeks to answer, 
therefore, are: (i) how do trade unions respond to change? and (ii) why do they
^Edwards PK and Bain GS (1988) ‘Why are trade unions becoming more popular? Unions and 
public opinion in Britain’ British Journal of Industrial Relations 26:3 pp311-326.
^The policies associated in the British labour movement with ‘new realism’ might be seen as the 
political consequence of this process.
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respond as they do?
Complete answers to both of these questions are clearly beyond the scope of 
a single research project. I have therefore limited my enquiries to a case study of 
one sector: local government services. This focus was selected for specific reasons 
and these are detailed in Appendix A. Moreover, with hindsight and as I shall 
demonstrate below, my research showed that this particular sector was a 
particularly apposite choice by virtue both of its significant role in current processes 
of social change and of its status as an important site for the production, 
reproduction and transformation of contemporary practices of trade unionism. 
Furthermore these twin virtues, I will suggest, are closely interrelated.
Trade union responses to processes which affect them take various forms. 
Two broad categories might be identified: policy and practice. These categories do 
commonly appear in both academic and popular discourse, although frequently in 
rather misleading ways. For example, the formulation and communication of 
policy is seen as the province of national union leaderships. Furthermore, it is 
often asserted that during the 1980s these policies have been ineffective. Thus the 
Trades Union Congress (TUG) conscientiously prepares a policy statement each 
year prior to the publication of the Government’s budget with no sign that its 
contents have any influence over Government policy. Such apparently ineffective 
policies can of course achieve other objectives such as agenda-setting and the 
publication of alternatives. By contrast, trade union practice is frequently 
associated with the ‘grass-roots’ and identified almost exclusively with industrial 
action in general and strike activity in particular.
These assumptions about the respective spheres of operation of policy 
formulation and practical activity are inadequate. For instance, national union 
organisations are involved in practice through their involvement in collective 
bargaining with employers’ organisations while at the local level trade unions do 
engage in policy formulation, though this may be in conflict with and/or formally
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subordinate to national union policy.^ In addition, union policies are not always 
ineffective and union practices are not limited to industrial action. In particular, 
where union policies are able to be implemented directly by union organisations and 
their members they may well have important effects and examples of this will be 
described in this study. And union practices include a wide range of activities 
besides striking, including recruitment, training and education, negotiation, 
campaigning, formal (party) politics, cultural and social activities and membership 
services such as legal advice and welfare programmes.
Throughout this study I will thus be concerned with the relationships between 
policy and practice at these different levels. I will show how at certain times 
practice first leads, and then becomes partially constitutive of, policies which in 
turn feed back into the further development of practice in sometimes supportive and 
sometimes contradictory ways. Furthermore this can also happen between different 
levels in the union organisations with local practices sometimes informing national 
policies and thereby being replicated in amended form elsewhere.
Moreover, as I stated above, my aim here is not merely to characterise and 
describe union responses, important though that is, but also to try to explain why 
unions and their members respond as they do. In doing so I will argue that an 
adequate explanation involves locating the formulation of policy and the social 
practices of trade unionism in their respective contexts in space and time. The 
importance of geographical context in the explanation of social phenomena is an 
increasingly prominent feature of writing in the social sciences (and not only in the 
work of human geographers). I believe that my research shows that a sensitivity to 
space, place and geographical context is crucial to explaining why trade union
^In addition trade unions vary as to the relationship between national and local policy. In the 
National and Local Government Officers’ Association (NALGO) for example, a decentralised 
decision-making system gives considerable autonomy to local branches. The National Union of 
Public Employees (NUPE), by contrast, is more centralised, although it should immediately be 
noted that such relative centralisation does not preclude the participation of lay members in both 
the formulation and implementation of policy.
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responses to change in local government service provision have taken the forms, 
and had the effects, that they have.
In this perspective the distinctions which I have drawn between different 
levels in the bureaucracies of trade unions and the stress I have placed on the social 
and political practices of trade unionism constitute not a merely useful typology of 
union organisation and activity but an interpretation, following Andrew Sayer,^ of 
the relations between real objects and structures. In other words there is a real 
distinction to be made between the nature of national union organisations and that 
of local branches and between union policies and the practices of trade unionism. 
Further, I believe that these real distinctions arise (at least in part) from the 
structuring of social relations over space and through time. If I am right in this, 
and much of what follows will seek to substantiate my claims, the geography of 
trade unionism is not incidental and contingent, but essential and necessary, to its 
nature.
Before introducing a number of wider aims which provide the political and 
academic purposes of this study I want to situate my work in its context. In 
addition to establishing the grounds for these purposes, this context helps to clarify 
how the specific focus outlined here holds wider significance for the changing 
nature of trade unionism in Britain.
Context
There are two sorts of context on which I wish to focus and these are related to 
each other. The first is the academic context: the other texts which have influenced 
this study, the debates from which it derives and to which it seeks to contribute and 
its disciplinary background. The second is what might be termed the political 
context. All academic texts have some political significance whether this is explicit 
or not. However I want in addition to go beyond this and deliberately situate this
‘^ Sayer A (1984) Method in social science: a realist approach (London: Hutchinson).
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study in two aspects of a broader political setting.
The first of these is relatively straightforward and stems from the fact that the 
focus of the study is political processes and events. This ‘empirical context’ 
(changes in the form and function of the state, changes in the relationship between 
the Government and the trade unions and so on) sometimes falls within my area of 
study, sometimes forms part of the explanations for processes studied and is 
occasionally cited as ‘scene-setting’ material. There should not, I think, be much 
controversy here. The second aspect is more difficult and consists in the political 
debates in which this study is an intervention, whether intentional or not. In one 
sense this is merely the academic context expressed in different terms. However it 
is not enough to clarify only the explicit academic context. Much academic writing 
fails to recognise or reflect on the political conditions and political consequences of 
its production. Frequently the political import of academic writing remains as a 
‘sub-text’, implicit and unacknowledged, at least by the author. The intention of 
this section is not to attempt to render my text transparent, and thereby to impose 
authority, since that is impossible and, given the role that anonymous others have 
played in its construction, inappropriate. Rather I want to acknowledge what I can 
of my political motives, thereby to disinter a part of the ‘sub-text’ for inspection 
and thus to try to avoid the disingenuousness inherent in attempts to produce value- 
free social scientific knowledge.^
Academic
The academic context will, I think, become clear in following chapters. In brief, 
however, there is a number of academic literatures which are of particular 
importance. These are work on trade unions and industrial relations, work on local 
government and the state, work on the relationship between geography and social 
change and attempts to interpret theoretically the nature of economic, social and
I^ recognise that much of the sub-text is happily beyond my powers of discovery. This study is 
not an exercise in self-psychoanalysis.
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political ‘restructuring’. In some cases texts which were important in the 
development of the research project and its execution will not play a significant role 
in this account of that project. This is sometimes because they became redundant 
(perhaps where a particular path of empirical enquiry proved unsuccessful) and 
sometimes because they had use at a particular stage of the research (research 
design, for example) but were superseded by other texts in subsequent stages.^ 
Thus the activity of interpreting research findings is qualitatively different from that 
of designing research projects and the texts constructed in each case are necessarily 
different firom each other.
Trade unions and industrial relations
Existing research on trade unionism and industrial relations is very wide-ranging, 
and is conducted from a variety of methodological and theoretical viewpoints. 
Much research is conducted from a critical and radical perspective and often, 
though riot always, adopts innovative techniques. The writing of Huw Beynon on 
Ford car workers,'^ of Cynthia Cockbum on the printing industry^ and of Hilary 
Wainwright and Dave Elliott on trade unionism in Lucas Aerospace^ are examples 
where forms of action research, participant observation and long interviewing were 
used iri the research process. Similar commitment and a rather different 
methodology inform the work of John K e l l y , w h o  eschews the detailed case 
study for a national-level analysis and develops a sort of empiricist Marxism in 
which, for example, he tries to ‘measure’ class-consciousness and correlate it
^For example during the design of the research project I considered in some detail the nature of 
ideology. This study does not contain a detailed account of that consideration, and thus makes 
little reference to the texts involved, but some of my interpretations do depend in part on the 
particular understanding of ideology which I developed at that time. Likewise the work of Scott 
Lash and John Urry was crucial in developing the focus of the project but does not appear in detail 
in the final study. (Lash S and Urry J (1987) The end of organized capitalism (Cambridge: 
Polity).)
^Beynon H (1984, first edition 1973) Working for Ford (Harmondsworth: Pelican).
^Cockbum C (1983) Brothers: male dominance and technological change (London: Pluto). 
^Wainwright H and Elliott D (1982) The Lucas Plan: a new trade unionism in the making? 
(London: Allison and Busby).
I {19 '^S) Trade unions and socialist politics ÇLmAoïi'.Ntxso).
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through time with levels of industrial militancy
Other writing on industrial relations is less explicit in its politics and while 
focussing (like Beynon, Cockbum, Wainwright and Elliott) on the workplace level 
is not limited to individual case studies and aspires to general statements about the 
changing nature of trade unionism in Britain. Important examples are the writings 
of Philip Bassett and John Maclnnes of which I will have much more to say in 
Chapter One.
Apart from ‘reference’ works like Henry Felling’s history of the British 
labour movement, Ken Coates’ and Tony Topham’s text on Trade unions in 
Britain, the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey and statistical material from 
journals such as Employment Gazette the other main areas of literature in the 
industrial relations field is that relating to organisational analysis. This literature 
has been of only very limited concern to this project. Organisational theory tends to 
reduce management-labour relations to a series of technical problems which are 
divorced from the real social and political content of trade unionism. Again 
following Sayer, I wish to suggest that the social and political content is not a 
contingent ‘added extra’ but is inherent in the nature of trade unionism. Any 
analysis which abstracts from it (as much organisational theory seems to do) can by 
definition only produce severely compromised explanations.
This dry bibliographic sketch does not, however, clarify the real significance 
for this study of the literature on trade unions and industrial relations. The key 
contextual literature is that which attempts to assess the implications of economic 
and political change for the stmctures and practices of trade unionism. In particular 
there has been a controversial debate over the significance of certain well publicised 
shifts in economic structures (such as that from manufacturing to service 
employment), developments in working practices (such as those associated with
 ^V w . pp86-101.
l^Robbins S P (1987) Organization theory: structure, design, and applications (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall).
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so-called Japanese methods), and changes in the legislative environment (such as 
the outlawing of solidarity (‘secondary’) industrial action). While some writers 
have identified these changes as widespread or fundamental or both, others have 
argued that they are limited and superficial. The importance of this for trade unions 
is that different interpretations of these processes can be used to legitimate very 
different political strategies. Put crudely, if the changes are dramatic and permanent 
then very different forms of trade unionism might be called for, whereas if they are 
of only passing significance then trade unions may be able to weather the storm and 
emerge from the other side little changed.
Expressing the alternatives this starkly deliberately caricatures the debate, and 
it will become clear in what follows that it is rather more sophisticated than this. 
However, one potential flaw in both these positions is immediately apparent: they 
both appear to assume that what trade unions were doing before the changes came 
along was appropriate to that time. While I do not wish to suggest that trade 
unionism prior to the 1980s was manifestly ^appropriate in form and function, I 
will argue that a critical analysis of the period is vital to understanding why and 
how trade unions have changed since.
Local government and the local state
My choice of case study requires that I consider also the extensive literature on the 
local government system in Britain and debates over the appropriate ways in which 
to theorise its changing nature. Like trade unionism, local government has been 
one of the key political battlegrounds in Britain during the 1980s. After a period of 
strong expansion during the early 1970s, local government services and 
employment have faced a succession of increasingly severe restrictions on spending 
levels and political autonomy.
The general textbook produced by Gerry Stoker provides an obvious starting 
place, and has the virtue of placing the local government system in Britain in its
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broader political c o n t e x t . I t  represents therefore, a considerable improvement on 
another tradition of research which I will call the public administration tradition. As 
with organisational theorists in the field of management-labour relations, writers 
from a public administration perspective tend to adopt a technocratic and de­
politicised view of the provision of local government services, often allied to a 
series of liberal-pluralist assumptions about the nature of politics in late capitalist 
Britain. This work, whilst occasionally able to provide useful descriptive material, 
is of only very limited analytical significance and does not require detailed 
consideration.
From more critical perspectives much research has revolved around the 
question of the relationship between local and central government. A seminal 
contribution from Cynthia Cockbum set the terms of the debate for some y e a r s .  ^ 4 
Cockbum’s study of local government in Lambeth in South London convinced her 
that the institutions of local govemment were, in essence, agencies of the central 
state. The autonomy enjoyed by local government is largely illusory, argued 
Cockbum, and its raison d’être is provided by the functions it fulfils for processes 
of capital accumulation and the reproduction of the capitalist system.
Cockbum’s view was challenged by the work of Peter Saunders. Saunders 
has somewhat modified his original argument, but again it was an important marker 
in the debate .Br ief ly ,  Saunders suggested that, rather than the local state being 
effectively subsumed within the wider stmctures of the state as a whole, it was 
possible to discem two relatively discrete spheres of influence, those of production 
on the one hand and consumption on the other. The sphere of production, argued 
Saunders, was the responsibility of the central state, while the sphere of 
consumption was the responsibility of local state institutions. This ‘dual state 
thesis’ has been extensively criticised. Probably its most important shortcoming is
^^Stoker G (1988) The politics of local government (London: Macmillan).
'^^Cockbum C (1977) The local state (London: Pluto).
l^Saunders P (1979) Urban Politics: a sociological interpretation (London: Hutchinson).
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that it relies on a rigid division of political labour between different scales of state 
organisations which is not always present in practice. There are many ways in 
which local-level organisations are involved in ‘production’ (through infrastructural 
provision, for example) while central govemment is responsible for a variety of 
‘consumption’ functions, such as social security.
Although adopting different positions, Cockbum’s and Saunders’ writings 
are both in part reactions to an earlier tradition of research into local politics. Urban 
managerialism focussed on the activities of ‘urban managers’ (local govemment 
officials and others) in controlling access to scarce resources, such as housing, 
Subsequent work criticised this sort of research in part for failing to situate the 
managers in a wider political and economic context which might clarify why such 
resources were scarce. However, urban managerialism did have the virtue of 
considering the intemal operation of local politics and attempting to ‘unpack’ the 
‘black box’ of political and administrative decision making. This is significant for 
my research since it is only by considering what goes on within local govemment 
that the causes and consequences of particular trade union responses to change can 
be identified.
More recently attempts have been made to revive this focus of research, but in 
ways which link it more explicitly to the wider context charted by Cockbum and 
Saunders. Work from this perspective is a key context for my research, which tries 
explicitly to relate developments in industrial relations within local authorities to 
wider shifts in the political and economic geography of Britain.
The essays on local socialism edited by Martin Boddy and Colin Fudge 
exemplify one aspect of this revival, which focuses on the operation of policies 
developed by local authorities in response to industrial decline and challenges from 
central govemment. A similarly critical perspective prompts Alan Clarke and
J and Moore R (1967) Race, community and conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
^^Boddy M and Fudge C (1984) L o c a / ( L o n d o n :  Macmillan).
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Allan Cochrane to expose the operation of the local govemment ‘machine’ by 
focussing on the key role of a particular local authority officer, the treasurer, in the 
success or failure of attempts to resist pressure from central governments^
Other writers have tried to tie in very directly the changing working practices 
of local authorities to both political conflicts in the local state and more general 
processes of social and economic changeS^ This work has the virtue from my 
point of view of addressing the issue of the ways in which local services are 
actually produced, although, as I have argued elsewhere,^® there are clear dangers 
in drawing too easy analogies between processes of change at the micro- and 
macro-levels.
Another advantage of research which dissects the mechanisms of local 
govemment is that it can clarify in part why local state policy varies from place to 
place. As I shall suggest in more detail in subsequent chapters, understanding the 
geography of trade union responses cannot be separated from the analysis of their 
genesis and effects. A crucial component of that geography is the uneven pattem of 
local policies and local govemment service provision with which the unions 
nationally are faced. The work of Simon Duncan and Mark Goodwin focuses 
specifically on the causes of such variation.^! They argue that policy variation is 
the result of local state institutions interacting with different sets of social processes 
in different places. Furthermore, the fact that social processes are different in 
different places is a consequence of their uneven development through time and
l^Clarke A and Cochrane A (1989) ‘Inside the machine’ Capital and Class 37 pp35-61. 
l^Geddes M (1988) ‘The capitalist state and the local economy: “restructuring for labour” and 
beyond’ Capital and Class 35 pp85-120; Hoggett P 1987 ‘A farewell to mass production? 
Decentralisation as an emergent private and public sector paradigm’ in Hoggett P and Hambleton 
R (eds) Decentralisation and democracy: localising public services (Bristol: School of Advanced 
Urban Studies) pp215-232; Stoker G (1989) ‘Creating a local govemment for a post-Fordist 
society: the Thatcherite project?’ in Stewart J and Stoker G (eds) The future of local government 
(London: Macmillan) ppl41-170.
20painter J (1991) ‘Regulation theory and local government’ Local Government Studies 17:6 (in 
press).
 ^^ Duncan S and Goodwin M (1988) TAg local state and uneven development: behind the local 
government crisis (Cambridge: Polity).
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across space.
While I will not be following their explanatory method precisely, it represents 
an important context for this study since it draws on debates concerning the 
relationship between space, place and social relations. I will have a considerable 
amount to say about these relationships, particularly in Chapter Six below, but it is 
useful here to summarise the academic context of this aspect of my research.
Geography and social change
Among the vast literature in this field I have drawn on a number of specific debates 
which deal with the ways in which the characteristics of particular places are 
produced and the subsequent effects that they have on social life within and beyond 
the local area. In the mid-1980s a major research programme initiated by Doreen 
Massey and funded by the ESRC aimed to examine how and why processes of 
economic restructuring had different outcomes in different places. The process of 
interpreting the empirical results of the Changing Urban and Regional Systems 
(CURS) initiative led to a considerable debate about the role of space and place in 
explanations of social change.22 Although the ‘locality debate’, as it became 
known, failed to produce a consensus on this issue, it is an important context from 
which I will draw and against which I will set my own interpretations of 
geographical variations in trade union policy.
I will suggest, however, that the locality debate (at its present level of 
development and in the specific circumstances of my research) provides only some 
of the resources required for an adequate explanation. Specifically I will argue that 
it does not address an issue of considerable importance in this study, namely the 
links between individual and group actions and the geographical settings in which 
those actions occur .23 I will therefore draw also to a limited extent on the work of
22Although as Massey has pointed out that was not necessarily the intention. Massey D (1991) 
‘The political place of locality studies’ Environment and Planning A 23:2 pp267-281.
^^This is not necessarily a criticism of ‘locality research’, which is usually concerned with a 
slightly different set of issues.
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Anthony Giddens, and in particular on his schematic discussion of the concept of 
Tocale’.^  ^ While I do not consider that Giddens’ concept as currently formulated 
‘solves’ the explanatory problem in this case, its explicit concern with social action 
is useful in considering the mechanisms by which trade union responses are 
developed and implemented at the local level.
Giddens’ arguments may be seen as a version of contextual theory, which 
emphasises the need to understand social processes and social action as situated in 
time and space. This need not mean, however, that political action is place-bound, 
in a negative sense. ‘Geography’ is not necessarily a threat to radical action, on the 
contrary the ‘imagined communities’ of particular places may consist in cultural 
repositories of the sort required to sustain and support progressive action of a 
variety of kinds, including new forms of trade unionism. In Chapter Seven I will 
consider the issues involved by setting the findings of my research against the 
context of David Harvey’s discussions of the production of space and place in his 
analyses of processes of urbanisation in capitalist societies.25
Thus I engage with the relationship between geography and social relations 
through two main sets of writing: those of Giddens and those of Harvey. The use 
of these disparate sources in the elaboration of what I consider to be key aspects of 
my argument runs the risks associated with theoretical eclecticism. However 
although they develop very different arguments they are not, I think, incompatible. 
In the first place I am not simply adding them together in the hope that the whole 
may be greater than the sum of the parts. Rather I wish to mobilise critically 
aspects of these various sources in ways which develop my own argument. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the disputes between them and the authors’ occasional 
denials, all the work I have cited arguably shares a similar methodological and 
epistemological basis in the philosophy of critical realism. Since, as I have already
‘^^ Giddens A (1979) Central problems in social theory (London: Macmillan)
25see, inter alia, Harvey D (1985) The urbanization of capital (Oxford: Blackwell).
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indicated, Sayer’s text on a realist approaches to social science has throughout this 
study guided my attempts to develop explanations, I have few qualms about using 
the works mentioned in this way.
Economic and political restructuring
Many of the recent debates about the links between geography and social relations 
have been initiated through attempts to explain adequately the apparently dramatic 
changes in economic and political relations which have affected all the advanced 
capitalist countries since the late 1960s. These changes include the decline in many 
areas of traditional manufacturing industry, the growth in new places of new 
industries, a shift in employment structure from manufacturing jobs to service jobs, 
a much more internationalised financial and industrial system and in many areas a 
dramatic rightward shift in politics. The interrelatedness, intensity and impact of 
these changes have prompted many writers to suggest that they go beyond the 
normal fluctuations in economic and political activity and should be identified as 
something more fundamental: as ‘structural changes’ or as processes of
‘restructuring’.
In some cases the terms are used in carefully specified contexts and with
considerable rigour, as in the work of Doreen Massey and Richard Meegan on
employment decline as a result of industrial restructuring, or in JH Bradbury’s
critical synthesis.26 More recently their use has been extended to cover the concept
of widespread (and perhaps simultaneous) fundamental changes in a variety of
spheres. Ron Martin writes that
what stands out from the past fifteen years or so is the accelerating pace, profound nature 
and marked shift of direction of change [...] across much of the world economy generally, 
the industrial, socio-political and spatial forms of economic organization that provided the 
basis of post-war development are losing their former role as the leading sources of growth 
and accumulation. Previously dominant industries, technologies, methods of production, 
skills, class divisions, state policies and even institutional arrangements are all in decline, 
and are being superseded by new industries, new technologies, new production methods,
^^Massey D and Meegan R (1982) The anatomy o f job-loss: the how, why and where of 
employment decline (London: Methuen); Bradbury JH (1985) ‘Regional and industrial 
restructuring processes in the new international division of labour’ Progress in Human Geography
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new skills and class divisions, and new policies and institutional configurations. Rather 
than simply marking a temporary inflection of the economic trajectory o f the post-war 
decades, the intense and wide-ranging reorganization since the early 1970s would seem to 
herald a significant break from it.2?
This is, on the face of it, a lot of content for even a relatively long word like 
‘restructuring’. The risk (which Martin avoids) is that using the word will become 
a substitute for careful descriptions and explanations of the changes underway. 
Furthermore, complete explanations of such disparate and sweeping changes are 
probably impossible. Transition models, as Nigel Thrift somewhat acidly remarks, 
‘are back on the agenda [...] but have to be used under strict conditions if they are 
to act as convincing explanatory tools’.28
The concept of restructuring operates in my research on two levels. Firstly, 
and I hope relatively unproblematically, it stands (as in the title of this study) for a 
number of specified changes underway in the provision of local government 
services. Foremost among these are privatisation, work reorganisation and the 
introduction of elements of market competition. Secondly, it refers to aspects of 
wider processes of economic and political change which have led, I will argue, to 
the introduction of these changes into local govemment and indeed into the public 
services more generally. It is here that care is particularly required and where 
Thrift’s injunction must be taken seriously.
As the research progressed I considered, adopted, modified and sometimes 
abandoned ideas from a number of accounts of ‘stmctural change’. Among these 
were the the work of Scott Lash and John Urry on ‘disorganised capitalism’, Claus 
Offe on the crisis of the welfare state, Harvey on ‘flexible accumulation’ and 
Jürgen Habermas on legitimation cr ise s .29 This initial survey of the literature
9:lpp38-63.
27&^tin R (1988) ‘Industrial capitalism in transition: the contemporary reorganization of the 
British space-economy’ in Massey D and Alien J (eds) Uneven re-development: cities and regions 
in transition (London: Hodder and Stoughton) p203.
28Thrift NJ (1989) ‘New times and new spaces? The perils of transition models.’ Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 7:2 ppl27-8.
^^Lash and Urry op. cit.’, Offe C (1984) Contradictions of the welfare state (London: Hutchinson); 
Offe C (1985) Disorganised capitalism  (Cambridge: Polity); Harvey D (1987) ‘Flexible
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convinced me that any account of the impact of structural change on the trade 
unions needed to emphasise the role of the state, partly because, at least in Britain, 
the relationship between organised labour and the state has been so influential in 
determining the character of trade unionism, and partly because a large and very 
significant proportion of trade unionists work in the public sector. The critical 
theory of Offe and Habermas undoubtedly presented the most rigorous account of 
the restructuring of the state, and yet there seemed to be only limited room in their 
theories for trade union struggle (or indeed social struggle of any kind), and I 
remained unconvinced by the tightness of the links they drew between shifts in the 
state and shifts in the nature of capital accumulation. I wanted a set of theoretical 
tools which opened up a space for both autonomous struggle and autonomous 
politics.
I was therefore attracted by the work of the regulation theorists. While one of 
their key texts claims that a separate theory of state was not appropriate within 
regulation theory,^0 other writers in the regulation school have prioritised the 
analysis of the state in their work. In particular Bob Jessop has been developing a 
regulation approach to the state (on which I have drawn freely) with the added 
virtue, from my perspective, of relating this to debates over the nature of 
‘Thatcherism’ whose role I discuss at some length in Chapter Three.
• Insofar as this study has a unifying theoretical perspective, therefore, it is 
provided by regulation theory. However, my earlier comments concerning the 
potential benefits of eclecticism apply here too and my intention in tailoring this 
account of the research is that regulation theory should act as a guiding thread, 
rather than a complete pattem.
accumulation through urbanization: reflections on ‘post-modernism’ in the American city’ 
Antipode 19:3 pp260-86; Habermas J (1976, German edition 1973) Legitimation crisis (London: 
Heinemann).
^^Aglietta M (1979, French edition 1976) A theory of capitalist regulation: the US experience 
(London: Verso) p28.
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Political
The academic literature represents one context. It partly clarifies why my 
arguments have evolved in the way that they have, and how I see my research 
relating to other work in the field. But it is only part of the story. Just as important 
is the political context of the research. In many respects, as I shall explain in the 
next section, it was the political context which prompted the research in the first 
place.
The political context is of two sorts. Firstly there is the political situation 
within which the empirical work was carried out, and which it seeks in part to 
analyse. Thus the political challenges of ‘Thatcherism’ to local govemment and 
trade unionism and the restmcturing of local govemment service provision are the 
political context for the responses trade unions have made. They are the changes to 
which trade unions have been responding. As I have suggested this means that 
sometimes they are part of the focus of the research itself, sometimes they form part 
of the explanations I advance and sometimes they ‘set the scene’ for trade union 
activity in the local area. These issues will emerge in the course of my account and 
are not particularly controversial.
More significant for the present discussion are the political conflicts and 
debates to which I hope this study is a contribution. Most important of these is the 
conflict over the future of trade unionism, and especially the tendency to see trade 
unions as archaic organisations of no relevance to modem, post-Thatcher Britain. 
This is an ideological stmggle in which the decline in trade union membership and 
influence is not at issue, but the interpretation of that decline most certainly is. The 
power of particular representations of trade unionism can best be illustrated with an 
example from the literature of the left.
Trade unionism has occupied a central place in the political, economic and 
cultural landscape of late capitalist Britain. Yet the iconography which informs 
interpretations of that landscape appears strangely dated. For much of the 1980s
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we have been presented with pictures of a trade unionism irrevocably wedded to the 
past, grounded in an economic system fast disappearing beneath it and vacuously 
casting around its out-moded conceptual frameworks in a forlorn attempt to come to 
terms with a society which has no need for trade unions because it has no need for 
the industries which brought them forth.
Plate 1.1 The complete trade unionist
The compiefe trade unionist
A New Internationalist guide to the equipment that every 
trade unionist should have.
STRIKE/STOPPAGE/SIT-IN
A m ulti p u rpose  tool w ith 
in te rch an g eab le  a ttachm en ts .
V e r /  ad ap tab le  bu t n e e d s  
reliab le p o w er supply  to  operate.
OVERTIME BAN
A ligh tw eigh t tool 
w h ich  h as  irritant effect)
BLACKING GOODS
C utting  Off supp ly  of 
vital g o o d s 'to  factories 
c a n  cripp le  produc tion
PICKETING
D elivers a telling 
b lo w  in the h an d s  
of th e  skilled 
w orker. S o  feared  
by em ployers 
an d  governm en ts .
INTERNATIONAL 
U NK S
U sed  to  ad ju s t nu ts  
an d  b o lts  o n  th e  
g loba l a ssem b ly  line. 
W orkers  n e e d  efficient 
in te rna tiona l m ech an isn  
w h e n  d ea ling  w ith 
m ultinationals.
CLOSED SHOP
E ssential for survival on  d a n g e ro u s  w orking 
sites. H-n-ing nil w orkers covered  by the 
urvo*« p ro tec ts  un ion  leaders  from nasty  flying 
o b jec ts  like v ictim isation by hostile  em ployers. 
It a lso  le inforcos w orker solidarity and  
m ain tains union bargain ing  pow er. C onvenien t 
for many em ployers b ec a u se  un ion discip line 
en su re s  o bservance  of ag reem en ts .
HEALTH AND SAFETY 
PROTECTION
R eg ub tions a n d  spec ia l cnu rpm en i arc 
n eed ed  on  potentially  u nhea lthy  or 
dangerous work s i te s  Enforced by union 
-appo in ted  H ealth  and  Safety  Officer.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
This covers th e  w ho le  body  of 
w orkers in te rests  -  a series 
of n eg o tia tio n s tha t w eaves 
to g e th e r everything from 
w orking hours to  sick  pay 
into a  to u y b  du rab le  fabric.
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
U nion  funds an d  v o te s  a re  u sed  
to  g e t a  g rip  o n  political parties. 
Very im portan t b e c a u se  labour 
law s and  g o v e rn m e n t econom ic  
po lic ies  can  a lso  c ram p w orkers ' 
asp ira tions.
INFORMATION
To p lan ah ead  rather than  ju st re sp o n d  
to  m an ag em en t decisions, un ions 
n eed  inform ation such  a s  com pany  
profits, w ag e  levels, investm en t 
and  production  plans.
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The stereotype is familiar: cloth-capped, male trade unionists working in 
manual occupations in large-scale, Northern, manufacturing-based industries and 
orchestrating a universal labourist politics in smoke-filled rooms. I believe it is 
doubtful whether this representation was ever in close correspondence with the 
material practices and self-understandings of the women and men who joined trade 
unions in the 1950s and 1960s. A fortiori, its reproduction, unchanged, during 
the 1970s and 1980s entirely divorced it from those practices and understandings. 
None of this, however, is to deny such imagery’s undoubtedly powerful effects.
It is frequently difficult to clarify the nature of the relationships between (to 
adopt Giddens’ terminology) structures and processes of signification on the one 
hand and those of domination and legitimation on the other. However, this should 
not tempt us to assume that images and representations are in some sense entirely 
free-floating and not constituted by, and/or constitutive of, relations of power and 
sanction. On the contrary, it is clear that the representation of trade unionism as 
relict involved a (sometimes deliberate) attempt to bring into question the legitimacy 
of trade unionism in general and of its hard won, if limited, powers in particular. 
In other words, particular images of trade unionism (including the ones developed 
in this study) are simultaneously the objects of conflicts over the meaning of trade 
unionism and the means of conflicts over the power and legitimacy of trade 
unionism.
There are countless examples of the use of particular representations to 
further anti-union interests. Mainstream press reporting of the trade union 
movement in Britain is littered with the metaphors of irrelevance: the ‘pre-historic’, 
the ‘antediluvian’, trade unions as ‘dinosaurs’, the Trades Union Congress as a 
‘carthorse’, leaders as ‘barons’. However, there is no necessary relationship 
between the interests of particular producers of symbols and the types of symbols 
they adopt. In other words, once established, images are autonomous and 
consequently can be constitutive of (and not just constituted by) specific power
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relations. An example will show how this can occur. In 1982 the radical left 
magazine New Internationalist published an issue on global trade unionism. This 
aimed, among other things, to present an account of trade unionism which gave due 
weight to involvement in trade unions by those in service and white-collar 
occupations, by women, by black people and by workers in colonised countries.
Notwithstanding this commitment, when the magazine tried to characterise in 
cartoon form the ‘complete trade unionist’ (complete in terms of the powers it felt a 
trade unionist should have) it presented an image which reproduced precisely the 
stereotype of a white, male, manual worker^i (Plate I.l). This suggests that the 
dominant representation of trade unionists (which casts them as products of, and 
only relevant to, a bygone age) has gained such iconic power that even this attempt 
to contest it ends up reproducing it as, of all things, ‘complete’. In this way the 
image becomes constitutive of power relations by legitimising particular interests 
(namely white, male, manual workers in trade unions and those seeking to portray 
trade unions as outmoded).
The ossification of the dominant representation of trade unionism, while 
serving certain interests is not the same thing as the ossification of either the 
institutional structures and practices of trade unionism, or the practices of trade 
unionists themseives.32 In this political context, therefore, a key assumption of 
this study is that the reproduction and transformation of trade unionism over time 
should be an object of empirical enquiiy, whose character cannot be read off from 
politically dominant accounts of the nature of trade unionism. As I will show, the 
trade unions and trade unionists I studied have responded to economic, political and 
cultural change thereby contributing to the active transformation of trade unionism 
in Britain.
'^^New Internationalist November 1982, p23. The cartoon is reproduced here by kind permission 
o i New Internationalist and the artist, Clive Offley.
^^Which is not to say that our knowledge of those structures and practices is unmediated by acts 
of representation.
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Purpose
Politics in research
It is from this political context that the aims of my research derive. These aims are 
themselves explicitly political. The heady days in which academics fondly believed 
that their writings could change the world may have passed, but writing is still a 
political act. It is political both because its subject matter is people and the power 
relations between them, and it is political because it is itself implicated in sets of 
power relations of which it may be only partially aware and over which it can only 
have partial control. To write about the lives of others is to engage in political 
activity.
My concern is that the politics of my writing should be as far as possible 
explicit, self-reflective and self-critical. A central part of this involves specifying 
the political purpose of the research. There are two main aims.
The narrow purpose
The ‘narrow’ aim is to provide some limited resources for the trade unionists in 
public services who are trying under very difficult conditions to develop a form of 
trade unionism relevant to the present and capable of providing radical responses to 
the challenges it faces. I hope that a sympathetic account of the progress of some 
of these struggles will be of use to other trade unionists facing similar problems in 
other areas.
This aim will not, unfortunately, be fulfilled by this text.^^ Having produced 
this ‘academic’ account my intention is to write others whose style and content is 
such that they are easily accessible by the people they are about. "^^
^^This is so because a more immediate (and still narrower) aim is the production of a doctoral 
thesis. Regrettably I do not feel I have the skills required to meet the requirements of both lay 
accessibility and academic credibility in one document.
^^An initial attempt, which goes some way to meeting the requirements, is provided by: Painter J 
(1990) ‘Seconds out, round two: the first round o f compulsory competitive tendering’ CLES 
Research Study Series 6 (Manchester: Centre for Local Economic Strategies).
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The broader purpose
A broader aim is to challenge the dominant representation of trade unionism as 
relict, which I discussed above, through the development of an alternative account. 
This aim is, I think, at least partly fulfilled in this text which consists of a set of 
narratives and theoretical exegeses which form one analysis of the character and 
causes of aspects of the changing nature of trade unionism. Other analyses could 
also have been written using the same material and this account does not claim in 
any sense to be definitive. On the contrary, the impossibility of producing a 
‘definitive’ account is testament to the creative, as well as the political, nature of 
research and writing.
Practice
That creativity does not, however, imply a licence to conduct the research process 
any old how. Qualitative and theoretical research, on which I rely heavily, can be 
practised with as much rigour as statistical analyses. Moreover theoretical and 
empirical research cannot be divorced firom each other.
The substantive material presented in the following chapters consists of 
accounts of the development of trade union policies and practices in response to 
political and economic change within a given field, that of local government 
services. My approach in constructing these accounts is informed by the realist 
philosophy of science elaborated by Sayer and others.35 Thus I aim to explain 
change by identifying the causal mechanisms and processes which generate it, but 
the nature of those processes is not immediately apparent in the events they 
generate. This has two consequences. Firstly there is no simple division between 
‘the theoretical’ and ‘the empirical’. All empirical data or evidence is theory-laden. 
Secondly, analysis has to proceed through a continual movement between the 
abstract and the concrete. Abstraction involves distinguishing between the essential
Sayer op. cit.
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properties and relations of objects and those which are incidental and contingent. 
This enables the operation of causal processes to be identified. However in order 
to explain concrete phenomena it is necessary to consider the ways in which 
characteristics which are only contingently related interact. Consider, for example, 
the case of a shop steward who is also a man. Through a process of abstraction we 
might identify one set of causal processes associated with being gendered 
masculine in a society where gender is a major social division and source of 
inequality and another set associated with being the lay representative of workers in 
a capitalist system. The two sets are contingently (and not necessarily) related, but 
that conclusion can only be drawn as the result of a process of abstraction. By 
contrast, if we want to consider the activities of the concrete individual we must 
identify what the effects of the combination of contingently-related characteristics 
are.
That is not to say, however, that the process of abstraction and the movement 
between the abstract and the concrete are mechanical processes. On the contrary, 
theorisation and explanation are creative, and hence the accounts produced by 
realist methods are fallible. All knowledge is to some extent partial, provisional 
and open to revision in the light of further research and theoretical development. 
Realism does not legislate for a set of standard procedures which can be applied 
universally and replicated at will. The study which follows, therefore, develops an 
argument which interweaves more abstract accounts of political and economic 
change and time-space relations with analysis of concrete organisations and places.
The material consists of elements from a variety of ‘textual’ sources. These 
include: press cuttings; broadcasts; trade union, local authority, government and 
other publications; the transcripts of interviews I conducted with key actors; 
existing ‘academic’ accounts in books and journals; maps; trade union, local 
authority and government statistics and reports; conversations with other 
researchers; and my own working papers and notes. In general terms this applies
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to the theoretical exegeses as much as to the narrative accounts of trade union 
action.
This description of my sources is based on a rejection of a clear distinction 
between what are conventionally labelled ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. 
However there is a distinction to be made between those sources which are in the 
public domain, (and which readers of this study can in principle consult for 
themselves in assessing my arguments) and those to which for various reasons 
only I have access. The former are listed in the bibliography. In the case of the 
latter my account must be taken on trust. In order to justify that trust, I will briefly 
discuss how these ‘private texts’ were constructed.
They mostly take the form of interviews with different individuals and may 
be divided into two groups. Firstly, eleven interviews were conducted with key 
informants at the ‘national level’. These included the national officers and research 
officers of public service trade unions and employees of local authority 
associations. The objects of these interviews were twofold. On the one hand, they 
provided information relating to the development of trade union policies at the 
national level. On the other, they were the source of suggestions concerning which 
local authorities would make appropriate case studies through which to investigate 
local variations in trade union responses. Secondly, once local case studies had 
been selected, interviews were conducted with between ten and twenty key 
informants in each area.^^
The ‘key informant’ status of local interviewees was established by 
consulting national and regional union officers. They were able to recommend 
which individuals in each place were most suitable for the purposes of this 
research. Further individuals were selected for interview when the research was in 
progress as necessary. The number of interviews conducted was determined by the 
principle of duplication: as the number of interviews undertaken in a place
^^The procedures used in selecting the case study areas are outlined in Chapter Six.
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increased, the proportion of each interview which provided new information 
decreased. After a certain point the returns were diminishing so fast that it was felt 
unnecessary to continue with further interviews. This principle works well in the 
case of information which is relatively widely known and relatively uncontentious. 
Where information is the subject of controversy, or only known by a small 
proportion of interviewees, then it is much more difficult to corroborate. In these 
cases a judgement had to be made as to how such information should be used, if at 
all.
The format of the interviews varied slightly depending on circumstances. 
Most were semi-structured, intensive interviews conducted with one individual 
alone, were taped-recorded with the interviewee’s permission and lasted for about 
one hour. The way in which I conducted each interview was guided by an outline 
‘interview schedule’ which provided the basis for the direction of questioning. In a 
few cases more than one interviewee was involved, and occasionally the discussion 
was recorded as written notes, rather than on tape. The product of most of the 
interviews was a typewritten transcript of the conversation. A small number of 
interviewees asked that the transcript be sent to them for approval before it was 
used in the study, and this was done when requested. All the interviewees were 
guaranteed anonymity, whether it was explicitly requested or not.
Taken together, the interview transcripts and notes, and the various other 
textual sources (reports, cuttings, articles, policy documents etc) provided a welter 
of evidence of the actions taken by unions, their officers and members and of the 
causes and consequences of those actions. In particular I was concerned to identify 
the nature of the responses made by unions to the changes in local government 
service production and the reasons why those responses were generated, rather 
than others. I also sought to discover the relationship if any between the 
responses, and the space-time contexts in which they were developed. As I have 
suggested, none of this can be done in a theoretical vacuum and the account
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constructed here advances its arguments by linking theoretical and empirical 
materials together.
Plan
I intend to develop the empirical and theoretical accounts in tandem through the 
subsequent chapters as follows. In C hapter One I focus on the causes and 
consequences of changing trade union membership levels during the 1980s: a 
subject of much controversy. Existing debates on this issue do not by and large 
consider in any detail changes in the practices of trade unionism in response to the 
shifts identified. It was this gap which provides part of the impulse for my 
research. In addition there has recently been a gradual increase in interest in the 
geographical aspects of the labour movement. As I shall argue in later chapters, 
‘geography’ is by no means merely a passive outcome of processes of change in 
the structure and practices of trade unionism, rather ‘space’ and ‘place’ are actively 
involved in the developments. In the second part of Chapter One I chart the growth 
in this interest in the geography of trade unionism with a view to contributing to it 
through the arguments put forward in the remainder of the study.
In Chapter Two, I provide an account of the development of public service 
trade unionism in the late 1960s and 1970s. I suggest that the strong growth of 
public service trade unionism in this period was related both to the growth of the 
public services sector and increasingly to the emergence of a crisis in that sector. 
Furthermore, there was a close interrelation between the development of the crisis 
and the specific nature of the trade union practices associated with it. Finally, the 
crisis in the public services was itself interrelated with wider processes of change in 
processes of capital accumulation and state formation, which may be referred to, 
following the regulation school as the ‘crisis of Fordism’.
Moving into the 1980s, C hapter Three considers how a specific set of 
political interventions associated with the Thatcher governments can be seen as 
constituting a relatively coherent attempt to resolve the crisis of Fordism through
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the establishment of the conditions for a new phase of capital accumulation. Such a 
resolution would, if successful, have profound implications for the public services 
sector. However, any transition to a new ‘post-Fordist mode of regulation’ will 
develop unevenly in time and space, and be subject to phases of experimentation 
and set-backs, though these will not necessarily be seen as such by the agents 
involved.
Local government services is one area where experimentation with new forms 
has been important, both because its relative autonomy from central government 
provides the opportunity for alternatives to be developed by local councillors with 
more radical political views than their national counterparts and because local 
government services were specifically targeted as part of the Thatcherite project. 
Chapter Four considers the development of trade union responses to one such 
local experiment, in Wandsworth, south London, where the local council embarked 
on a widespread programme of service privatisation. I argue that the events of 
Wandsworth suggest that the unions increasingly found the forms of struggle 
inherited from the 1970s inadequate and began to develop new structures and 
practices in response. Events, however, moved on, and the Government was by 
now drawing on isolated local experiences and ‘experiments’ in developing national 
policies towards local government. These policies were embodied in a series of 
radical legislative measures during the mid- to late-1980s, among which were 
provisions to force local councils to put the production of many services out to 
competitive tender to the private sector.
The unions also perceived the need to generalise from their local experiences 
and drawing on these and the innovative work of the labour movement research 
organisation, SCAT, trade union policies towards public service privatisation were 
drawn up which departed markedly from the strategies adopted in the previous 
decade. Chapter Five discusses the development of these policies.
However the success of the formal national union policies depends on their
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implementation in particular places by local trade union organisations. The local 
responses therefore heavily influence the extent to which the unions at the national 
level succeed in their aims. As has been noted above, the trade union movement is 
geographically diverse, and the development of local responses owes much to the 
geographical contexts in which it occurs. In Chapter Six I present some of the 
main empirical material of the research: the evidence from case studies of local trade 
union responses. After a discussion of the case study method, which I relate to 
Sayer’s realism, I outline my reading of Giddens concept of ‘locale’ and explain 
how I mobilise the idea in analysing local trade union activity. I then discuss the 
case studies in detail showing in each case how an understanding of the institutional 
contexts of trade union action is crucial to its explanation.
In C hapter Seven I build on these arguments to consider what might be 
involved in the elaboration of a theoretical account of local trade union action and its 
broader geography in specifically capitalist societies through an analysis of the 
work of Harvey. I conclude that while Harvey’s ideas are illuminating, his 
approach is ultimately unable to grasp the significance of local struggles because he 
adopts an unnecessarily restricted concept of ‘place’.
Finally, in C hapter Eight, I consider the implications of the substantive 
research for the regulationist account of the crisis of Fordism and its potential 
resolution. I focus particularly on the role of struggle and creative response by the 
trade unions in producing an uneven and contested transition and of the geography 
of that trade unionism in determining the character of any ‘post-Fordist mode’ of 
regulation.
1 British trade unionism in the 
1980s
Decline and debate
The parameters of decline
In 1978 the distinguished Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm, wondered aloud 
whether we had seen the forward march of labour halted. ^  The following decade 
saw much evidence (and most commentators) marshalled in support of this thesis. 
The breadth of the consensus was remarkable. It ranged from those on the right 
who had never had any sympathy for the labour movement or its aims to some 
sections of the left for whom the 1980s had seen the unions in, as Philip Bassett 
put it, ‘a decade-long freefall into national powerlessness and irrelevance’.^
Figure 1.1: Aggregate union membership, all UK trade unions
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^Hobsbawm E (1981) ‘The forward march of labour halted?’ in Jacques M and Mulhem F (eds) 
The forward march of labour halted (London: Verso) ppl-19.
^Bassett P (1989) ‘All together now?’ Marxism Today January pp44-7, ref: p44.
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A whole variety of indicators was advanced in defence of this sort of 
argument. After years of steady increases, aggregate union membership figures fell 
dramatically during the early part of the decade and have continued to decline more 
slowly since (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.2: Union density, UK^
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Absolute statistics like these, while suggestive, can only provide the 
broadest brush account of trade unions’ changing fortunes. It is also necessary to 
consider the relationship between trade union membership and the workforce as a 
whole. ‘Union density’ is a measure of the proportion of workers who are 
members of a union. Different definitions of density may be adopted depending on
^Union density ‘including unemployed’ was calculated by dividing the figure for total trade union 
membership by the number of people in the total workforce excluding self-employed and HM 
forces. Union density ‘excluding unemployed’ was calculated by dividing the membership figure 
by the total workforce excluding self-employed, HM forces and unemployed.
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whether or not the unemployed are included in the count. Figure 1.2 shows the 
change in membership density calculated on two different bases for the ten-year 
period 1978-87.
The large rise in unemployment associated with the economic recession of the 
early 1980s partially accounts for this pattern. Only a very small proportion of 
unemployed workers remains in trade union membership. Therefore, if the 
unemployed are included in the count a rise in unemployment will tend to generate a 
fall in union density. Of more significance is the steady decrease in density among 
workers remaining in employment. It was evidence of this sort which prompted 
some commentators to talk of a ‘crisis’ of trade unionism.^
Figure 1.3: Mean annual number of days lost
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Membership is not the only indicator of the status of trade unionism. Figure
^See for example Towers B (1987) ‘After Blackpool: the wider questions’ Industrial Relations 
Journal pp239-243.
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1.3 shows the trend in the number of days lost in industrial stoppages between 
1968 and 1988, averaged over five-year periods. The significance of these data is 
unclear. A high strike rate may signify a vigorous labour movement, but equally a 
low one may reflect a situation where trade unions can achieve their objectives 
without going on strike. An extended dispute, such as the coalminers’ strike of 
1984-5, may lead ultimately to defeat and a loss of influence. However, bearing in 
mind these caveats. Figure 1.3 does seem to suggest that the 1980s have seen a 
gradual decline in industrial militancy. When the influence of the 1984-5 pit strike 
disappears from the averages the annual mean is likely to fall sharply to below 200 
days lost per thousand employees. However it would clearly be mistaken to 
suggest that the 1980s had been a quiescent decade. If the unions were in a ‘free- 
fall into [...] irrelevance’ in this period, they were hardly going without a fight.
The parameters of debate
Though ambiguous, these various statistics constitute a prima facie case for trade 
union decline during the 1980s. However they can say nothing about the causes of 
decline, or its longer-term implications. Assessing these involves considering the 
social processes whose operation has an impact on trade union organisation and 
influence. Trade unions have always had to respond to changing circumstances. 
What seems to have prompted the gloomy assessments of the future prospects for 
trade unions is the perception that the current changes are of a peculiarly 
fundamental and far-reaching nature.
There are thus two crucial issues to consider. Firstly, do current processes of 
economic and political change constitute in some sense a sea change? Secondly, if 
they do, do they necessarily have the sort of dire implications for trade unions 
predicted by Bassett and others? For example, Bassett argues that the growing 
non-union section of the workforce can in principle be brought into membership.^
^Bassett (1989) op.cit.
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He even goes as far as to accept that the so-called ‘business unionism’ of the
EETPU is not the only feasible type of response. Yet the response he does
advocate (which is based on an individualist approach to membership recruitment
and the provision of members’ services such as credit cards) is not only entirely
apolitical, but does not follow logically from his own assessment of the unions’
current plight. Through my use of regulation theory I will consider the issues of
crisis and structural change in more detail in succeeding chapters, but it will be
useful here to set the terms of the debate through a comparison of the positions of
Bassett and John Kelly.^
Bassett argues that long terms shifts in the nature of industry, work and the
composition of the working class have contributed to the decline in trade union
strength in the 1980s. He charts the growth of non-unionism and argues that
particular problems are created for the unions by the fact that the factors which are
disproportionately associated with it are increasing:
non-unionism [...] tends to be associated with the following characteristics: smaller 
organisations; smaller establishments within those organisations; relatively high 
proportions of women workers; relatively small proportions of manual workers; southern 
areas of the country; newer establishments; and high-technology industry. For British 
unions, the worrying thing about this list is its underlying link: that all these
characteristics are now associated with growth in the economy. In every case, the 
characteristic with which non-unionism is associated is on the increase. [...] What all this 
seems to indicate is that the union base is dwindling: fewer and fewer people are in trade 
unions, more and more are not.^
Moreover, according to Bassett, even among union members, the changing 
composition of the working class has had a dramatic effect:
Though the level of trade union membership is roughly back now to what it was more than 
a decade ago, within that overall level the social and occupational mix of the workforce and 
of trade unions has changed radically: more white-collar workers, fewer blue-collar; more 
union members in national and local government, fewer in traditional heavy industries; 
more women, fewer men; more home owners, fewer council tenants.^
That these changes are occurring is widely acknowledged (Massey, for
^Bassett P (1986) Strike free: new industrial relations in Britain (London: Macmillan); Bassett 
(1989) op. cit.; Kelly J (1988) Trade unions and socialist politics (London: Verso).
^Bassett (1989) op.cit. pp46-7.
^Bassett ^986) op. cit. p35.
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example, makes similar points^). Where Bassett’s account becomes problematic is 
in his attempt to read off from such social recomposition implications for industrial 
relations:
[...] the changes in the working class [...] may well imply the fashioning o f a new, 
different form of employee —  with different material values, different attitudes, different 
ambitions, different ideological views. Translated into the world of work, these changes 
indicate a more flexible, more consensual approach. Among the industrial changes which 
these new attitudes have wrought against an almost wholly altered economic background, 
few have probably been so far-reaching as those which have swept through the employees’ 
representative organisations —  the trade unions.^®
This claim is in dramatic contrast with a number of surveys of workplace 
industrial relations which have emphasised the remarkable degree of continuity in 
the practices of trade unionism during the period of membership decline. Moreover 
the statement itself appears to be dL non sequitur. If, as Bassett himself suggests, 
the working class is continually refashioning itself,ii then it is a mistake to assume 
any essential relationship between the changing composition of the working class 
and its political views or industrial relations practices. There is no necessary reason 
why a service sector-based, female-dominated trade union movement should not be 
as radical and as solidaristic (albeit, perhaps in different ways) as the heavy 
engineering workers and coalminers were in the past.
The substance of Bassett’s argument is that in Britain previously dominant 
sectors, workforces, and forms of work organisation are in decline, both 
numerically and in terms of their structural importance. Growth in the economy 
today is based on high-technology manufacturing, private sector service industries, 
small companies and establishments (especially in the south of England), part-time 
work and a relatively high proportion of women in the workforce. There is truth in 
this description of the way the economy is moving, and it is also true, as Bassett 
points out, that these characteristics have in the past been associated with high
^Massey D (1984) Spatial divisions of labour: social structures and the geography of production 
(London: Macmillan) pp291-3.
^^Bassett (1986) op.cit. p40.
^hbid. p31.
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levels of non-unionism.
I disagree, however, with his implicit assumption that there is any necessary
relationship between working part-time, being employed in the service sector or
being a woman and not joining a trade union. Bassett writes:
[...] unions have had to look for support to women, to part-time workers, to employees in 
the service sector —  groups which don’t have much of a history of or tendency towards 
trade unionism.l^
There may be little history of unionism in private sector services, but the 
same cannot be said of the public sector, so employment in services as such is no 
bar to trade unionism. Research by John Maclnnes suggests that part-time workers 
are no less ready to join trade unions than their full time counterparts,^^ while the 
idea that women ‘don’t have much history of, or tendency towards trade unionism’ 
is as offensive as it is inaccurate. Consider the Grunwick strikers in the 1970s, the 
hospital domestics in Cambridge, the involvement of women in the defence of 
mining communities during the pit strike and since, and the recent nurses’ action 
over health service regrading. Clearly there are important difficulties in recruiting 
in industries, workforces and regions with limited traditions of trade union activity, 
but that has always been true. It was widely held during the 1930s that unions 
would find it impossible to recruit car workers, yet thirty years later car workers 
formed the backbone of the union movement.
Thus Bassett’s view of modern trade unionism is curiously static and 
ahistorical. He equates ‘full trade unionism’ with the forms and structures of trade 
unionism associated with large scale manufacturing in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
implies that since those forms and structures may no longer be appropriate the 
unions will have to learn to live with less-than-full-trade-unionism. But that ‘full 
trade unionism’ was a product of social practice and struggle often in the teeth of 
employer hostility, and in the same way a new trade unionism can be developed
l^Bassett (1989) op. cit. p44. 
^^Financial Times, 6 December 1988.
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which is appropriate to the needs of workers in ‘new times’.
To some extent this is recognised by Bassett, indeed the end of his Marxism 
Today article is given over to outlining a new model unionism. Unfortunately his 
suggestions reflect the inadequacies of his earlier analysis. For Bassett, non­
unionism is to be tackled through a combination of an individualist attitude to 
recruitment and the provision of services to members, perhaps using associate and 
family membership categories. This sort of approach is required, according to 
Bassett, because the traditional benefits associated with trade unionism are either no 
longer attractive, or else can no longer be provided. In the past, so the argument 
goes, membership of a trade union brought higher wages, better conditions, and 
protection against employers’ injustices. Today the average wage of union 
members in Britain is ‘only’ 10% higher than that of n o n -m em b ers , and this, 
according to Bassett is inadequate to encourage people to join unions. 
Furthermore, the benefits of trade union membership are the result of collective 
bargaining which in turn depends on union recognition. Today, Bassett suggests, 
employers see no advantage in recognising unions, and there is thus no incentive 
for their workers to join. As a result, unions must offer their potential members 
financial services and associate membership schemes to tempt them.
Yet this was not how recognition was gained in the first place. In those 
industries where unions are recognised for bargaining, recognition was not handed 
down from heaven; it had to be fought for and won. Certainly in later years (until 
Thatcher repealed them) there were laws providing for the statutory recognition of 
trade unions, but those laws in turn were the fruits of union campaigns and 
struggle. Bassett’s view of the unions is dominated by the demands and initiatives 
of employers: unions must be individualist because employers are, unions must 
offer financial services because the employers’ refusal to recognise them leaves 
them powerless to do anything more, IBM and MacDonald’s are non-union
l^Bassett (1989) op. pp46.
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companies because these employers ‘see no need for unions in their business’. 
This is ‘business unionism’ with a vengeance.
Underlying Bassett’s whole argument is a conception of union relevance 
based solely on the numbers of union members. Membership decline is clearly 
important, and the considerable reductions in membership suffered by trade unions 
over the last few years have been seriously damaging. However two things follow 
from this. First, the causes of that decline must be accurately understood. Most of 
the decline can be accounted for by unemployment. Job-loss in the recent recession 
was disproportionately concentrated in the sectors and regions where unions were 
strongest. (Though this does not mean that unions cause unemployment. The 
causal connection between unionisation and lower productivity, identified by David 
Metcalf has been challenged by Peter Nolan and Paul Marginson.i^) In so far as 
jobs have been created they have been in the sectors and regions with limited 
traditions of trade unionism. This is a reflection of the changing structure of the 
economy and does not necessarily reflect any decline in the legitimacy of trade 
unionism.
Second, the unions must not be panicked into thinking that their future 
success should be measured simply by the number of members they recruit. 
Membership growth may be a necessary condition for the success of trade unions, 
but it is far from a sufficient one. True relevance consists in protecting and 
empowering the powerless and the marginalised, and it is here, rather than in the 
provision of mortgages and cheap pensions that the future of British trade unionism 
should lie. Bassett identifies a number of the characteristics associated with the 
growth of the British economy, but he does not identify them all. A fuller list 
would include: continuing high levels of unemployment; low wages and poor 
conditions for those employed in many private sector services especially hotels, 
catering, and cleaning; the de-unionisation of council workforces as their jobs are
^^Financial Times, 19 December 1988.
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put out to tender; the decline in standards of health and safety at work; and the 
relatively longer hours worked by British workers compared with those of 
competitor nations. All these are issues of traditional importance for the unions, 
albeit in new forms, and all are problems which have worsened as non-unionism 
has grown.
Whatever the specific merits, or problems of Bassett’s arguments, they are 
predicated on the existence of a sea change in the fortunes of trade unions during 
the 1980s. For Bassett the downward turn in union membership levels really did 
represent the halting of the forward march of labour. In this view things will never 
be the same again.
By contrast, Kelly argues that current economic developments are essentially 
cyclical in character and that the fortune of the trade unions will revive when these 
cyclical trends reverse:
Those who believe in a crisis of the labour movement have made a series of analytical 
errors. They have mistaken short-term cyclical trends, such as the decline in union 
membership, strike frequency and bargaining power, for long-term, secular trends. All 
previous evidence suggests that these three indicators will rise again as the economy moves 
out of recession, and those who thmk otherwise have provided no convincing grounds for 
their beliefs.l6
Kelly cites evidence from past periods of recession in Britain and 
comparisons with other countries in support of his case. He argues that past 
recessions have seen greater temporary declines in union membership and density 
than has the latest one, without affecting the long-term strength of the union 
movement. In addition the evidence from other countries suggests that there has 
not been a generalised collapse of trade union density in advanced capitalist 
countries and some countries have actually seen an increase in density between 
1979 and 1985.1'^ He also points out that trade union finances have remained 
sound, that wage rates and earnings have not been systematically eroded and that
l^Kelly op. cit. p289. 
p269.
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the popularity of trade unions in public opinion polls has increased in the Thatcher 
years.
Like Bassett, Kelly addresses the issues raised for the trade unions by
changes in the composition of the working class. He does this through a
consideration of Lash and Urry’s concept of the contemporary ‘disorganisation’ of
capitalism.!^ Lash and Urry argue, according to Kelly’s summary, that:
The labour movement under disorganised capitalism still exists and still engages in 
conflict, but compared with the past it will be more fragmented and divided, because of the 
increased heterogeneity of the organised working class. Its capacity to develop and sustain 
class consciousness, and to pursue class as opposed to merely sectional interests, will 
henceforth decline.!^
The increased fragmentation and heterogeneity identified by Lash and Urry
stems, according to Kelly from four main trends. First, the industrial working
class is declining as a proportion of the workforce, while the main area of
expansion is the poorly-unionised private services sector. Second, the average size
of manufacturing establishments has declined and third, these establishments are
becoming concentrated in small towns and rural areas. Fourth, there is a growing
division in the workforce between a relatively well-paid and securely-employed
‘core’, and a less secure, poorly-paid ‘periphery’. This is to some extent
associated with the growth of part-time and temporary employment
Kelly does not dispute the existence of these trends, but argues that they are
temporary phenomena associated with recession:
The End of Organised Capitalism rightly points to a series of transformations in capital, 
labour and the State that have gathered pace since the 1970s, and the existence of many of 
the trends it identifies is beyond dispute. But the argument also implies, quite wrongly, 
that these trends are secular: they are not short-term products o f recession that will be 
reversed once an economic recovery is under way. If we return to the 1930s it becomes 
clear that many of the factors that are today supposed to herald the decline of class politics 
were also present then.20
Again Kelly’s justification for this criticism proceeds by analogy with past
!^Lash S and Urry J (1987) The end of organized capitalism (Cambridge: Polity). 
!^Kelly op. cit. p284. 
p284.
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recessions. He argues firstly that in the depression of the 1930s many of the same 
processes of change were apparent, but that the trade unions responded to them and 
they had no long-term effects on the strength of the labour movement. (For 
example, new sectors and previously un-unionised workforces and regions were 
brought into membership.) Secondly he suggests that many of the trends identified 
by Lash and Urry are reversible. (For example, that greenfield sites ‘do not 
remain green f o r e v e r ’ .21 ) Thirdly, he argues that Lash and Urry’s account 
exaggerates the extent of change.
Now in a sense Kelly is quite correct. The development of capitalism does 
appear to proceed in phases and there is certainly no necessary reason why trade 
unions should not in the future organise as great or greater a proportion of the 
workforce as they have in the past. Kelly’s arguments are an important check to 
the enthusiastic declarations of the terminal decline, ‘Americanisation’ or 
‘marketisation’ of the union movement.
However, in my view they beg two crucial questions. Firstly, what is it that 
differentiates successive phases of capitalist development such that the conditions 
that trade unions have to respond to in a new phase are qualitatively different from 
those they have seen in the past? Secondly, what are trade unions actually doing in 
practice to respond to changed circumstances and how effective have they been? 
To some extent Kelly has an answer to both these questions. To the first he implies 
that to all intents and purposes capitalist development is truly cyclical and there are 
therefore no important qualitative differences between one phase and the next. For 
example he argues that the concentration of capital in the service sector will lead to 
growth in the proportion of workers who work for large companies which have 
been traditionally easier to organise. Kelly’s implicit response to the second 
question is that since trade unionism has revived after periods of recession in the 
past, there is no reason to suppose that it will not do so again.
21/W . p285.
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Neither of these answers is entirely satisfactory. As far as the second 
question is concerned, the suggestion that it can safely be assumed that trade unions 
will revive simply because they always have in the past is a product of a degree of 
empiricism in Kelly’s approach. The identification of an empirical regularity in the 
past relationship between recession and union membership provides no logical 
grounds for assuming that the regularity will continue in the future. In other 
words, there are no historical laws and history does not simply repeat itself. 
Whether or not trade union strength recovers depends crucially on the action trade 
unions and their members and officers take. (Although uncritical, Bassett’s 
account22 has the virtue of focussing on the practices of trade unionism, rather than 
merely quantitative measures of union strength.) This relates also to the inadequacy 
of Kelly’s implicit response to the first question I posed above. The reason that 
unions did revive during the new phase of capitalist development which followed 
the recession of the 1930s was, as Kelly recognises, precisely because they set out 
to organise those sections of the workforce with no tradition of or apparent 
inclination towards trade unionism. There seems, therefore, to be a contradiction 
in Kelly’s account. On the one hand he argues (correctly) that trade unions can and 
do respond creatively to the challenge of organising apparently trenchantly non­
union sections of the workforce, and that that is how unions revive in a new cycle. 
On the other hand he insists in his discussion of Lash and Urry that the growth of 
these sections is merely a short-term phenomenon which does not herald a 
qualitatively new phase of capitalist development at all, and which will quickly 
reverse in an economic recovery.
The argument that in the 1980s trade unions have been marked not by crisis 
and the onset of permanent decline, but by relative stability and continuity is also 
advanced by M a c l n n e s . 2 3  Whereas Kelly focuses mostly on macro-level national
22Bassett (1986) 0/7. cfr.
23Maclnnes J (1987) Thatcherism at work (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).
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trends and membership data, Maclnnes’ analysis is directed to the state of 
workplace industrial relations. His work, thus shares with Bassett’s the virtue of 
examining the actual practices of trade unionism, and yet he generates remarkably 
different conclusions. His consideration of union recognition and representation, 
management strategy, collective bargaining, worker participation and industrial 
democracy, ‘flexible’ working and wages lead him to conclude that the economic 
change in the 1980s and the Thatcher Governments have had only a limited impact 
on the structures and practices of workplace trade unionism. If membership has 
fallen it is not because of a the onset of a secular decline, but simply a matter of 
differential employment change in sectors with varying levels of unionisation (see 
Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: Employment change and union density, 1976-8624
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However these sectoral shifts in employment structure also involve changes
24union density data refer to 1984.
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in the geography of industiy and of trade unionism. Although this is given only 
cursory attention by the writers I have been discussing, there are good reasons for 
supposing it to be of considerable importance to the debate. Many of the 
disagreements in the debate over the current state of the labour movement in Britain 
stem from different assessments of the significance of presently limited, but 
potentially extensive, shifts in employment, working practices and so on. Bassett’s 
examples of new ‘strike-free’ agreements and ‘single-union’ deals between unions 
and employers are undoubtedly dramatic, but as Bassett himself acknowledges they 
are only characteristic of a very small number of c o m p a n i e s . 2 5  In this debate it is 
always easy for an alternative account to point to other places where the changes 
have not occurred. This partly refiects the fact that any long-term change is likely 
to occur unevenly in time and space. Conventional social science has tended to see 
this uneveness as incidental to the ‘underlying’ processes of changes; in realist 
language it refiects the impact of contingent effects which are not part of the 
necessary relations constituting the real mechanisms and processes. As I have 
suggested in the Introduction, my research suggests that this judgement may be 
mistaken; the geography of trade unionism is, I believe, crucially implicated in its 
changing character. Our present knowledge of that geography, like the practices of 
trade unionism themselves, is, however, somewhat patchy.
The geography of British trade unionism: a case of 
uneven development?
When considering the geography of trade unionism in Britain we are faced with 
uneven development in two respects. In the first place trade unions clearly have an 
uneven geography. For example levels of membership are much higher in some 
areas (notably the more northern regions in general and their large cities in 
particular) than in others. In the second, the geography of trade unionism is at
^^Bassett (1986) op. cit. pl75.
44 Responding to restructuring 
present rather unevenly understood.
For the most part the main protagonists in the debate over the existence and 
nature of a ‘crisis’ in the labour movement have had little to say about geography in 
systematic terms, but it is interesting to note the frequency with which issues of 
space, location and place impinge on their accounts, at least implicitly. Thus Kelly 
notes the role of locational shift in manufacturing industry in setting new conditions 
for unions to recruit in, while in his account of the growth of non-unionism, 
Bassett writes:
non-union companies tend to cluster together: there is a geographical variation in 
unionism, as well as sectoral and occupational variations.^^ Among manual workers, non­
unionism is the highest in [the] south-east, the south-west and the east Midlands, with 
Scotland not too far behind. Among white-collar workers, it’s highest in London, in East 
Anglia and in Scotland. Across the first four years of the 1980s, for which detailed 
information is available, the growth of non-unionism is startling. Just as union 
membership fell in every region for both manual and white-collar workers by figures 
ranging from just over 1% to as much as 42%, so the level of non-unionism grew 
(certainly, from a lower base) in an enormous range - running from 2% to more than 
400%.27
By and large Bassett’s argument proceeds through the identification of
associations between the characteristics of non-union establishments and growth in
the economy. However he does occasionally identify a properly causal
relationship, rather than merely a correlative one, and geography is important here:
new towns such as Milton Keynes or Basingstoke, or Livingston or Irvine, are largely non­
union enclaves, and are often promoted as such to companies thinking of establishing 
themselves there.^^
In general however, both Kelly and Bassett consider geography only
obliquely. By contrast, geography is accorded a more central place by Tony
Lane.29 indeed the starting point of his analysis is explicitly geographical:
Over the last twenty years the industrial landscape, the geographical distribution of industry 
has undergone a profound transformation. While to some extent checked by regional 
policies designed to guide the flows of industrial relocation, the fact remains that there has 
been a flight o f large scale industrial plants from conurbation centres. [... Bjoth
26while there is certainly geographical variation in unionism, Bassett provides no evidence for his 
assertion that ‘non-union companies tend to cluster together’.
'^^Bassett (1989) op. dt. p45.
^^Ibid. p45, emphasis added.
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manufacturing and service industry is now far more widely dispersed than it was twenty 
years ago.^®
Lane bases his account on the work of Steve Fothergill and Graham
Gudgin.3i A number of objections may be levelled at the approach they adopt in
trying to identify the causes of urban and regional employment c h a n g e ,b u t  these
do not in principle compromise Lane’s analysis, since he is interested in the
implications, rather than the causes, of the shifts. In particular he regards the
‘industrial decline of the city’ as having far-reaching consequences. The decline of
manufacturing and other heavy industry in its erstwhile heartlands has seen
dramatic employment reductions in key areas of union strength such as Liverpool,
London, Manchester, Coventry, Tyneside, Clydeside, Sheffield and South
Wales.33 The workforces of today’s large cities are rather different:
In today’s cities the odds are that the largest employers are in the public sector: the local 
councils, hospitals, universities and polytechnics. With highly sectionalised workforces, 
elaborate status hierarchies and little muscle, these cannot be the leading cohorts of the 
future.34
It will become clear that I do not share Lane’s pessimism in respect of the 
public sector, particularly in those areas with past traditions of radicalism. In part 
the generally downbeat tone of his assessment of the prospects for the future stems 
from his acceptance of the argument that the unions’ legitimacy has been declining 
among their own membership. Indeed he refers to a ‘crisis’ of legitimacy in the 
movement. Strangely^ however, geography largely disappears from his account at 
this point. The work of Duncan Gallie,35 by contrast, suggests that there has been 
no significant decline in legitimacy of trade unions, and interestingly his approach
^^Lane T (1982) ‘The unions: caught on the ebb tide’ Marxism Today September pp6-13.
^®Lane op. cit. p7.
 ^^ Fothergill S and Gudgin G (1982) growf/i (London: Heinemann).
^^See the debates in Massey D and Meegan R (eds) (1985) Politics and method: contrasting 
studies in industrial geography (London: Hutchinson).
^^Lane op. cit. p7.
34/W . p8.
^^Gallie D (1987) ‘Patterns of similarity and diversity in British urban labour markets: trade union 
allegiance and decline’ paper presented at the Sixth Urban Change and Conflict Conference 
University of Kent 20-23 September.
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is based on an analysis of geographically differentiated data. According to Gallic, 
the differences between places, both in union membership levels and in the level of 
commitment to trade unions among workers, can only be accounted for by 
considering differences in the history of trade union organisation in each place 
which affects the early socialisation of the workforce, and consequently its attitudes 
to unionism. Gallic found that industrial centres had suffered most from recession 
and were also the areas of greatest trade union strength, but at the same time the 
traditions of strong union organisation in those places meant that the unions were 
more resilient (and maintained their popular legitimacy better) than elsewhere.
Notwithstanding the differences between them, what the work of Lane and 
Gallic suggests is that both geographical change and spatial variations in social 
phenomena enter into the heart of contemporary developments in trade union 
strength and activity. Their accounts also imply that attempts to explain those 
developments would benefit from an understanding of the existing geography of 
the labour movement and of the way that is changing.
To date there have been relatively few contributions to the development of 
such an understanding. From an historical perspective Humphrey Southall 
considers the nineteenth century through an examination of statistical records 
relating to friendly societies,^^ and Peter Sunley^^ covers one aspect of the 
enduring geography of trade unionism through the twentieth century in his analysis 
of the coalminers’ strikes of 1926 and 1984. The latter of these disputes is used by 
Mick Griffiths and Ron Johnston to consider the relationship between ‘place’ and 
trade u n i o n i s m . ^ s  For the contemporary period geographers analysing the
^^Southall H (1988) ‘Towards a geography of unionization: the spatial organization and 
distribution of early British trade unions’ Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 13,4 
pp466-483.
^^Sunley P (1990) ‘Striking parallels: a comparison of the geographies of the 1926 and 1984-5 
coalmining disputes’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 8 pp35-52.
^^Griffiths M and Johnston R (1991) ‘What’s in a place? An approach to the concept of place, as 
illustrated by the British National Union of Mineworkers’ strike, 1984-85’ Antipode 23:2 ppl85- 
213.
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restructuring of the UK economy sometimes make reference to the geography of 
the labour movement, although it is only infrequently the central focus of their 
concerns. For example, in his analysis of the ‘political economy of Britain’s north- 
south divide’ Martin^^ maps the regional variation in levels of union membership 
and industrial militancy as two among many indicators of the growing inequality 
between different regions of the country. Kevin Morgan and Andrew Sayer^o 
illustrate how intra-regional variations in trade union traditions can influence the 
location of new investment and how management may seek actively to ‘re-make’ 
the industrial relations context with which it is faced.
Doreen Massey and Nick Miles^i focus more explicitly on the changing 
geography of the labour movement. They point out that in the past the geography 
of trade unionism has tended to mirror that of the traditional manufacturing sectors 
in which the unions have been based. This produced a spatial distribution of union 
membership characterised by areas of concentration which they term ‘heartlands’. 
In some cases, notably those of the large cities, several heartlands overlapped to 
produce particular areas of more general union strength. With the decline of those 
traditional industries and the growth of services, particularly public services, the 
geography of the union movement has become much more dispersed. In addition, 
Massey and I have recently considered how these developments have been affected 
by the political attack on the union movement by the Thatcher government, which 
seems on occasion to have displayed a remarkably deft geographical sense.^2
Finally, a small number of industrial relations specialists have focussed on 
spatial variations in unionisation. Neil Millward and Mark Stevens consider survey 
data from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (‘WIRS’) and from the
^^Martin R (1988) ‘The political economy of Britain’s north-south divide’ Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 13,4 pp385-418.
^OMorgan K and Sayer A (1985) ‘A “modern” industry in a “mature” region: the remaking of 
management-labour relations’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 9 pp383-403. 
^iMassey D and Miles N (1984) ‘Mapping out the unions’ Marxism Today May ppl9-22. 
^^Massey D and Painter J (1989) ‘The changing geography of trade unions’ in Mohan J (ed) The 
political geography of contemporary Britain (London: Macmillan) ppl30-150.
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Government’s Social Attitudes Survey
Table 1.1: Regional variations in union density, 1984
All workers Manual workers Non-manual workers
Great Britain 58 67 51
East Anglia 40 52 35
Greater London 47 65 37
Rest of South East 43 47 41
South W est 55 62 47
East Midlands 61 66 56
Scotland 63 67 60
W est Midlands 65 71 59
Yorks/Humberside 67 73 61
W ales 71 79 66
North W est 71 80 65
North 72 83 61
Source: Millward N  and Stevens M (1988) ‘Union density in the regions’ Employment Gazette 
May pp286-295
Table 1.1 broadly confirms in more systematic terms and at the regional level 
what most of the previously cited accounts imply. Namely, that trade unionism is 
concentrated disproportionately in Scotland, Wales and the northern part of 
England. The relatively high density figures in the table probably stem from the 
exclusion of establishments with fewer than 25 employees which are known to 
have below average levels of unionisation. On the other hand the survey also 
excludes the heavily unionised coal mining sector, which will have distorted the 
results in regions with major employment in that industry. Millward and Stevens
'^^Millward N  and Stevens M (1988) ‘Union density in the regions’ Employment Gazette May 
pp286-295.
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analyse their data by attempting to ‘control’ or ‘adjust’ for regional variations in
industrial mix, workplace size and ownership characteristics. Leaving aside the
methodological issues raised by this sort of approach,"^ they found that regional
variations persisted after the figures had been adjusted in this way. The authors go
on to speculate that:
an obvious suggestion is that the higher levels of unionisation outside the four southern 
regions of Britain arise from a tradition of union involvement that emerged when those 
regions had more large-scale heavy industry than they do now.^^
However, they conclude that ‘examining this [...] is beyond the scope of our 
current analysis’. A similar approach is adopted by PB Beaumont and RID Harris, 
who use both shift-share and multivariate statistical analysis to dissect regional 
variations in trade union recognition agreements.46 They conclude that there is a 
significant difference in the average level of union recognition between the north 
and the south of Britain^ ‘even when other influences (such as plant and enterprise 
size, the age of the plant, and occupation mix) are controlled for’.47 Again, 
however, methodological objections can be levelled at their approach, and again 
they are able to conclude only that they have identified ‘a number of important 
differences emerging which point to the particular ways in which different regional 
traditions with regard to unionization have been manifested’48 without extending 
their anlaysis to consider the impact of those variations in tradition in detail.
The work of geographers and others on spatial variations in trade union
44The principal objection which may be raised is that characteristics such as industrial structure, 
size and labour movement traditions are not discrete variables whose effects can be 
straightforwardly added together or subtracted from the ‘whole’. Firstly, the various characteristics 
are interrelated: they affect each other. For example, labour movement traditions are closely linked 
with the development of different industries in different regions. Secondly, the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. Acting together characteristics or ‘variables’ may produce ‘emergent 
effects’ which cannot necessarily be detected or predicted when those characteristics are considered 
in isolation from each other.
^^Millward and Stevens op.cit. p293.
4^Beaumont PB and Hams RID (1989) ‘The north south divide in Britain: the case of trade union 
recognition’ Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics 51:4 pp413-428.
47/W ., p423. ,
48/W ., p426.
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membership and activity is thus at an early stage. A number of geographers have 
pointed to the importance of trade unionism in the changing human geography of 
Britain and some industrial relations specialists have noted the importance of 
geographical variation to developments in trade unionism. In addition to the 
emerging focus on mapping and examining the spatial variation in membership 
levels and other characteristics it will be important to flesh out these accounts with 
an appreciation of the practices of trade unions and their members, the 
transformation of those practices through time and across space and the relationship 
between those transformations and the places in which they occur.
2 Public service trade unionism 
and the political geography of 
Fordism
The pattern of growth
If the geographical patterning of trade unionism in Britain is still only partly 
understood, the implications that this patterning has for the development of trade 
unionism is currently yet more obscure. Yet, as I suggested in the Introduction, the 
geography of social relations is increasingly recognised as having important effects 
on the operation of social processes. I now want to begin my exploration of these 
connections by considering the period before the recent decline in trade union 
membership which I charted in Chapter One.
It was during this period that strong membership growth both stemmed from, 
and had an influence on, the conditions of production of public services in Britain, 
and those provided by local government in particular. The legacy of the growth 
during this period has had, I will claim, a considerable impact on the nature of trade 
union responses to change in those conditions during the 1980s. It is therefore of 
key importance to consider the pattern of that growth in some detail.
Moreover, I want to suggest that the interrelationships between the growth of 
public service unionism and the conditions of production of public services in the 
1960s and 1970s can only be understood as the products of the particular mix of 
economic, political and cultural conditions existing in Britain at the time. 
Interpreting the impact of those conditions requires a methodological perspective 
which does not simply collapse political and cultural relations onto the motions of 
the economy, but which does recognise the connections between these various 
spheres and which can identify the causal mechanisms at work in each case. In
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addition it must provide the means for interpreting how crises in those economic, 
political and cultural relations arise and what the necessary and sufficient conditions 
are for their resolution. Such a perspective is provided by regulation theory. i
The particular mix of social relations with which I am concerned in this 
chapter is usually labelled ‘Fordism’ by regulation theorists. The partial 
breakdown of these relations in the 1970s is thus the ‘crisis of Fordism’. I will 
adopt these terms since it would be very difficult to discuss the work of regulation 
theorists without doing so. However, there are some problems with them. One 
difficulty is that ‘Fordism’ is used both within and outside the regulationist 
literature. As Bob Jessop puts it: ‘not every study of Fordism is regulationist nor is 
every regulationist study concerned with (post-)Fordism’.  ^ Another problem is 
that the term is used to describe a number of different social phenomena. Thus 
Fordism is simultaneously a particular form of the labour process, a particular 
‘regime of accumulation’ and a particular ‘mode of regulation’. Granted, part of 
the object of the exercise is explicitly to link these various aspects of social life 
together, but this can lead to misunderstandings. For example critics of regulation 
theory may argue that the existence of many examples of non-Fordist labour 
processes ‘disproves’ the existence of a Fordist regime of accumulation.^ A 
methodological reading of regulation theory, by contrast, would recognise that the 
production of some goods and services by non-Fordist processes is not 
incompatible with the existence of a ‘regime of accumulation’ and may even be a
deliberately stress the methodological significance for two reasons. Firstly, I want to use the 
perspectives and concepts of the regulation approach without necessarily being bound by the 
specific substantive claims of its major proponents. Secondly, I want to defend the guiding 
principles of regulation theory against attempts to discredit the approach as a whole by refuting 
one or more of those claims.
^Jessop B (1990) ‘Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect’ Economy and Society 19:2 
pi 54.
related but slightly different mistake is committed by Simon Clarke who engages in a faintly 
bizarre attempt to argue against regulation theory by showing that the vision of a utopian society 
drawn up by Henry Ford (an American capitalist) shares no features with the regulation theorists 
analyses of Fordism. This seems to me to be an exercise in literalism of the utmost sterility. See 
Clarke S (1990) ‘New utopias for old: Fordist dreams and Post-Fordist fantasies’ Capital and Class 
42 ppl31-155.
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necessary feature of such a regime.
This recognition that the characteristic social forms of particular ‘regimes of 
accumulation’ or ‘modes of regulation’ do not need to be ubiquitous for the insights 
of the regulation school to hold has important implications for geographers. In 
particular it suggests that the ‘mixes’ of social relations which the regulation 
approach seeks to analyse may well develop unevenly in space and time.4 
Moreover that uneveness may then impact back on social processes in ways which 
materially affect their operation. The effects of this geography may be either 
functional or dysfunctional for the continued reproduction of the social relations 
which produced it. Spatial uneveness may either work with, or undermine, current 
social processes. For example, in the specific case of the processes associated with 
the accumulation of capital, David Harvey shows how particular spatial 
configurations of social relationships (‘spatial fixes’ and ‘structured coherences’) 
can tend first to support, and then to act as a barrier to, the further development of 
capitalist relations of production and consumption.^ I will return to Harvey’s 
arguments in Chapter Seven.
I will discuss the regulation approach and the characteristic geography of 
British Fordism in relation to both public services and the trade unions below. 
First I want to briefly outline the pattern of development of public service trade 
unionism during the 1970s.
Labour movement strength in the public services sector was built up 
remarkably rapidly in tandem with a more general growth of trade unionism 
especially among white-collar workers. In 1964 the unions which subsequently 
merged to form the white-collar union ASTMS (Association of Scientific, Technical
^Hudson R (1989) ‘Labour market changes and new forms of work in old industrial regions: 
maybe flexibility for some but not flexible accumulation’ Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 7:1 pp5-30.
^Harvey D (1985) ‘The geopolitics of capitalism’ in Gregory D and Urry J (eds) Social relations 
and spatial structures (London: Macmillan) ppl28-163.
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and Managerial Staffs) shared a combined membership of 72,800.^ By 1979 
ASTMS had 471,000 members,^ which represents an increase of nearly 550% in 
fifteen years and an average annual growth rate of 13%. The growth in white- 
collar unionism is partly a reflection of the changing occupational stmcture of the 
United Kingdom economy. For example, in the white-collar banking, insurance 
and finance sector there were 583,000 potential union members in 1968. By 1979 
their numbers had increased to 720,900, a rise of 23.7%.^ However the number of 
actual union members rose by 57.9% from 250,300 to 395,300, while union 
membership in the economy as a whole increased over this period by 30.4%. Thus 
the growth was not only a result of a changing economic structure, but 
demonstrates an increasing propensity among workers to join trade unions within 
particular sectors.
The simultaneous large increase in trade union membership in the public 
services also involved many white-collar workers. The white-collar public service 
union NALGO expanded rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1960 its 
membership was 274,000, but by 1982 this had grown to 784,297.^ The mainly 
manual workers’ union, NUPE, also grew strongly, from 283,471 in 1968 to 
712,392 in 1978.1® Nearly three-quarters of this increase was due to the 
recruitment of women, many working part-time. Hyman’s figures show that the 
growth of these unions and others meant that the proportion of the public sector 
workforce belonging to a trade union increased substantially, from 66.1% in 1968 
to 82.4% in 1979.H
During the same period the number of trade unionists in the public services
^Taylor R (1980, first edition 1978) The fifth estate: Britain’s unions in the modern world 
(London: Pan) p33.
^Coates K and Topham T (1988, first edition 1980) Trade unions in Britain (London: Fontana) 
p64.
hbid. p59.
^Hyman R (1985) ‘Class struggle and the trade union movement’ in Coates D, Johnson G and 
Bush R (eds) A socialist anatomy of Britain (Cambridge: Polity) ppl 10-111. 
l®Taylor op.cfr. p349.
11 Hyman op. cit. pl09
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grew as a proportion of total union membership. Thus, as Table 2.1 suggests, the 
1970s saw public sector services become increasingly important to the British 
union movement.
Table 2.1: Public service unionism as a proportion of ail unionism
Sector Trade union 
members in 1968 
(000s)
As a percentage 
of all trade 
unionists
Trade union 
members in 1979 
(000s)
As a  percentage 
of all trade 
unionists
Post and 400.6 3.93 427.6 3 .22
telecom­
munications
Electricity 181.5 1.78 178.3 1.34
Railways 228.9 2.25 204.2 1.54
W ater 33 .5 0.33 61 .4 0.46
National 457.1 4.48 583.8 4.39
government
G as 90.5 0.89 95.5 0.72
Local 1366.8 13.41 2232.0 16.80
government
(including
education)
Health 369 .8 3.63 971.2 7.31
Total 3128 .7 30 .69 4754.0 35 .77
Source: adapted from Coates K and Topham T (1988) Trade unions in Britain (London: Fontana) 
pp58-9; Felling H (1987) A history of British trade unionism (Harmondsworth: Penguin) p300; 
Employment Gazette various issues
However Table 2.1 also shows that this growth in importance was uneven 
within the public service sector. In fact membership in traditional strongholds of 
trade unionism like the Post Office and British Rail declined as a proportion of total 
union membership. By contrast local government trade unionists grew in relative 
terms from 13.41% of all trade unionists in 1968 to 16.8% in 1979, while the 
proportion of all trade unionists who worked in the health service doubled over the 
same period from 3.63% to 7.31%. By 1979, then, nearly one trade unionist in 
every four worked in either local government or the health service.
The major utilities were essentially, and in some cases still are, nationalised 
industries. Local government and health care, on the other hand, are central to the 
welfare state. Christine Cousins stresses the differential growth in trade unionism
56 Responding to restructuring
in these two parts of the public sector.
In Britain, unionization in the public sector has been higher than in the private sector 
throughout the post-war period, but whilst union organisation has a long tradition in the 
nationalised industries, only in the 1970s was there a significant development in unionism 
in the public service sector. In the period 1969-1979, the health services and local 
government, and education services added 1.5 million union members, nearly 50% of total 
national union growth. Much of this growth is associated with increased white-collar and 
female unionization.^^
Thus the absolute and relative growth of public service trade unionism during 
the 1970s was overwhelmingly a growth in welfare state trade unionism. This 
development partly accounts for the increasingly dispersed geography of trade 
union membership identified by Massey and Miles and referred to in Chapter One 
above. They argue that after the Second World War the British trade union 
movement was based ‘in the cities and in particular regions of industrial 
concentration’.14 This was largely a product of the way the industrial structure of 
the economy was geographically differentiated. From the end of the 1950s, 
however, these ‘heartlands’ declined and a more dispersed geography developed. 
Although there are geographical variations in welfare provision, employment in 
public services is by its nature fairly evenly regionally distributed in relation to 
population. A general increase in trade union membership in this sector relative to 
the levels of membership in manufacturing industry, for example, will therefore 
tend to produce a more even geography of union membership overall.
In their discussion of the parliamentary representation of trade unions through 
their sponsorship of Labour MPs, Coates and Topham make a similar point about 
the decline of the traditional bases of trade unionism to that put forward by Massey 
and Mües:
Direct trade union sponsorship takes a variety of forms. Its classic shape is to be found in 
the declining numbers of safe mining seats, in which the NUM used to be able to boast 
that they could weigh the votes necessary to secure their victories. Other occupational 
concentrations explain how some unions are able to secure representation in particular
^^ousins C (1987) Controlling social welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf) pl25. 
l^Massey D and Miles N (1984) ‘Mapping out the unions’ Marxism Today May pp 19-22. 
^^Ibid. pl9.
areas
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But they go on to assert that for the newly-expanded white-collar and public
sector unions this is not the case:
Whilst it is clear that there are mining constituencies, and may once have been ‘railway’ 
constituencies, or ‘engineering’ towns, it is doubtful whether there are ASTMS cities, or 
NUPE counties.^^
This may be true for the specific activity of the selection of Labour Party 
parliamentary candidates. However, as I will suggest below, that there are in fact 
grounds for believing that the labour movement in Britain’s large cities is often 
marked by the predominance of public service unions.
The significance of a particular sector to trade unionism in general does not 
consist solely of the contribution it makes in terms of numbers of members. Indeed 
there is no necessary relation between the size of membership of a trade union and 
its political, economic or industrial power. A small union can sometimes have 
considerable influence if its members are in key occupations. The role of the 
diminutive NACODS^^ was important during the miners’ strike of 1984-85 
because its members are responsible by law for safety at coal mines. By contrast a 
large general union like the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) may 
find it difficult at some periods to gain influence in proportion to its size because the 
varied nature of the occupations in which it organises may mean that there are fewer 
common interests among its members than might be the case with a smaller union. 
Therefore to assess the overall significance of trade unionism in the public services 
during the 1970s it is necessary to consider both the politics and \h t practices of 
that trade unionism, as well as membership growth and its causes. I have 
suggested that understanding these politics and practices involves examining the 
political and economic context in which they developed. Before considering the
^^Coates and Topham op. cit. p339.
^^Ibid. p340.
l^National Association of CpUiery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers.
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practices of public service unionism in the 1970s, therefore, I want to discuss the 
perspective of regulation theoiy in more detail and in particular its treatment of the 
role of public services and trade unionism under Fordism. :
The political geography of Fordism
Regulation theory: a methodological perspective^^
As theoretical traditions go, the ‘regulation school’ is pretty disparate. Jessop has 
identified seven different schools: three in France, and one each in Holland, 
Germany, Scandinavia and North America. D (Jessop modestly avoids identifying 
his own work as part of a British school.) My own use of regulation theory draws 
principally on the Parisian school and the work of Jessop himself. The roots of 
Parisian regulation theory lie in Marxist political economy in general and in 
Althusserian structuralism in particular. However, while Althusserian analysis 
tended to see the reproduction of social formations as occurring ‘quasi- 
automatically’,20 regulation theory became concerned with how capitalism survived 
at all, given it’s necessary tendencies to breakdown, crisis and rupture. As Alain 
Lipietz describes it, ‘the regulation of a social relation is the manner in which this 
relation is reproduced, notwithstanding its conflictual and contradictory 
character’
In very general terms regulation theory addresses this problem by identifying 
sets of institutional forms which act together to stabilise (‘regulate’) contradictory 
social relations. The combination of institutions involved is known as the ‘mode of 
regulation’ The particular pattern of capital accumulation (involving a specific
l^Early regulationist studies stressed the methodological significance of the approach as can be 
seen in the Introduction to Aglietta’s key text (Aglietta M (1979, French edition 1976) A theory 
of capitalist regulation: the US experience ^London: Verso) pp 9-17). This methodological 
emphasis has recently been revived. See, inter alia, Jessop (1990) op. cit.; and Boyer R (1990) 
The regulation school: a critical introduction (New York, NY: Columbia University Press) 
especially pp60-66. 
l^Jessop (1990) op. cit. 
pl70.
^^Lipietz A (1988) ‘Reflections on a tale: the Marxist foundations of the concepts of regulation 
and accumulation’ Studies in Political Economy 26 pl4, emphasis original. -
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relationship between production and consumption) which is regulated by the mode
of regulation is known as the ‘regime of accumulation’. The mode of regulation is
unlikely to be able permanently to control contradictory tendencies, and eventually
these may become overwhelming, leading to a breakdown of stability and a phase
of crisis and restmcturing. During the crisis phase new institutional forms emerge
through processes of social and political struggle.22 These new forms may act
together to establish a new period of stability, but will not necessarily do so.
Institutional forms obviously vary from one mode of regulation to another.
They may include the labour process, the form of the wage relation, the social
consumption norm, the public provision of consumption goods and services (the
‘welfare state’), the mechanisms of collective bargaining, the money and credit
systems and the mechanisms of popular representation. They therefore include, but
cannot be reduced to, the functions of the state. In regulation theory ‘regulation’
does not mean state regulation, and a phase of state deregulation of the economy
does not mean that regulation has been reduced, merely that its form has changed.
Two crucial points should be stressed. Firstly, institutional (or ‘structural’)
forms can be, and often are, autonomous from each other. They have their own
patterns of historical development and conditions of emergence. They are likely to
interact and this may lead to a phase of stability, but they cannot be reduced to some
grander process like ‘the accumulation of capital’. According to Aglietta:
None of these structural forms can play its role in the mitigation of social contradictions 
without the simultaneous operation of all the others. But this simultaneous operation is in 
no way something inherent in the logic of accumulation. On the contrary, the structural 
forms are separate from one another and each covers a specific field within the overall space 
of capitalist social r e l a t i o n s . ^ 3
Secondly, if institutional forms interact to produce stability this is contingent.
^^This is not to imply that social and political struggles do not occur during other periods: they 
do. However it is during crises that they have a real chance of influencing the fundamental 
direction of social development. At other times they may be effective in producing change within 
Ae parameters of the existing system and they may have the effect of precipitating a crisis.
^3Aglietta op. c/r. p383.
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Social and economic stability is not inevitable. Indeed the contradictory nature of 
social relations suggests that it might be expected to be the exception rather than the 
norm. In one sense it is precisely the apparent unlikeliness of phases of stability 
that prompts regulation theorists to investigate their causes. This stress on the 
contingent nature of regulation means that regulation theory is explicitly non­
functionalist. It deliberately avoids the claim that certain institutions arise because 
they are ‘needed’ for the reproduction of the system. Alain Lipietz makes these 
points powerfully:
Above all — and this is the most important point —  the emergence of a new type of 
accumulation is not preordained in the course of capitalism. Even if it does correspond to 
, certain noticeable tendencies, the stabilization of a mode of regulation is not the necessary 
outcome of a system of accumulation emerging from Plato’s cave to dictate the laws to us, 
shadows. Accumulation and regulation are discoveries in the history of men’s [j/c] 
struggles and they have worked for so long as they have guaranteed some regularity and 
permanence in the social reproduction.^
In counselling against ‘pessimistic functionalism’, he goes on:
In short, what we have said about the much more improbable than likely existence of 
capitalism and its concrete instances must not lead us to think on the contrary that ‘when it 
works, it must have been designed for that purpose’, or that this mode of regulation was 
meant to encourage this regime of accumulation, for example like saying that Social 
Security was invented for the purpose of keeping mass production running smoothly.^
The regime of accumulation which emerged between the two World Wars and 
developed fully in the 1950s is known as ‘Fordism’, and involved the dominance 
of intensive accumulation. According to Aglietta, under an intensive regime, capital 
accumulation proceeds through the extraction of relative surplus value.
Surplus value is the difference between the value produced by labour and the 
value required to maintain and reproduce labour. Under capitalism this difference 
is appropriated by capital and is the source of capitalist profit. To simplify, if ty is 
the time during which value is produced, and t„ the time during which the value 
necessary for the reproduction of labour is produced, then the time in which
^Lipietz A (1984) ‘Imperialism or the beast of the apocalypse’ Capital and Class 22 pp81-109 
ref:p86. . . , : ,
^^Lipietz (1984) op. cit. p87.
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surplus value is produced (tsv) is equal to ty - tn-^  ^ Surplus value can therefore be 
increased in one of two ways. Extracting absolute surplus value involves 
increasing ty, while relative surplus value is extracted by shortening tn. Increasing 
ty can be done by drawing more people into production, or by making them work 
longer hours. By contrast shortening tn involves increasing the productivity of 
labour through mechanisation. This lowers the value of the commodities produced, 
and thereby shortens the ‘socially necessary labour time’ (tn).
However, the mechanisation associated with the transition from an extensive 
to an intensive regime of accumulation also generated a great expansion in the 
volume of consumption goods produced. For accumulation to proceed, a m inim um  
level of working class consumption was required to allow the realisation of surplus 
value in the form of money capital. This consumption level was reached, but this 
did not happen automatically. Rather, processes of social and political struggle led 
to the institutionalisation of certain of the structural forms mentioned above, and it 
was these which provided the sufficient conditions for continued accumulation.
I will discuss the character of some of the structural forms of British Fordism 
in more detail shortly. Before doing so, however, I want to consider the 
relationship between regulation theoiy and realist philosophy, because in my view 
this clarifies another key feature of regulationist accounts which is important in the 
present study, namely the stress regulation theory places on the national l e v e l . ^ 7  
Capital accumulation always occurs in specific concrete situations in 
particular places. However, through a process of abstraction in thought it is 
possible to identify the common features of all processes of capital accumulation.
^^This is a considerable simplification for the purposes of clarity. In fact‘t’ should be defined as 
abstract labour time, rather than actual hours and minutes. Thus increasing the rate of work 
involves the extraction of absolute, not relative surplus value. However, since the emphasis in 
this study is on the regulation of accumulation rather than the accumulation process as such, 
subsequent arguments do not depend heavily on the labour theory of value in the way that they do 
in Aglietta’s early work.
^^Harris L (1988) ‘The UK economy at the crossroads’ in Allen J and Massey D (eds) The 
economy in question (London: Sage) p35.
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including those necessary relations (such as the wage relation) which define them 
as capitalist. Moving back down the hierarchy of abstraction cannot be done 
deductively. The nature of the more concrete cannot be derived from the abstract 
purely in thought but can only be understood by combining knowledge from 
empirical investigation of other phenomena which are contingently related. This 
movement between the abstract and the concrete, which I referred to in the 
Introduction, is a hallmark of realist philosophy of science, and is spelt out in more 
detail by Sayer.^s As I have suggested, regulation theory is predicated on a realist 
approach and this is elaborated by Jessop. For Jessop, the movement from the 
abstract to the concrete involves the ‘articulation’ of concepts of different levels of 
abstraction.^^ He points out that at any given level of abstraction within this 
hierarchy of concepts, the character of more concrete situations is indeterminate 
until the contingent conditions are specified.^® Those conditions can only be 
identified through empirical research.
What regulation theory does is to take seriously the business of specifying the 
contingent conditions which enable the stabilisation of accumulation. Many of 
these contingent conditions are the product of processes which vary from state to 
state because they are the outcome of different national legal frameworks, political 
systems, forms of trade union organisation and mechanisms for monetary control. 
In abstract terms the processes and tendencies whose contradictions are regulated
^^Sayer A (1984) Method in social science: a realist approach (London: Hutchinson) ppl28-132. 
^^See Jessop (1990) op. cit. pl54. There the reader is referred to the discussion of ‘articulation’ in 
Jessop B (1982) The capitalist state: marxist theories and methods (Oxford: Blackwell) pp213-220. 
This account is closely argued and complex, but if  my interpretation is correct it is, in its 
essentials, making the same argument as does Sayer.
3®Derek Gregory uses this idea of a conceptual hierarchy to criticise Sayer’s treatment of 
geography. He suggests that Sayer reduces the significance of spatial form to the levels of the 
contingent and the concrete, and argues that ‘spatial configurations are important not only for 
concrete research but also for “abstract research’”. He claims that Sayer has partly conceded this 
point, but continues ‘to regard abstract propositions about time-space relations as highly 
generalized’. For Gregory, ‘what this seems to indicate [...] is not a rigid dividing line between 
“abstract” and “concrete” research, but rather the need for the careful delineation of a hierarchy of 
concepts in which time-space relations become ever more tightly specified’. (Gregory DJ (1986) 
‘Realism’ in Johnston RJ, Gregory DJ and Smith DM (eds) The dictionary of human geography 
(Oxford: Blackwell) pp389-90.)
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by modes of regulation are the same wherever capital accumulation occurs. Once 
the analysis becomes more concrete, however, and the specific mechanisms of 
regulation are identified, the seamless web of ‘capital in the abstract’ fragments. 
Among the most significant of the fractures are those which run along national 
boundaries.3i
The implication of this method for substantive regulationist accounts is that
‘modes of regulation’ will often have an important national specificity, at least for
as long as nation states retain a degree of political autonomy from each o t h e r . 3 2
Indeed some regulation theorists have made this explicit by developing the concept
of ‘national mode of growth’ to specify ‘the pattern of production and consumption
considered in terms of its role in the international division of l a b o u r ’.33 Thus
Fordism has taken different forms in different countries with its development in
Britain in particular being seen by some regulation theorists as ‘flawed’ and
incomplete. As Jessop puts it:
The Keynesian welfare state [...] system provided the political shell and the organising 
myth in and through which a Fordist regime of sorts extended its hold over most parts of 
British society. The extension of Fordism in Britain was flawed at all three nodal points in 
the virtuous circle of mass production-high wages-mass consumption. Productivity did not 
increase to the same extent as in other countries; the Fordist wage relation was defective; 
and mass consumption was financed through demand management and the social wage as 
well as productivity increases.34
Flawed or not, British Fordism involved a set of structural forms and a mode 
of regulation in which both public services and organised trade unionism played
31 This is not to say, however, that regulationists regard ‘the international’ as unimportant. 
Jessop identifies four foci of regulation approaches: two international and two national. (Jessop 
(1990) op. cit. pl61.) In niy view, therefore, Joe Doherty oversimplifies Harris’s arguments in 
locating regulation theory on the endogenous side of the ‘false dichotomy’ between endogenous 
and exogenous explanations for the decline of Britain in the international system. By moving 
between the abstract and the concrete in the way I have suggested, regulation theory clarifies which 
regulatory mechanisms are located at the national level and which at the international. (Harris op. 
cit.; Doherty J (1989) ‘Britain in a changing international system’ in Cochrane A and Anderson J 
(eds) m tranrift'o/i (London: Sage) p9.)
3^The time may come when the mode of regulation for Britain operates predominantly at the 
European scale. That time, however, is not yet.
33jessop (1990) op. cit. pl74.
34jessop B (1989) ‘Conservative regimes in the transition to post-Fordism: the cases of Great 
Britain and West Germany’ in Gottdiener M and Komninos N (eds) Capitalist development and 
crisis theory: accumulation, regulation and spatial restructuring (New York, NY: St Martin’s)
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key roles. Moreover both of these institutions were central to the crisis of Fordism. 
Indeed the character of public service trade unionism was forged in the crisis of 
Fordism, and this had important implications for its practices in the 1970s.
The public services and the trade unions under Fordism
Public services
The emergence of Fordism in Britain involved not only the increasing, though by 
no means universal, adoption of mass production techniques in the production of 
consumption goods, but also a specific set of political conditions. Foremost among 
these were social struggles between the two World Wars over demands for 
universal welfare provision, which was consolidated in the late 1940s with the 
election of the Atlee Government and the establishment of the welfare state. This 
arose autonomously from the adoption of new manufacturing technologies and 
forms of industrial organisation, but the two were related. Firstly, the (precarious) 
prosperity generated in the long Fordist boom provided the resources to extend 
state welfare to the whole population. Secondly, at the same time the social 
security system which was part of that welfare provision put a floor under working 
class consumption and thereby enabled it to continue even during periods of 
capitalist downturn, ‘ironing out’ dramatic fluctuations in capital accumulation.
In Britain many elements of the public services sector such as the health 
service and large parts of local government involve the direct state provision of 
services. Aglietta argues that in principle these services could be produced by 
capitalists (as in the United States) or provided by the state (as in Britain). 
Furthermore: I ,
[i]t is impossible to encompass the distribution between the two in any general law, since 
it varies considerably from one capitalist country to another [...] this should not be 
surprising since there are no use-values which are commodities by nature, nor others which 
are not. The commodity is a social relation of exchange, and its use-value only the support 
of this exchange. It can well happen therefore, that certain use-values that are not 
commodities under certain types of labour process and certain evolutionary logics of the 
mode of consumption become so at other periods [or other places] in capitalist
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development.35
However,
[t]he labour process of Fordism, in fact, pushes to the limit the mechanical principle of 
work collectivization. This principle only proves effective in the repetitive long production 
runs of standardized commodities. It is totally inadequate for the production of collective 
services. Either these services are produced by capit^ists with undeveloped methods, and 
their cost rises astronomically as the social demand for them rises. [...] Alternatively, 
these services are produced by public bodies.3^
Although state provision is also a drain on surplus value because of the 
consequent expansion of public expenditure, it is a drain on aggregate surplus 
value, not on the profitability of specific capitals rather than others. Thus if the 
production of collective services is unprofitable for individual capitals but there is a 
continuing political demand for them, capitalists in general may accept (albeit after a 
struggle) that those services should be provided by the state. The exact nature of 
this truce will depend on the existing state of social struggle and the assessment by 
capitalists of the costs involved. In Britain this is often referred to as the ‘post-war 
settlement’. Once established, the state provision of collective services continues to 
be acceptable to (and in some respects functional for) capital for as long as 
accumulation continues notwithstanding the growth of public expenditure. The 
welfare state and the public services were thus key parts of the mode of regulation 
of the Fordist regime of accumulation in Britain.
Trade unions ■
Another crucial set of institutional relations within the ‘mode of regulation’ of 
Fordism were those relating to the organisation of labour. While collective 
bargaining arrangements and recognition agreements were never ubiquitous and 
while a large proportion of the workforce remained ununionised throughout the 
period, the concentration of union strength in key sectors and the impact of
^^Aglietta op. cit. pp165-166.
^^Ibid. pl66. Note the crucial elements of political determination. The services must be produced 
by non-profit-oriented organisations if the social demand is to be met. The capitalist sector in 
Britain does not provide adequate health services in chronic geriatric medicine, for example, 
because it would not be profitable to do so.
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unionisation on the wages and conditions of workers made trade unions a central 
part of the mode of regulation.
The dominant political strategy of the British trade union movement after the 
Second World War was that of labourism. That is, the existence of capitalist social 
relations were accepted, and the role of the unions was seen as gaining the most for 
labour within the parameters implied by that acceptance. The expression of these 
politics in the workplace was a trade off, in manufacturing at least, between unions 
and management. Labour accepted the prerogative of management to manage in 
exchange for steady real wage increases negotiated through ‘free collective 
bargaining’. This acceptance lasted only as long as the steady wage increases were 
forthcoming. With the development of the crisis of Fordism from the 1960s 
onwards the shop stewards movement increasingly intervened in production as 
wage increases began to be curtailed. At the level of national politics the 
‘consensus’ saw the emergence of a new ‘corporatist’ politics, as Colin Leys points 
out:
The key element in the new political order was the incorporation of the labour movement 
—  both the trade unions and the Labour Party —  into the state. From the time of the First 
World War, trade union leaders began to be accorded (however grudgingly, and as far as 
possible only symbolically) recognition as a legitimate and substantial political force. The 
terms of this recognition were that they should confine themselves to purely industrial 
questions and pursue ‘industrial’ aims ‘responsibly’: that is, that they should accept the 
legitimacy (and by implication the permanence) of the private ownership of industry. 
Similarly the Labour Party, emerging in 1923 as the second largest party in parliament, 
was entrusted with the government of Britain’s privately owned economy —  on condition 
that in office it showed no inclination to get rid of it.37
Although Leys locates the origins of the consensus in the interwar years, it 
was not until the period after the Second World War that these relations became 
more fully developed. Trade union membership increased from 7.9 million to 10.3 
million in the twenty years from 1945.38 Of more significance for Fordism than 
shear numbers of members, however, was the steady growth in collective
37Leys C (1989, first edition 1983) zrt BnVûtm (London: Verso) p61.
38pelling H (1987, first edition 1963) A history of British trade unionism (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin) pp299-300.
Public service trade unionism and the political geography of Fordism 67
bargaining. According to Coates and Topham, ‘primitive’ procedures for collective 
bargaining in the workplace existed from the early history of trade unionism in 
B r i t a i n , 3 9  but these were not developed into full national agreements until after 
1945:
The Second World War gave a further impetus to the setting up of national negotiating 
machinery, fifty-six new Joint Industrial Councils being created during 1939-45. At the 
end of the war, the Acts which established the nationalized industries all contained clauses 
compelling the newly created authorities to set up negotiating machinery with the 
appropriate trade union. By 1946 already, some 151/2 million workers in industrial and 
service occupations were covered by collective machinery or by statutory Wages Councils. 
Since the war, some 70 per cent of the working population have had their wages and 
working conditions regulated by these means.4®
The procedures for collective bargaining and the concomitant industrial 
strength of the trade unions were central to the operation of Fordism. By ensuring 
that the employed woridng class had a guaranteed level of income and one that 
could be expected to rise in real terms over time, the private sector was provided 
with a steady and potentially increasing market for its products and the ability 
(through the trade off described above) to control the production process and thus 
introduce technological change.^i
Notwithstanding its important role in the mode of regulation, Fordist trade 
unionism was unevenly developed. Firstly, it was predominantly a trade unionism 
of manufacturing industry. Public services, as I have suggested, were not fully 
unionised until the 1970s, during the crisis of Fordism. Private services were 
never a major basis of trade unionism under Fordism. Secondly, it was 
overwhelmingly a trade unionism of men. This was not only a reflection of the fact 
that fewer women than men were in paid employment, but was a product too of the
3^Coates and Topham op. cit. pl75.
40/b/d. pl78.
41ft was an aspect of the flaws in British Fordism that technological advancement was never used 
to the same extent to increase productivity as in some of Britain’s industrial competitors. Some 
commentators have suggested that if the British trade unions had been stronger, then this would 
have forced British capital to modernise its plant more rapidly and would paradoxically have 
increased the effectiveness of British industry. See for example Harris L (1985) ‘British capital: 
manufacturing, finance and multinational corporation? in Coates D, Johnston G and Bush R (eds) 
A socialist anatomy of Britain (Cambridge: Polity) pl6.
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lower union densities among women workers. Figure 2.1 shows the pattern of 
trade union membership over time disaggregated by sex.
Figure 2.1: Trade union membership by sex
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Source: Hyman R (1985) ‘Class struggle and the trade union movement’ in Coates D, Johnston G 
and Bush R (eds) A socialist anatomy of Britain (Cambridge: Polity) p i 07.
The low levels of union membership among women reflect the patriarchal 
structures of Fordist trade unionism. Cockbum demonstrates graphically the 
complex links between class and gender relations in the printing industry which 
operated to exclude women from that bastion of trade union s t r e n g t h . ^ ^  Elsewhere, 
she has identified some of the causes of lower levels of trade union membership 
among women:
The ‘density’ of women’s trade union membership [...] is still only 60 per cent that of 
men. This has often been read as a further indication that women are less politicised than 
men. There are, however, many sound explanations for women sometimes failing to join a
union.^3
Among these explanations are the greater preponderance of casual and
^^Cockbum C (1983) Brothers: male dominance and technological change (London: Pluto). 
"^^Cockbum C (1987) ‘Women, trade unions and political parties’ Research Series3A9 p6.
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temporary employment among women, in which workers may question the 
usefulness of belonging to a union; the concentration of women in ‘caring’ jobs 
which might be seen as conflicting with possible industrial action; the domestic 
responsibilities of many women which make playing an active role in a union 
difficult; and the negligence of unions in failing to give priority to organising low- 
paid and unskilled workers/^ Although some of these conditions could be 
overcome, they do account in part for the currently higher levels of trade unionism 
among men. However, male trade unionists themselves form part of the problem 
as well. Cockbum’s research suggests that the image and practices of trade 
unionism have frequently expressed a masculinity which women workers can find 
unattractive, intimidating or b o t h . 4 5  in subsequent chapters I will suggest that 
these gender relations may slowly be changing and that the stereotype of trade 
unionism discussed in Chapter One may be rather more appropriate to Fordism, 
than to its successor.
Thepoliticalgeography o f British Fordism
I have already suggested that geography ‘matters’ because modes of regulation 
fragment along national lines. But there is also geographical differentiation within 
national modes of regulation. Within the economic sphere this has been a focus for 
the work of industrial geographers. Ray Hudson, for example, has shown how 
Fordist social relations were only developed to a very limited extent in the ‘old 
industrial r e g i o n s ’ . ^ 6  Although geographers working outside the regulation 
approach have examined the uneven provision of public s e r v i c e s , ^ ^  what we might 
call the "political geography of Fordism’ has not been considered in detail.
The characteristic political geography of British Fordism involved, among
^Ibid. pp6-7.
45/W. pp8-9.
^%udson op. cit.
47see inter alia Mohan J (1988) ‘Spatial aspects of health care employment in Britain: 1
Aggregate trends’£nv/ro/zwc/it and A 20:1 pp7-23.
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many other things, the concentration of public services, and hence public service 
employment in areas of dense population growth. These were mostly the large 
cities with many jobs in manufacturing industry: the bastions of Fordist trade 
unionism. (There were also important areas of trade union strength in the ‘old 
industrial regions’ of the pre-Fordist period.) As manufacturing employment in 
these areas was reduced by industrial restructuring, including relocation to 
‘greenfield’ sites, their employment structures became dominated by public service 
jobs. These workforces became increasingly unionised and enabled the labour 
movement to open up, albeit unintentionally, what we might call ‘spaces for 
labour’, at least as far as employment was concerned. On top of these employment 
structures, many consumption goods and services were provided by the public 
sector, most notably through large scale building of council houses and flats. 
Furthermore, local city councils were also usually controlled by the Labour Party, 
during a period when local authorities were subject to much less central control than 
was the case in the 1980s. All these factors combined with the result that many of 
these places did become ‘public sector cities’.
Part of the process of restructuring of the public services sector during the 
1980s, I will argue, can be seen as an attempt to reclaim these ‘lost spaces’ for 
private capital, while a succession of political carrots and sticks have been used to 
reclaim them politically for neo-liberal conservatism. In response to their continued 
domination by the Labour Party in the 1987 General Election Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher said of the inner cities, ‘we want them too, next time’.^ ^
The crisis of Fordism
The causes of union growth and the nature of the trade unionism that was 
developed in the health service and local government during the 1970s are both 
related to the changing character of the welfare state. I have already shown that the
^^Gamble A (1988) ‘On, and on, and on...?’ Marxism Today November pl4.
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welfare state was an increasingly important source of membership for the trade 
union movement as a whole. In addition to this, it became one of the strategic sites 
of trade union action and struggle.
This occurred because the new trade unionism, represented particularly by the 
growth of NALGO and NUPE, was forged during the crisis of the welfare state. 
This had important implications for the sort of trade union practices which 
developed. Moreover the fact that the growth of the new unions happened at the 
same time as the emergence of a crisis in the welfare state was not simply a 
coincidence. Rather, the crisis was one of the causes of the growth of unionism as 
state employees tried to resist the ensuing restrictions on state spending. At the 
same time the form that the crisis took, and the sorts of policies which have been 
adopted in attempts to solve it, were influenced by the growth of trade unionism. 
Thus there was a complex interrelation between the development of the crisis and 
the concomitant development of public sector trade unionism. However the growth 
of unions was not the cause of the crisis. The roots of crisis lie in the nature of late 
capitalism in Britain.
In regulation theory, a crisis in the mode of regulation occurs when it can no 
longer regulate the contradictions of the system. In British Fordism, for example, 
the demand for universal welfare provision and access to public services eventually 
began to conflict with the continued accumulation of capital. The continual growth 
in demand for public services could only be sustained if their conditions of 
production enabled them to be produced more cheaply. The nature of Fordism set 
limits to accumulation. These led to a crisis in the mode of regulation.
One set of limits exists within the particular labour process which comes to 
dominate under the Fordist regime. This labour process, based on the automation 
of manufacturing production and the continual fragmentation of tasks, is also 
(somewhat confusingly) referred to as ‘Fordism’. The perpetual transformation of 
the means of production which enables relative surplus value to be extracted
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produces diminishing returns/^ Firstly, increasing fragmentation of tasks 
lengthens the balance delay time. This is the time lost because of imbalances in the 
supply of components from one part of the production line to the next. Secondly, 
increased intensity of work and its routinised nature affect the physical and 
psychological capacities of the workers to fulfil the tasks. Thirdly, the link 
between the output of the individual worker and the collective output becomes more 
obscure. Aglietta argues that this reduces the ability of management to increase 
individual productivity through incentive bonuses. This means that while the 
regulation of the wage relation through collective bargaining implies rising real 
wages, there are limits to how far productivity can be increased to compensate.
Figure 2.2: Local authority expenditure as a share of GNP
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Source: Gough I (1979) The political economy of the welfare state (London: Macmillan)
A second set of limits takes up the argument advanced earlier concerning the 
production of collective services. Aglietta argues that the development of the
Aglietta op. cit. pp 119-22.
Public service trade unionism and the political geography of Fordism 73
Fordist regime of accumulation saw a growth of demand for collective services. I 
have suggested that the political situation in Britain was such that these were largely 
provided by the state, through the establishment of the National Health Service and 
the expansion of local government. At the same time, the production of collective 
services was generally not amenable to the sorts of productivity increases provided 
in the capitalist sector by the mechanisation of production. Hence the cost of public 
service provision rose rapidly. Figure 2.2 shows the growth of expenditure by 
local government in Britain as a proportion of GNP over the period 1951-75.
This growth, coming on top of the limits to accumulation emerging in the 
production process, meant that the grudging acceptance by capital of the state 
provision of services eroded rapidly from the mid 1960s. Ultimately public 
expenditure represents the appropriation by the state of part of suiplus value. Once 
growth in the extraction of relative surplus value faltered because of the limits to 
accumulation mentioned above, the state encountered increasing resistance from 
capital in its financing of collective services. Gough provides evidence of this in 
the case of Britain. Total state expenditure grew rapidly as a proportion of GNP 
from 42.1% in 1961 to 50.3% in 1971 and 57.9% in 1975. By contrast, state 
revenue (which kept pace with this growth during the 1960s) actually fell as a 
proportion of GNP from 48.6% in 1971 to 46.6% in 1975.5» This meant that the 
public sector borrowing requirement grew from 1.7% of GNP in 1971 to 11.3% in 
1975.
Thus there is a set of contradictions at the heart of the Fordist regime of 
accumulation, which resulted during the 1970s in the development of the sort of 
crisis I outlined above. Specifically, the continued accumulation of capital was 
restricted by the very political and social forms which originally permitted it. One 
of the key contradictions of Fordism is that between the political demand for 
continual growth in public services on the one hand, and the requirement that the
5»Gough I (1979) The political economy of the welfare state (London: Macmillan) p77.
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cost of the reproduction of labour power be continually reduced on the other. 
Given that Fordist production methods are not suited to reducing the cost of many 
public services at a rate which compensates for the growth in demand, the 
provision of those services becomes one of the central elements in the crisis of the 
mode of regulation characteristic of Fordism.
In addition, attempts by the state to reduce the costs of public services within 
the Fordist mode of regulation come up against the collective bargaining procedures 
which are one of the defining features of Fordism. These procedures are backed up 
by the power of state employees organised in trade unions. For as long as the state 
is willing to preserve and sanction institutionalised collective bargaining within the 
public service sector it will be difficult to hold down the cost of public services. 
However, threats to these structures by government may well bring more members 
into membership of the labour movement. This is precisely what happened in 
Britain during the 1970s when public service trade unionism expanded in the way I 
have described.
Public service trade unionism and the crisis
I have shown that the structures of public service provision which were established 
in Britain after the Second World War were founded on a series of contradictions. 
These contradictions developed over time until they threatened the reproduction of 
those structures. This constituted a crisis of the welfare state, which could only be 
resolved by a qualitative transformation in the ‘mode of regulation’. However, as I 
shall discuss in detail in Chapter Three, the elements of a possible resolution to the 
crisis were slow to emerge. Thus the crisis developed throughout the 1970s with a 
concomitant growth of public service trade unionism described above.
The fact that this growth occurred at the same time as the crisis was not 
purely coincidental. Firstly, because the crisis of the welfare state was a crisis of 
the mode of regulation itself, public services became a strategic site for trade union 
struggle. This was because once the reproduction of the mode of regulation is
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threatened, the nature of its replacement is determined by social and political 
struggles. However, it is not necessarily the case that the protagonists in the 
struggles are fully conscious of this. Thus to show that the public services became 
a strategic site for struggle is not to imply that trade unionists necessarily occupied 
that site. It is logically possible for such opportunities to be missed. On the other 
hand, state attempts to solve or ameliorate the crisis of the welfare state after 1975 
largely involved placing downward pressure on public expenditure. Most resource 
expenditure in the welfare state goes to pay the wages of state employees. 
According to Ian Gough wages accounted for 31 percent of UK social 
expenditure.5i If transfer payments are excluded the proportion is 54%. Thus 
placing ‘downward pressure on public expenditure’ is very likely to involve 
attempts to limit the state wage bill, either by shedding labour, or by limiting wage 
increases.
In addition, the state attempted to shift the balance of political forces away 
from labour through legislative and other changes. During the seventies there was 
no wholesale attack on the system of collective bargaining in the public services, 
indeed as Beaumont shows, the high union densities in the public sector were 
partly a result of employer encouragement for collective bargaining and union 
m e m b e r s h i p . 5 2  However, there were a number of changes which prefigured 
developments which would follow in the 1980s. Most notable was the 1971 
Industrial Relations Act. Taken together, the limitations on public e>q)enditure and 
state attempts to alter the framework of industrial relations legislation ensured that 
trade unionists in the public sector and elsewhere were indeed involved in struggles 
throughout the 1970s, regardless of whether they saw them as being of strategic 
importance to the future of public service provision or not.
By contrast with the Industrial Relations Act introduced by the Heath
^^Ibid. p84.
52Beaumont PB (1987) The decline of trade union Srganisation (Beckenham: Croom Helm) pl49.
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government, the ‘social contract’ between 1975 and 1977 was partly an attempt by 
the Labour administration to deal with the crisis of public service provision through 
an agreement with the union leadership to limit wage rises. However as Gough 
argues, this could not resolve the contradictions of the welfare state.53 Although 
the leadership and to some extent the bureaucracy of the labour movement could be 
incorporated temporarily, the policy of limiting wage increases led to an upsurge in 
grassroots trade unionism.
These developments led to the dramatic growth of public sector trade 
unionism already noted. Furthermore, the resulting increases in levels of industrial 
unrest influenced the fate of successive attempts to solve the crisis within the 
existing structures of public service provision (and consequently also the course of 
the crisis itself). In other words, the nature of public sector trade unionism during 
the 1970s was bound up in the development of the very crisis which led to its 
growth in the first place.
The average number of working days lost in strikes each year from 1960 to 
1969 was 3.6 million. The figure for the years 1970 to 1979 was 12.9 m i l l i o n . 5 4  
Much of this increase was accounted for by the militancy of public service trade 
unionism during the 1970s. In manufacturing industry increased grassroots unrest 
found expression in the shop stewards’ movement and in the public service sector 
unions during the 1970s the growth of membership was also simultaneously a 
growth of workplace organisation. Taylor recounts that union stewards only 
gained employer recognition in local government and the health service in 1969. 
From then on
the steward system spread rapidly through NUPE. In 1970, 38 per cent of the union’s 
branches had no stewards at all, while 21 per cent had five or more. By 1974 only 11 per 
cent of branches said they had no union stewards and the proportion with five or more had 
grown to nearly half.55
550ough op. cit. pp146-152. 
54pelling op cit.
55xaylor op. cit. p213.
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In 1974 NUPE commissioned a report on its organisation from Warwick
University. The ‘Warwick report’ as it is known recommended a considerable
strengthening of rank and file organisation. Because its members are concentrated
in the lowest paid jobs in the public services, NUPE was at the forefront of the
struggle to resist attempts by the state to retrench public expenditure through wage
restraint: ‘NUPE was the main militant union defending the social wage and public
expenditure from attack since the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ’ .5 6  Although the public services were
in crisis, there was no attempt to transform radically the way they were provided;
rather the emphasis was on cost. Because of the nature of this attack, the central
concern for all the public service sector unions during the 1970s was the stmggle to
maintain the level of wages.
This culminated in 1978 and 1979 in a series of strikes throughout the public
sector against the government’s attempts to limit pay rises to five per cent The
significance of this continual emphasis on wage demands, albeit prosecuted in a
radical manner, is that it was essentially defensive. Furthermore, reliance on the
strike weapon in welfare and environmental services involves putting pressure
directly on the users of services, and only indirectly on the employers. If public
sector services became a strategic site of union struggle in the second half of the
1970s, the tactics of that struggle were drawn largely from the traditional union
armoury of economistic demands and the withdrawal of labour. A former NUPE
branch secretary described it thus:
then [m the 1970s] it was just ‘we’re workers and all workers produce something which 
other people use, and there is no difference between us and the people who make plastic 
boxes. When they go on strike the assembly line comes to a halt and that is something 
that people have to live with’.57
That is not to say that such tactics were unsuccessful. Indeed the ‘dirty jobs’ 
strike of 1978-9 led to an eventual pay settlement in the region of ten per cent.
56/W . p352.
57lnterview with the author, 16 January 1990.
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compared with the government’s five per cent limit. Indeed the very success of 
the unions’ resistance ensured that the crisis of public service provision could not 
be resolved within the existing mode of regulation. It is in this sense that the 
development of a relatively militant public sector trade unionism during the 1970s 
influenced the course of the crisis. At the same time, because the crisis was 
expressed as government attempts to restrain public spending, and specifically 
public sector pay increases, the trade union militancy was expressed largely as a 
defence of real wages in the public services. The practices of trade unionism which 
developed at this time, particularly in the large cities, might be characterised as a 
form of syndicalism, especially once the leadership of the labour movement had 
been incorporated through the social contract.
There were a number of attempts to go beyond traditional economism. Best 
known in the manufacturing sector (and therefore outside the public services) was 
the Lucas plan produced by shop stewards at Lucas aerospace. This proposed that 
instead of making workers redundant, their skills and resources should be put into 
socially-useful production. This sort of prefigurative activity by trade unionists 
gets away from the purely defensive demands which were the normal union 
response to management proposals for rationalisation. Wainwright and Elliott point 
out that
[s]uch a defensive stand has often been the only way to defend jobs, but in the long run it is 
hopeless in industries like the car industry where the market for the type of cars being 
produced is virtually saturated. Workers’ plans are in effect proposing a form of 
restructuring, but a restructuring in the interests of labour rather than c a p i t a l . 5 8
Although such plans were the exception rather than the rule the principle they 
demonstrate is important. In the public service sector they found their echo in the 
growing politicisation of some of the major unions. The health service unions, for 
example, campaigned against pay-beds in National Health Service hospitals.^»
5^Wainwright H and Elliott D (1982) The Lucas plan: a new trade unionism in the making 
(London: Allison and Busby) p245.
5^Taylor op.cit. p345.
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Generally however such developments were limited to conference resolutions and 
publicity campaigns, rather than the prefigurative approach which was seen at 
Lucas.
Possible futures: there was an alternative
Thus the growth of public service unionism in Britain was a product of and an 
influence on the development of the crisis in the provision of public services. State 
attempts to resolve this crisis within the existing mode of regulation were 
unsuccessful, partly because of union resistance, including importantly at the 
grassroots. However this tended towards a trade unionism based on the 
economistic defence of wages. The strategic potential of the situation was 
(understandably) not widely perceived and there were therefore few attempts to 
develop prefigurative union practices which might have promoted a ‘restructuring 
for labour’.
It is, however, important to bear in mind that the establishment of a new 
mode of regulation is not predestined. Times of crises and transformation are times 
of experimentation, in which the processes of social struggle endemic to capitalist 
societies take on a crucial significance. If new institutional forms can be fought for 
and developed then the character of any resolution of the crisis is up for grabs. The 
crisis of the mode of regulation could have been the opportunity for a strategic 
restructuring for labour.
The election of the Thatcher government in May 1979, however, was to be 
the start of an attempt to bring about just such a strategic restructuring, but in the 
interests of capital, rather than labour. As I have suggested, the outcome of this 
restructuring would be the result of social and political struggle, including trade 
union struggle. For the public service unions the starting point for this struggle 
was the practices developed during the 1970s. These were soon to be tested.
3 Thatcherism, public services 
and the unions: a new ‘mode 
of regulation’?
Introduction
The interrelationship between the practices of public service trade unionism and the 
crisis of the welfare state continued to develop into the following decade. In 
contrast to the 1970s, however, the period after 1979 was a particularly difficult 
one for the trade unions, including those in the public sector.
The Conservative government which came to power in May of that year 
sought not merely to manage the crisis, as previous governments had done, but to 
resolve it. What is more, both the trade union movement and the public sector were 
key targets of the new policies. The trade unions’ responses to these attacks form 
the central focus of this study, and in this chapter I want to consider the sources of 
the attacks and the nature of the shift which occurred in 1979, and relate them to the 
regulation approach introduced in Chapter Two. Drawing particularly on the work 
of Jessop and his collaborators, I will consider how the policies and practical 
strategies of the Conservative government during the 1980s are related to the 
transition from Fordism and the possible emergence of a successor ‘mode of 
regulation’, post-Fordism.
The distinctiveness of Thatcherism
The nature of Thatcherism and the extent to which 1979 should be seen as a
political turning point or discontinuity were topics of fevered debate on the left
during the 1980s. Some denied that the concept of ‘Thatcherism’ had any
relevance. Tony Benn wrote:
I believe [...] that all this talk of Thatcher and Thatcherism is a diversion and that, as 
socialists, we must be much more analytical than that. For what is really happening is
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much more deep-seated. A decaying British capitalism is being forced by its own internal 
pressures, or contradictions, to withdraw the gains that it could afford to concede to working 
people during the post-war boom. 1
Others insisted on the uniqueness and novelty of Thatcherism. Among these 
was Stuart Hall, who focussed particularly on its ideological aspects. HalTs 
writings have sometimes been read as implying that Thatcherism is principally an 
ideological phenomenon, or even as underwriting a more general ideological 
determinism.2 I believe both of these to be misreadings. Hall states that it is 
impossible either to conceptualise or to achieve ‘hegemony’ without ‘the decisive 
nucleus of economic activity’.^  However, Hall’s argument is based on the premise 
that there is no simple correspondence between this ‘decisive nucleus’ and 
ideology. He stresses that ideology has its own rhythm of development and its 
own effectivity, and that just as ideological constructions have material conditions 
of existence, so material changes and policy initiatives have ideological conditions 
of existence.
Hall argues that Thatcherism should be seen as a hegemonic project, which 
seeks to combine an authoritarian and interventionist social policy (‘Victorian 
values’, an emphasis on ‘traditional’ family life, a restricted role for women and so 
on) with a neo-liberal approach to economic policy (deregulation.
^Benn T (1985) ‘Who dares wins’ Marxism Today January pl3.
^See for example Hall S (1983) ‘The great moving right show’ in Hall S and Jacques M (eds) The 
politics of Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart) ppl9-39. For a critique of Hall’s concept 
of ‘authoritarian populism’ see Jessop B, Bonnett K, Bromley S and Ling T (1984) ‘Authoritarian 
populism, two nations and Thatcherism’ New Left Review 147 pp32-60. The ensuing debate is 
contained in Hall S (1985) ‘Authoritarian populism: a reply to Jessop et al.’ New Left Review 
151 ppl 15-124; and Jessop B, Bonnett K, Bromley S and Ling T (1985) ‘Thatcherism and the 
politics of hegemony: a reply to Stuart Hall’ New Left Review 153 pp87-101. Hall’s analyses 
have been closely associated with the journal Marxism Today, whose earlier focus on Thatcherism 
has now widened to a more general concern with the character of ‘New Times’. Jessop et al. also 
criticise the treatment of Thatcherism in the ‘New Times’ analysis. See Marxism Today, October 
1988; Jessop B, Bonnett K and Bromley S (1990) ‘Farewell to Thatcherism? Neo-Hberalism and 
“New Times’” New Left Review 179 pp81-102; and Leys C (1990) ‘Still a question of hegemony’ 
New Left Review 181 ppl 19-128. Three collections collate much of this material: Hall S (1988) 
The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the left (London: Verso); Jessop B, 
Bonnett K, Bromley S and Ling T (1988) Thatcherism: a tale of two nations (Cambridge: Polity); 
Hall S and Jacques M (eds) (1989) New Times: the changing face o f politics in the 1990s 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart).
^Hall (1985) op. aV. pl20.
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internationalisation and ‘free markets’). For Hall, Thatcherism’s ability to exploit 
the contradictions between these positions is one source of its dynamism and 
resilience:
[Thatcherism] managed, by the end of the 1970s, to identify itself with ‘the people’ ... Its 
novelty lies, in part, in the success with which this ‘populist’ appeal was then orchestrated 
with the imposition of authority and order. It managed to marry the gospel of free market 
liberalism with organic patriotic Toryism. ‘Free market, strong state, iron times’: an 
authoritarian populism.^
Gamble notes the same contradictory right-wing traditions within 
Thatcherism, and stresses the paradoxes in many ‘New Right’ positions.^ Like 
Hall, Gamble organises his analysis around the concept of ‘hegemony’. He argues 
that ‘Thatcherism should be seen as an attempt to clear the way for a new 
hegemony, not as that new hegemony itself’,  ^ since the establishment of true 
hegemony would involve the regime gaining the sort of popular legitimacy which 
has so far eluded it.7 Gamble’s account is deliberately more wide-ranging than 
Hall’s, in that it is not restricted to the ideological aspects of Thatcherism. He 
argues that the concept of hegemony provides the sharpest analytical toolkit because 
it ‘allows proper weight to be given to ideology, economics and politics’.^
For Gamble, the promotion and implementation of a particular accumulation 
strategy (Hall’s decisive nucleus) is integral to any hegemonic project.^ His 
description of Thatcherism’s accumulation strategy is based broadly on the 
regulationist account of the crisis of Fordism, but he argues that the ‘shape of the 
new regime of accumulation is very unclear’.^ »
Bob Jessop has provided some clarification. Jessop’s account is much more
^Hall S and Jacques M (1983) ‘Introduction’ in Hall S and Jacques M (eds) The politics of 
r/wtc/ieri57n (London: Lawrence and Wishart) plO.
5See Gamble A (1988) The free economy and the strong state (London: Macmillan) especially 
pp27-60.
^Ibid. p236.
7/W . p237.
8/W . p25.
9 /W . p24. 
p230.
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closely integrated with regulation theory, and he and his collaborators are also more 
critical of Hall’s approach than is Gamble. However it will be useful to consider 
his ideas in some detail since (in contrast to many writings in the regulation school) 
they deal with the specifics of the British case and also extend the regulation 
approach to the political sphere in a fairly sophisticated fashion. Jessop’s 
arguments stress both the plurality of possible political forms in the transition from 
Fordism, and the close relationship between state activity and the crisis of Fordism 
and the emergence of any new ‘regime of accumulation’ and ‘mode of regulation’.
The politics of transition
Those sceptical of the distinctiveness of ‘Thatcherism’ have pointed out that this
programme was not entirely new. A number of the policies pursued by the
Thatcher government had been on the political agenda for some time. Public
expenditure cuts had been introduced by the Labour government under pressure
from the IMF in 1976, and the Conservative administration which came to power in
1970 under the leadership of Edward Heath was committed to some of the radical
policies which would later form part of the Thatcher project:
[T]he new monetarist, nationalist, racist rejection of the post-war consensus which [Enoch] 
Powell expressed found a deep response on the authoritarian right wing of the party. These 
currents converged with Heath’s more limited ‘competition policy’ at a pre-election strategy 
conference in the Selsdon Park Hotel in Croydon in January 1970 which committed the 
party to many of the ‘new right’ policies, including the abolition of universal social 
security payments and legislation to curtail trade union powers.
Leys argues that one thing that was new about the 1979 election was that ‘for 
the first time the leadership of a major party was committed to a project which went 
to the heart of the relationship between labour and c a p i t a l ’ .^^  in other words, while 
Heath had been elected on a radical right programme he had failed to cany through 
its implementation. It is in this sense that the Thatcher programme represented a 
potential resolution of the crisis identified in Chapter Two. This forms the starting
^^Leys C (1989) Politics in Britain (London: Verso) p89. 
12/b/d. plOl.
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point for Jessop’s characterisation of Thatcherism as a potential ‘mid-wife to post-
Fordism’. 15
Regulation theory emphasises that the emergence of a new regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation is the result of social and political struggles, 
and that therefore there is not only one possible resolution of the crisis of Fordism. 
However, this does not imply that there are unlimited possible resolutions. As 
Leborgne and Lipietz put it, ‘to be a serious candidate for “the way out of crisis”, 
any new model of development must be practical’. F i r s t l y ,  assuming that 
capitalism survives the crisis (which is itself not inevitable) any new forms must be 
compatible with the defining features of the capitalist mode of production, such as 
the wage relation, the extraction of profit and the private ownership of the means of 
production. Secondly, national variations in specific pre-existing institutional 
forms make some sorts of resolution more likely in some countries than others, and 
some sorts of resolution impossible.
In Chapter Two I outlined how the crisis of Fordism was generated. To 
recap briefly, the Keynesian welfare state (including the public services sector) was 
integral to the temporary stabilisation of processes of capital accumulation which 
constituted the Fordist regime of accumulation. However the costs of providing 
public services to the level determined by the post-war political settlement escalated 
rapidly, while at the same time productivity growth in the capitalist sector faltered 
as a result of inherent rigidities in the production process and the impracticality of 
extending Fordist mechanisation to the service sector. Aglietta’s original analysis 
did not consider possible ways out of the ensuing crisis in detail, but the general 
conditions for a resolution can be discerned. Referring to the United States, 
Aglietta writes that:
the only avenue of escape from the crisis is one in accordance with the law of accumulation
that is the kernel o f the capitalist mode of production. For this to be successful, the
^5jessop B (1986) Thatcherism’s mid-life crisis’ New Socialist March ppl 1-15, ref: pl2. 
^^Leborgne D and Lipietz A (1988) ‘New technologies, new modes of regulation: some spatial
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system must engender new conditions of production and exchange capable of accomplishing
a lasting and massive rise in the rate of surplus-value.^5
The necessary conditions for this, according to Aglietta, include the 
following:
1 The development of ‘Neo-Fordist’ production techniques, replacing ‘the 
mechanical principle of fragmented labour disciplined by hierarchical direction with 
the informational principle of work organized in semi-autonomous groups, 
disciplined by the direct constraint of production i t s e l f T h e s e  techniques are 
based on microprocessor technologies and include the numerical control of 
manufacturing processes, computerised design, ‘total quality control’, just-in-time 
stock management and vastly increased information storage and handling 
capacities.
2 The application of these techniques to capitalist commodity production 
where they confer ‘a new and notable flexibility on the labour p r o c e s s ’ , i 7  thereby 
overcoming some of the limits to accumulation under Fordism generated by 
rigidities in the labour process.
3 The application of these techniques to the production of what Aglietta refers 
to as ‘the means of collective consumption’ (which in the case of Britain includes 
the public services sector). According to Aglietta the production of these services 
using the methods characteristic of Fordism is not feasible, but some Neo-Fordist 
methods can successfully be a p p l i e d . Thus the service sector can in principle 
benefit from the sorts of productivity increases only possible under Fordism in the 
mass production sectors of manufacturing.
4 The withdrawal of the state from the direct production of the ‘means of 
collective consumption’, thereby simultaneously reducing the drain on profitability
implications’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 6 pp263-80, ref: p263. 
l^Aglietta M (1979) A theory of capitalist regulation: the US experience (London: Verso) pl67. 
16/b/d. pl67.
17/W . pl68. 
pl67.
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generated by an expanding public services sector and enabling private capital to 
exploit the new source of accumulation provided by the Neo-Fordist methods.
The perspective of the regulation approach is firstly that these developments 
will not occur inevitably, that they are not inscribed in the ‘logic of capital’ and 
secondly that a complete resolution of the crisis must involve all of them. This 
implies that the mechanisms which actually produce the transition must be sought in 
the processes of struggle bound up with the crisis of Fordism. Further, the 
concrete institutional forms taken by the new regime cannot be straightforwardly 
read-off from the abstract analyses in Aglietta’s account.
Leborgne and Lipietz point out that there is no necessary relationship between 
the adoption of flexible production systems and flexibility in the wage contract, 
such as that provided by the increased use of part-time, temporary or subcontracted 
labour.^» They identify three possible reorganisations of the labour process related 
to the adoption of the new technolopes (‘deskilling’, ‘individual involvement’ and 
‘collective involvement’)2i and two general forms of the wage contract, ‘rigid’ and 
‘flexible’. In principle, they argue, this provides six possible wage contract/labour 
process combinations, although at least one of these (collective involvement and 
flexible contracts) seems to them to be contradictory. While their work exemplifies 
the plurality of possible paths out of the crisis of Fordism, Leborgne and Lipietz are 
not concerned to identify the alternative political arrangements which are compatible 
with various possible new regimes, nor the political mechanisms through which the 
transition is taking place.
The importance of Jessop’s work lies in its attempt to relate the shift from 
Fordism to the changing institutional and political circumstances of Britain in the 
1980s. His initial characterisation of Thatcherism was developed in the context of 
his debate with Hall, and while it was essentially compatible with the tenets of
% W .p 385 .
^»Leborgne and Lipietz op. c/r.
21/W . p270.
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regulation theory it is not linked to it explicitly. By 1986, however, Jessop was 
centrally concerned with the problems of theorising the welfare state in the 
transition from Fordism, and relating this to an emerging Thatcherite accumulation 
strategy for a re-invigorated post-Fordist capitalism.22
As in his earlier work on state theory,23 Jessop emphasises that there can be 
no theory of ‘the’ capitalist state. ‘At most’, he writes, ‘one could provide a 
theoretically-informed, historically-based account of the forms, functions, and 
dynamics of specific welfare states in more or less circumscribed conjunctures.’24 
However, he argues that it is possible to identify ‘two main forms of political 
response to the crisis of Fordism’25 with differing consequences for welfare state 
policy. These are the neo-liberal response and the neo-statist response.^^ in a 
subsequent account he adds a third form, the n e o - c o r p o r a t i s t . ^ 7  These types are 
not intended as complete descriptions of actual state forms under post-Fordism, but 
should rather be regarded as ‘poles around which different national solutions will 
develop during an extended period of conflict and experimentation’ .28
The neo-liberal form involves a ‘market-guided transition td post-Fordism’.29 
The public sector wül undergo a combination of privatisation and liberalisation with 
commercial criteria introduced to the remaining state sector. The private sector will 
see deregulation and the establishment of a new legal and political basis for 
economic activity promoting a highly flexible labour market, ‘management’s right 
to manage’ and the exclusion of organised labour from decision making.
The neo-statist approach involves extensive state intervention to promote
See Jessop (1986) ‘Thatcherism’s mid-life crisis’ op. cit.; Jessop B (1989) ‘Thatcherism: the 
British road to post-Fordism’ Essex Papers in Politics and Government 68; and Jessop B (1986) 
‘Der Wohlfahrtsstaat im Übergang vom Fordismus zum Postfordismus’ Prokla 65 pp4-33. I am 
grateful to Bob Jessop for providing me with an English translation of the latter.
23Jessop B (1982) The capitalist state (Oxford: Blackwell).
^4jessop (1986)‘Der Wohlfahrtsstaat. . . ’ (9/7. c/r. p4.
25/6/d. p23.
pp23-26.
^7jessop (1989) ‘Thatcherism: the British road . ..'o p . cit. p25.
^^Jessop (198Q ‘Der Wohlfahrtsstaat ...'o p . cit. p23.
29jessop (1989)‘Thatcherism: the British road . . . ’ 0 / 7. c/f. p25.
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‘state-sponsored’ flexible accumulation. Its features would include flexible skilling 
in the labour market, rather than flexible pricing and contracts, decommodification, 
the state promotion of sunrise industries to ‘ensure the dynamic efficiency of the 
industrial core’.3»
The neo-corporatist strategy would extend the corporatist framework of 
Fordism beyond the organisations of capital and labour to ‘other policy 
communities’ such as ‘science, health, education, policing’.31 It would shift the 
emphasis of corporatist activity away from the national level to the regional and 
local levels. The role of the state would be to underwrite the decisions of 
corporatist institutions rather than ‘disengage’ (neo-liberal) or ‘intervene’ (neo­
statist).
In Jessop’s view these three forms are all compatible with the resolution of 
the crisis of Fordism, but different types are more likely to be adopted by some 
countries than others, given the existing national variations in political situations, 
institutional arrangements, the character of Fordism and its crisis and the result of 
social and political struggles. Further, countries may combine elements of the 
various types, though ‘an effective transition will probably rest on the dominance 
of one or other strategic line’.32
For Jessop, Thatcherism represents an attempt by the state to secure the 
conditions for following a broadly neo-liberal path to post-Fordism. He argues that 
the institutional organisation of the British economy had proved too rigid even to 
exploit Fordism fully let alone move smoothly to a post-Fordist mode of growth 
predicated as it would be on increasing flexibility. Moreover, the British state had 
proved itself unable to break down those rigidities, as evidenced by the events of 
the 1960s and 1970s. Thatcherism, therefore, is seen as an attempt to overcome 
this impasse by restructuring the state to provide it with the capacity to act against
3%M. p26. 
31/W . p25. 
32/W . p26.
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the barriers to accumulation.^^ Jessop stresses that this does not mean that 
Thatcherism will succeed in reforming the state in this way, nor that it will continue 
to pursue a post-Fordist future even if it does.
Thatcherism, therefore, is not (as some of its political supporters claim) a 
rolling-back of the state as such, but a removal or marginalisation of the structures 
of crisis management established under the crisis of Fordism and their replacement 
with strong powers to act on the supply side of the economy to promote (a 
particular form of) post-Fordist accumulation. Jessop argues that just as the state 
intervened extensively in the period of post-war reconstruction to establish the 
conditions for Fordism, disengaged somewhat during the successful phase of 
Fordism in the 1950s and early 1960s and then began to act strongly again in the 
crisis, so it may be expected that the state would be closely involved in the 
establishment of any new regime, only rolling itself back (if possible and/or 
necessary) once strong accumulation is established.34
The key features of Thatcherism’s neo-liberal approach identified by Jessop 
are liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, (re-)commodification and 
internationalisation. These constitute Thatcherism’s accumulation strategy and do 
not provide a complete account of its nature, since they neglect issues of 
hegemony, legitimation, state form and the social bases of Thatcherism. In 
particular I have not discussed Jessop’s characterisation of Thatcherism as a ‘two 
nations political project. This is clearly related both to the accumulation strategy 
(for example through its emphasis on price-flexibility of labour) and to the effect of 
such a strategy on the public services sector. Jessop’s argument is that the politics 
of support and social bases of Thatcherism enable it to neglect the ‘second nation’ 
or ‘have nots’ and provide merely a minimum level of means-tested social security.
3 3 /w . ppl7-18. 
54/W . PP19-20.
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Thatcherism, post-Fordism and public services
The accumulation strategy of Thatcherism has profound implications for both the 
public services sector and the trade unions. I have already indicated the central 
place accorded to the public services sector by Aglietta in his specification of the 
conditions for a resolution of the crisis of Fordism. Within the neo-liberal strategy 
pursued by Thatcherism the reduction of costs within the public services seems to 
involve spending cuts, privatisation, partial re-commodification and the 
introduction of commercial criteria to their production and distribution. There 
appears to be only limited emphasis on the introduction of new technologies either 
to reduce costs or to enable the profitable transfer of production to the private 
sector. However there are some signs of this. Paul Hoggett argues that the use of 
information technology in local government is enabling (if not necessarily 
producing) a shift to a Neo-Fordist form of work organisation.^^ in the services 
with which this study is most directly concerned, it is notable that private sector 
companies based in continental Europe which are seeking to gain a foothold in the 
local government service sector frequently do so on the basis of their innovative 
approach to technology. By contrast some UK companies put more emphasis (at 
least in practice) on straightforward intensification of an existing labour process. 
Jessop himself identifies a number of areas where Neo-Fordist techniques could 
radically transform the public service sector. The use of information technology 
most clearly enables productivity increases in services which can be computerised 
easily, such as the cash benefits payments system. However he also suggests that 
it will allow more better information storage (of patients records for example), more 
efficient catering, electronic diagnostics, the use of expert systems, distance 
learning through telecommunications.^^ According to Jessop, ‘where a political
35Hoggett P (1987) ‘A farewell to mass production? Decentralisation as an emergent private and 
public sector paradigm’ in Hoggett P and Hambleton R (eds) Decentralisation and democracy: 
localising public services (Bristol: School of Advanced Urban Studies) pp215-232.
3^Jessop (1986)‘Der Wohlfahrtsstaat . . . ’ op. c/r. pp27-8.
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coalition has emerged favouring privatisation and retrenchment, these innovations 
can be exploited to expand private sector provision alongside a residual welfare 
state’.37
For the public services, then, liberalisation, which involves the promotion of 
free market competition, may be seen in the insistence that NHS ancillary and local 
government services be subject to compulsory competitive tendering. Deregulation 
is exemplified by the policy of allowing private bus companies to provide services 
on the same routes as public sector organisations. The NHS reforms also contain 
elements of deregulation in the proposal for self-governing hospitals and the local 
management of schools fall in the same category. Privatisation is seen in the 
activities of some local .councils, and may also be a product of liberalisation. The 
sale of state assets such as the water, gas and electricity services are further 
examples. Re-commodification of the residual state sector may be seen in the use 
of market proxies in education and the internal market policy for the NHS and the 
increase in user fees (ranging from prescription charges to council swimming pool 
entrance). Internationalisation is exhibited in the public services by the foreign 
direct investment in water companies and the local government service sector.
Thatcherism, post-Fordism and trade unions
This Thatcherite strategy also has profound implications for the trade union 
movement. I showed in Chapter Two how the development of trade unions in the 
public services sector was closely related to the crisis of Fordism. The relatively 
militant trade union action during the late 1970s, particularly in the public services 
sector, was used as an excuse by the incoming government to implement a series of 
draconian legislative measures against trade unions. Although, according to 
Jessop, it was not until the mid 1980s that Thatcherism gained the status of an 
‘increasingly coherent economic s t r a t e g y ’ ,38  the targeting of trade unions in the
3 7 /w . p28.
38jessop (1986) ‘Thatcherism’s mid-life crisis’ op. cit. p ll .
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early 1980s is compatible with the neo-liberal strategy, even if this was not the 
original intention.
First, many of the gains the unions had achieved during the Fordist period in 
terms of their legal status were unilaterally withdrawn, with the result that the 
judiciary became much more heavily involved in industrial relations matters than 
had previously been the case. Second, the monetarist policies of the first Thatcher 
administration intensified the national impact of the international recession. Again, 
while these policies did not at the time constitute a coherent accumulation strategy in 
Jessop’s sense, they nonetheless generated very high levels of unemployment with 
the effect of both reducing the membership strength of many unions (though this 
was less true for those in the public sector) and exerting pressures on collective 
bargaining arrangements as unions became less able to hold out for index-linked 
wage rises. Third, direct battles with some of the key labour movement institutions 
were provoked and mostly won by the government. The foremost example was the 
miners’ strike of 1984-5, for which the government prepared over a period of 
years, and during which they eschewed the opportunity of settling the dispute 
through compromise, insisting on holding out for complete victory.
If fully implemented, the Thatcherite neo-liberal strategy would probably 
require a much reduced role for a smaller trade union movement, organising some 
of the so-called ‘core workforce’ and leaving thé periphery largely to the ‘free play 
of market forces’. The new model unions in this scenario are exemplified by the 
EETPU39 electricians union under the leadership of Eric Hammond. The sort of 
practices implied by this form of trade unionism could include the establishment of 
single-union, no-strike deals struck on the basis that the interests of capital and 
labour are essentially identical. The idea that what is good for the company is good 
for its employees is the cornerstone of ‘business unionism’. Other characteristics 
might be a shift to plant-level, or even individual, pay bargaining, with the unions’
39Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union.
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role restricted to that of a latter-day friendly society providing cheap insurance and 
credit cards to its membership.
There is little evidence that such a trade unionism is emerging in any but the 
most limited fashion. Most surveys of workplace level industrial relations suggest 
that continuity is more evident than change.^» This could potentially lead to more 
concerted government action to try and shift industrial relations in its desired 
direction, though this does not currently seem to be a policy priority. Furthermore, 
if there is little evidence of widespread change in the private sector, the same is true 
a fortiori of the public services. While the government has been able to hold public 
sector pay awards below the rate of inflation through the imposition of cash limits, 
it has not been able significantly to alter the industrial relations practices of the 
public sector in tune with the neo-liberal strategy, although its encouragement of 
local-level wage bargaining suggests it would very much like to.
However this does not imply that the trade unions have not altered their 
practices during the 1980s, merely that on the whole they have not changed them to 
suit the Thatcherite strategy (‘new realism’ notwithstanding):* This is hardly 
surprising given the highly restricted role the neo-liberal strategy implies for trade 
unionism. However, as I shall seek to show in succeeding chapters, the unions (at 
least in the local government sector) have generated a variety of creative responses 
to the government’s attempts to pursue such a strategy, and produced a number of 
transformations in the practices of trade unionism which may well by consonant 
with some transitions tp post-Fordism, but could cause considerable problems for 
the Thatcherite one.
Maclnnes J (1987) Thatcherism at work (Milton Keynes: Open University Press); Kelly J 
(1989) ‘British trade unionism 1979-89: change continuity and contradictions’ paper delivered to 
the Work, Employment and Society Conference, Durham, 14-15 September; Millward N and 
Stevens M (1986) British workplace industrial relations 1980-84 (Aldershot Gower).
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Thatcherism and local government
The restrictions on the public sector implied by the neo-liberal strategy are reflected 
in Thatcherite policies towards local government. Allan Cochrane identifies three 
main trends. These are changes to the system of local government finance, the 
growth of non-elected local government and tendencies towards the privatisation of 
services.^i These empirically identifiable trends are compatible both with the neo­
liberal strategy (combined to a degree with neo-corporatism) and with the (as yet 
unrealised) Thatcherite vision for local government spelt out by Nicholas Ridley 
under the label of the ‘enabling c o u n c i l ’
The changing financial climate for local government is seen both in the cash 
limits on local expenditure introduced during the 1980s and in the political 
centralisation imposed to enable the implementation of the new regime. 
Centralisation has also enabled attacks on sources of potential political opposition to 
Thatcherism, and has seen the recasting of the political bases of local government 
and administration, in the direction of a limited neo-corporatism. Elements of the 
neo-corporatist strategy may be seen particularly in the growth of non-elected local 
government,43 although this is a corporatism which largely excludes labour. 
Finally, as I discussed above, privatisation and deregulation are key elements of the 
neo-liberal strategy in relation to the public services.
Ridley’s concept of the ‘enabling authority’ foresees a shift in the pattern of 
service provision from one where the public sector finances, produces and controls 
the distribution of a wide range of services to one where ‘unnecessary’ services are 
eliminated and where the private sector plays a far larger role in the production and 
distribution of those services which remain. Among the principles that Ridley 
argues should inform the activities of local councillors is the idea
^^Cochrane A (1989) ‘Restructuring the state: the case of local government’ in Cochrane A and 
Anderson J (eds) (London: Sage) pp95-140.
^%idley N  (1988) The local right: enabling not providing (London: Centre for Policy Studies). 
'^^See Stoker G (1988) The politics of local government (London: Macmillan) especially pp52-79.
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that the delegation of as much as possible to the private sector enables the local authority 
to direct resources better to where they are most needed and provide for them more 
effectively. It also helps to promote local firms and jobs and entrepreneurs.^
To transform fully the pattern of local service provision the Conservatives 
would need to take on considerable central powers through which to try to force 
councils to tow the line. These powers were contained in a series of legislative 
measures which dramatically altered the legal framework of central-local relations in
Britain.45
The system of local government finance in Britain is Byzantine in its 
complexity. An initial impulse for change came in the mid-1970s as the Labour 
government sought to reduce overall public expenditure in response to economic 
crisis. At this time local authority expenditure peaked as a proportion of both gross 
domestic product and overall public expenditure's and the proportion of local 
authority expenditure met from central government grant started to fall.47 Thus 
considerable problems developed in the financing of local government services. 
Many local authorities tried to solve these problems by increasing rates to 
historically high levels. The election of the Conservative government in 1979 
brought an intensification in the pressure on local government finances. Initially 
spending limits were introduced for some authorities. These were enforced by 
reducing central government grants for authorities which ‘overspent’. However, 
councils could still increase rate poundages to maintain budgets. The government 
then introduced measures to limit rates rises: ‘rate-capping’. The abolition of the 
domestic rating system in favour of a universal poll-tax and a uniform business rate 
followed soon after. This will increase the proportion of local authority 
expenditure met direct from central government grants. In turn this will increase 
central government’s power over local government finances.
'*%idley op. cit. p29.
^^Duncan S and Goodwin M (1988) The local state and uneven development (Cambridge: Polity). 
^^Cochrane op. cit. p97.
'^ I^bid. p i l l .
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Non-elected local government comprises a large variety of (mostly specialist) 
agencies. Both Cochrane and Stoker argue that the scope of non-elected local 
government has grown in recent years. Stoker identifies six types of agencies:^^
- arm’s length agencies of central government (eg district health authorities)
- local authority implementation agencies (eg enterprise boards)
- public private parmership organisations (eg local enterprise agencies)
- user organisations (eg housing management cooperatives)
- inter-govemmental forums (eg voluntary regional planning committees)
- joint boards (eg fire authorities in metropolitan areas)
According to Stoker, the growth of non-elected local government has 
‘increased the complexity and fragmentation of the governmental environment at the 
local level. As a consequence the scope for organisational conflict and tension has 
increased’.^9 The wider significance of this development is more difficult to 
guage. On the one hand, some agencies of non-elected local government may be 
viewed as increasing democratic control (tenants’ management of housing for 
example). Other agencies seem symptomatic of a loss of local accountability (such 
as police, fire and transport joint boards in metropolitan areas).
The final major trend identified by both Cochrane and Stoker is that towards 
the privatisation of local service provision. The government have not sought to 
force councils to privatise the provision of their services. Rather they have forced 
them to compete with the private sector or other agencies for the right to provide 
services. The intention of this has been to introduce ‘market discipline’ to the 
public services sector, through compulsory competitive tendering thereby reducing 
costs and ‘inefficiencies’. If this leads in some cases to contracting-out to the 
private sector that has the additional effect (beneficial in the Conservative view) of 
increasing the scope for private accumulation as the earlier quotation from Ridley
Stoker op. cit. p58. 
"^ I^bid. p79.
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indicated.
Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) was introduced in the Local 
Government Act, 1988. The preamble to the Bill which became the 1988 Act states 
that the legislation aims (among other things) ‘to secure that local and other public 
bodies undertake certain activities only if they can do so competitively’. The 
provisions relating to compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) are to be found in 
Part 1 of the Bill, which ‘requires local authorities... who wish to afford their own 
staff the opportunity of carrying out certain activities to expose the activities to 
competitive tendering’. Thus CCT is already biased in favour of the private sector, 
since the time-consuming and costly tendering procedure is only required if the 
council wishes to try to retain services in-house. If the council decides simply to 
privatise a service, then it does not have to engage in a competition at all.
Campaigns against CCT have been a key area for trade union responses to 
local government restructuring and these will be considered at length in subsequent 
chapters. For this reason the provisions of the Act and its associated procedures 
are outlined in Appendix A.
None of these groups of policies were introduced fully formed. Their 
development was somewhat ad hoc and subject to experimentation, setbacks, and, 
most importantly, conflict. Among the most important sites for such 
experimentation and conflict were a number of local authorities controlled by 
Conservative groups allied to the ‘new right’. One of these, Wandsworth, in south 
London, was the setting for a number of important industrial disputes, and 
provided the impetus for creative responses by the trade unions.
4 Wandsworth: Laboratory of 
Thatcherism
Introduction
In Chapter Three I argued that Thatcherism as a political phenomenon should be 
seen as more than a collection of particular policies. It increasingly represents an 
attempt by the state to resolve the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation 
through a change in the mode of regulation. However it is important to note three 
caveats.
Firstly, the coherence of the Thatcherite project should not be overstated. 
This caution may appear to undermine the argument that Thatcherism is a potential 
new mode of regulation, but it is accepted within regulation theory that a transition 
between modes of regulation will not be brought about by a voluntary decision on 
the part of one agency to implement a structured set of policies. However, it may 
be the case that government policies, the ideology through which they are 
represented and a given combination of economic changes may act together in a 
relatively coherent fashion, often in ways which their originators did not intend, 
and notwithstanding the contradictions between different parts of the whole. After 
all the Fordist regime of accumulation was contradictory, and it was in part that fact 
which led to its crisis. For as long as the contradictions of Thatcherism do not 
immediately act to threaten the emerging structures it may be considered to 
represent a potential resolution of the crisis.
Secondly, whatever the hopes of its eponymous progenitor, Thatcherism is 
limited in its effects to the national space of the United Kingdom. In that sense it is 
likely to be a national ‘mode of growth’, rather than a fully blown mode of 
regulation, although it would still be a form of a more general shift to a new mode
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Thirdly, no new mode of regulation develops evenly. This uneven
development over space will be the subject of later parts of this study. It is also
subject to uneven development in respect of its different parts and structures and an
uneveness through time. As Lipietz has put it:
[...] as nature is full of oddities like the omithorhynchus or toucans, which have survived 
on very low stocks in between the dotted equilibria which scan the evolution of species, so 
in the same way is the history of capitalism full of short-lived experiments, or reabsorbed 
revolutions, of undeveloped prototypes and total freaks. ^
This chapter draws on the idea that the development of capitalism involves 
‘short-lived experiments’ and ‘undeveloped prototypes’. Lipietz’s implication is 
that these prototypes fail to become widespread. However even (or perhaps 
especially) the most universal and longlasting inventions begin with prototypes. 
The analogy can thus be extended beyond the toucans of the social world to include 
those political and economic forms and ideological discourses which eventually 
emerge as dominant, or central to the new regime. The experiment and the 
prototype prefigure not only the oddities, the fi*eaks and the dead ends, but also the 
normal, the successful and the through routes.
In its development then, Thatcherism as a national phenomenon drew on a 
variety of ‘prototypes and experiments’ for political and intellectual inspiration. 
The role of so-called right-wing think tanks such as the Adam Smith Institute, the 
Institute of Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies in developing new 
policies away from the public scrutiny accorded to the normal channels of policy 
making has often been remarked on. It has been one of the difficulties faced by the 
left in developing a radical response to Thatcherism that it does not have 
comparable institutions. Another source of ‘experimentation’ has been local 
government. Since party politics in Britain is practised at local as well as national 
level, local government can under certain circumstances provide a testing ground
^Lipietz A (1984) ‘Imperialism or the beast of the apocalypse’ Capital and Class 22 p86.
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for ideas which later find a role in the national arena.
Local government is also one of the major providers of public services, and 
consequently at the centre of the both New Right critique and the new mode of 
regulation discussed in Chapter Three. From the late 1970s onwards therefore, 
whenever the New Right in the Conservative Party was able to gain control over a 
local council, the stage was set for a Thatcherite experiment avant la lettre. 
Moreover, as was pointed out in Chapter One, local government services are very 
heavily unionised. While the trade union legislation was developed only piecemeal 
at the national level, trade unions were often the focus of both critique and political 
attack in particular local authorities. Just as these authorities provided a sort of 
laboratory of Thatcherism for the Government, they were also places of 
experimentation and development for the trade unions, both locally and as the 
broader significance of local developments became clear, more widely.
These processes were perhaps most advanced in the case of the London 
Borough of Wandsworth, purportedly the home of Mrs Thatcher’s favourite 
Council, and the scene of a series of important disputes between the trade unions 
and the local authority. If Thatcherism or some development thereof succeeds in 
resolving the crisis in favour of capital and becomes a part of a new stabilisation 
and a new mode of regulation (neither of which is inevitable) then the experiment 
which took place in Wandsworth during the 1980s will have been crucial. Whether 
that happens will depend in part on the impact of the trade unionism which 
developed in response.
Wandsworth: laboratory of Thatcherism 101
.  I  '  ■ -  >
Wandsworth Borough Council 1978-1982: the flagship 
launched^
Preconditions and ‘moderate’ beginnings, 1971-79
From 1971 until May 1978 Wandsworth Council was controlled by the Labour 
Party (see table 4.1). At this time, both manual and white collar grades were 
heavily unionised. In the case of non-manual staff NALGO claim that the 
proportion of potential members who belonged to a union reached a peak of 80 per 
cent. The strongest areas of organisation were the social services and housing 
departments. The density figure has apparently since declined to about 66 per 
cent.3
Table 4.1: Wandsworth Borough Council election results
Election Date Total seats Labour Conservative Others Conservative
maioritv
1971
!
80 53 7 0 ■46
1974 60 48 12 0 . -36
1978 61 25 36 0 11
1982 61 27 " 33 1 5
1986 61 30 31 0 1
1990 61 13 48 0 35
Source: Wandsworth Borough News various dates
^In studying trade unionism in Wandsworth I have used a case study method to enable me to 
construct an account of the development of the trade union response to the restructuring of local 
government in the borough and to identify the set of conditions which generated that response 
(rather than some other). The account takes the form of the following narrative in which I aim 
both to describe the events which occurred and to identify some of the conditions, processes and 
mechanisms which generated them. (A discussion of the basis of this methodology may be found 
in Chapter Six, where I consider the relationship between case analysis and the realist approach to 
social science.)
^It has proved extremely difficult to obtain accurate union membership figures for local areas. In 
m ^ y cases there are simply no records in the appropriate form. Where such records do exist, 
union officers ^ e  normally unwilling to make them public. This seems to be due in part to the 
intense competition between unions for members in some places.
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A former NUPE activist told me that when the Conservatives came to power 
in 1978 NUPE had about 500 members, and the then GMWU^ around 2,000. 
This implies a union density figure for manual staff of approximately 75 per cent. 
According to the same interviewee, NUPE’s membership was concentrated among 
the refuse collectors and the park-keepers. The gardeners and the vast majority of 
other workplaces in the Council were covered by the GMWU.
In many respects local authority trade unionism in Wandsworth during the 
1970s was typical of the defensive militancy I described in Chapter Two above. 
Faced with historically high levels of inflation and unemployment, and, from 1975, 
attempts by the Labour government jo restrict public expenditure, local government 
trade unions throughout the country were pressing for their living standards to be 
maintained. Although this was a period when terms and conditions for local 
authority employees were determined to a considerable extent through negotiation at 
the National or Provincial Joint Councils, there were some features of the situation 
in Wandsworth Council which not only differentiated it from other boroughs in 
terms of its industrial relations, but also provided part of the context within which 
subsequent events unfolded.
In many areas local authority trade unionism during the 1970s was marked by 
competition between unions for members and influence. In Wandsworth the
establishment of a Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee (JSSC) involving NUPE, the
: : ;
GMWU and the TGWU seems to have minimised this sort of infighting. According 
to a former NUPE activist:
[there was] traditional rivalry throughout the sixties and the early part of the seventies. The 
JSSC helped iron out those difficulties and establish spheres of influence. People felt that 
there was a bigger problem than fighting against each other. Wandsworth was one of those 
see-saw boroughs. Labour had four years in power then the Tories had four years in power. 
The Conservatives were always perceived as being the problem, or a bigger problem than 
the Labour Party. I think that that led to a feeling that sectional union interests should be 
put aside, and people should get together and overcome a more traditional feeling of 
sectarianism. So the G and M convenor and a couple of good shop stewards established the
^General and Municipal Workers’ Union. :
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JSSC.5
Initially the organisation was an informal, even clandestine, organisation, but
it eventually developed into an official negotiating body:
At first it didn’t have any status, people were meeting in their homes, and it was a caucus 
of stewards thrashing out differences between unions, things that could unite them, making 
them march together. By the late 1970s it had ceased to be a body which met almost 
clandestinely in people’s houses and it established itself as the negotiating forum with 
councillors and started to meet in the Town Hall. People were given release to attend the 
JSSC and then the representatives of the JSSC became the representatives of the Joint 
Works Committee, so the whole thing had official status. You had a joint union 
negotiating structure, rather than a negotiating structure which involves all the unions, 
which is something quite different.^
This comparatively high level of unity and strong grassroots organisation was
to prove important in subsequent developments in the borough. However, militant
trade unionism was not confined to the Council’s manual employees. The late
1970s also saw the establishment of Wandsworth NALGO as a key organisation.
A former NALGO activist put it like this:
NALGO was a very well organised and extremely wealthy branch. The branch had had the 
foresight in the 1970s [in fact this was in 1979, after the Conservatives had gained power 
— JP] to set up a strike fund and all members contributed a 16 per cent levy on top of their 
subs. That gave us enormous financial resources which were a useful weapon. We had a 
branch administrator, we had a branch office, we had a lot of equipment, the capacity to 
produce high quality publicity very quickly and a good tradition of having a proper steward 
system.^
The significance of this last characteristic is clear from the fact that it was only 
in the late 1980s that NALGO began introducing a steward-based system of 
representation across thq country.
High levels of membership, strong organisation and a lack of inter-union 
rivalry contributed to the unions’ ability to make gains from the Labour Council. A 
further factor was the character of the Labour group itself. Wandsworth Council 
under Labour was committed to a radical programme of service expansion financed
i
through rate increases. When it was rumoured in early 1978 that the Council
^Interview with the author, 16 January 1990. 
^Interview with the author, 16 January 1990. 
^Interview with the author, 26 January 1990.
104 Responding to restructuring
planned to increase rates by 20 per cent, Councillor Morgan, then the Chair of the
Council’s Finance Sub-committee, told the local newspaper ‘we are aiming to
continue our programme of growth which we committed ourselves to three years
ago’.  ^ Furthermore, this expansion was explicitly linked by some councillors to a
wider project of socialist transformation. According to Councillor Ward,
Wandsworth’s recent decision to make it a condition of the leases for Council factory 
buildings that the employers should pay trade union rates, recognise trade union rights, 
observe health and safety legislation and generally provide good working conditions is a 
step in the right direction. It is important not only because of the undoubted benefits it 
will bring for local workers, but also because it marks a new stage of cooperation between 
the local labour movement and the Labour group on the Borough Council. Labour groups 
on local councils are part of the labour movement, and we should not lose sight of our 
wider political aim of bringing the means of production, distribution and exchange into 
common ownership.^
In the event Labour’s expansion plans did involve a rates rise of 20 per cent, 
leading the local newspaper to headline its lead story ‘Huge rates shock - Labour 
Council does it again’.io The Labour Party manifesto for the May 1978 local 
elections promised ‘no cuts in Council services, no increases in charges and no 
redundancies among Council workers’.^  However it seems that there was already 
widespread dissatisfaction among tlie electorate about the existing level of services. 
In particular Council tenants were unhappy with the standard of housing 
maintenance, described to me by one left Labour councillor as ‘d i r e ’ . i ^
In the 1970s the trade unions were not the only group active in local politics 
in Wandsworth. The Conservative Party too had been preparing for the future. In 
1976 (only a year after Margaret Thatcher became Conservative leader) a New 
Right pressure group called ‘Aims for Freedom and Enterprise’ published a 
pamphlet entitled Waste in Wandsworth: how direct labour squanders ratepayers' 
money and the nation's r e s o u r c e s It was written by the New Right economist
^Wandsworth Borough News 10 February 1978.
^Wandsworth Borough News 2> March 1978.
^^Wandsworth Borough News 10 March 1978.
^^Wandsworth Borough News 1 kpinl\9i%.
^^Interview with the author, 9 November 1989.
^^Sherman A and Mallam D (1976) Waste in Wandsworth: how direct labour squanders ratepayers’
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Alfred Sherman in collaboration with Conservative group leader Dennis Mallam. 
This document, which focuses on the building works department in Wandsworth 
Council, falls short of recommending privatisation, but elaborates many of the 
criticisms which were to become a hallmark of the Conservative approach to local 
government. These include the supposed high degree Of wastage of resources by 
direct labour organisations, the lack of financial competitiveness compared with the 
private sector, and the malign role of the trade unions who are portrayed as gaining 
privileges for one group of workers at the expense of others.
Drawing on this sort of analysis, the Conservative campaign for the local 
elections juxtaposed the perceived poor quality of service and the above average 
rates increase and focussed heavily on the supposed waste and inefficiency of the 
Labour administration. One Labour councillor I spoke to said that this had ‘struck 
a chord with the electorate’, a view which has gained the status of received wisdom 
across the political spectmm, and in the trade unions. A Labour Party campaigner 
at the count on election night commented, ‘how can you expect to win an election
after imposing a 20 per cent rent increase?’.14
It is extremely difficult to assess the causes of particular election results. 
However, regardless of its effect on the decisions of voters, this ideology was 
significant because of the way it informed not merely the actions of the incoming 
Conservative administration, but also in time, and in rather different ways, the 
response of the trade unions to those policies.
These then were the preconditions for the Conservative victory at the polls in 
May 1978. However the borough remained politically marginal until May 1990. 
The intervening twelve years saw a series of conflicts involving the trade unions, 
the political parties and the users of Council services. The outcome of those 
conflicts have had far-reaching implications for Wandsworth, for public services,
money and the nation’s resources (London: Aims for Freedom and Enterprise). 
^^Wandsworth Borough News 12 May 197S.
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for the Conservative government, and not least for the trade unions at both national 
and local levels.
The Conservatives came to power under the leadership of the ‘moderate’ 
Dennis Mallam. The programme on which they were elected (under the heading 
‘Put Wandsworth right’) included promises to reduce ‘waste’ and encourage home 
ownership. No mention at this stage was made of reducing the influence of trade 
unions, or of contracting out Council services. During the remainder of 1978 and 
the early part of 1979 Wandsworth Borough, like many other local authorities was 
involved in a series of industrial disputes with its manual workforce culminating in 
the national public service strikes of the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’. After the 
Conservatives had been in control in Wandsworth for a year, Mallam was replaced 
as leader by his deputy, the much more abrasive and radical Christopher Chope 
who shared the New Right perspectives of the Thatcher government which came to 
power at the same time. This ‘coup’ set the scene for a Thatcherite experiment in 
local government.
The New Right ‘coup’ and early skirmishes
I have already suggested that the restructuring of local government brought about 
by the New Right in Wandsworth may be seen as a sort of experiment for the 
Thatcher government’s wider restructuring of the public services. It is in this sense 
that Wandsworth Council is often referred to as Thatcher’s ‘flagship Council’. In 
much the same way, however, the Chope administration was itself involved in 
experiments within the borough. The development of Conservative policy on the 
Council was marked by some ad hoc solutions and a degree of ruthless 
pragmatism, as well as by the popular image of doctrinaire Thatcherism. Thus to 
some extent it is only with hindsight that the relative coherence of the restructuring 
becomes apparent. That said, the local trade unions were the first to emphasise the 
wider significance of the Wandsworth experiment and were doing so from an early 
stage. '
Wandsworth: laboratory of Thatcherism 107
With hindsight, then, the key components of the Wandsworth ‘model’ 
include (i) reduction of costs through job-shedding, labour intensification, 
organisational change, and sub-contracting; (ii) sales of capital stock (particularly 
council housing); (iii) withdrawal of the local authority from functions deemed 
unnecessary, inappropriate or politically unacceptable (for example, ‘the activities 
of homosexuals, massive units of researchers, strategic planners, police monitoring 
units’; and (iv) prioritising the requirements of capital in the local area (for 
example, the use of receipts from sales to develop the local infrastmcture which has 
‘proved attractive to private sector investment in the borough’.16
As this project developed over time, so did the response of the trade unions. 
In the early stages the unions were most concerned with those areas which had a 
direct impact on their members, such as the reorganisation of Council work and the 
moves to contract out the production of an increasing number of services to the 
private sector. Early campaigns focussed around the defence of jobs and working 
conditions during a period of very high unemployment. As time went on and the 
scale of the proposed changes became apparent, the unions developed a more 
sophisticated and radical approach. This represented the beginnings of a change 
from some of the previous forms of trade union struggle. In particular the 
traditional ‘defensive militancy’ of the 1970s started to give way to a trade 
unionism which sought to use the specific characteristics of the public services to 
set the agenda according to the priorities of workers and users, rather than 
managers. This changing pattern of trade union response can be seen in the 
development of struggles from the initial defeats in the street cleaning service to the
l^Beresford P (1987) Good council guide: Wandsworth 1978-87 (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies) p5.
16/6/4. p6. This use of public sector capital for infrastructural investment is hardly typically 
Thatcherite, although Wandsworth Council’s self-proclaimed status as the ‘Brighter Borough’ 
seemed just as much a part of its appeal to the former Prime Minister as its more right-wing 
policies. Indeed Labour councillors readily accept that this aspect of the programme has been 
successful. Its appeal to Mrs Thatcher may perhaps be explained by its having been financed in 
part through sales of council housing, often on the open market.
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cooperation of NALGO and local tenants groups to prevent the privatisation of
housing caretaking.
It took some time for the new Council leadership to introduce major cuts in
Council expenditure. However, between 1979 and 1987 the Council cut its
revenue expenditure by sixteen per cent in real terms, From the start this had
considerable consequences for the workforce:
By Autumn 1980, with Wandsworth enthusiastically embracing the policy of cutbacks, 
there had been a reduction of over 1,000 jobs through the use of ‘natural wastage’ and 
frozen posts. This had been contributed to by the closure of some old people’s homes, 
luncheon club facilities and other Council establishments considered surplus to
requirements.^^
It was at this point that the Council first raised the threat of privatisation in an 
attempt to force through a restmcturing of the refuse collection service. The tactic 
worked and the agreement implemented in January 1981 resulted in a reduction of 
nine vehicles and 39 jobs, saving the Council over £400,000.
Chope immediately announced further cuts of £21m. These involved 
proposals to reduce the manual workforce by 300 and the white-collar staff by 400. 
The manual and white-collar unions organised a joint day of action followed by 
selective strike action by key white-collar workers. NALGO’s foresight in building 
a large strike fund enabled it to pay its striking members their full salary, thus 
enabling them to see the action through. Cooperation between NALGO and the 
manual unions during this dispute was a key development which prepared the 
ground for what was to come. The unions managed to secure an agreement from 
the Council that there would be no compulsory redundancies and that reductions in 
the workforce would be achieved through a voluntary severance scheme. Initially 
this agreement applied to the whole workforce.
'^ I^bid. p7. This figure excludes expenditure relating to the additional functions taken over by 
London Boroughs following the abolition of the GLC in 1986.
^^Benlow D and Scott I (1983) Fighting privatisation: the struggle for Wandsworth (Nottingham: 
Institute for Workers’ Control and NUPE) p4. 
pp4-5.
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At this time the Council’s street sweepers were involved in negotiations about 
work organisation and working conditions. Dissatisfied with the progress of the 
talks, the Council proposed that while negotiations continued, tenders to carrying 
out street sweeping in Wandsworth should be invited from the private sector. This 
approach was supported by the Leisure and Amenity Services Committee at its 
meeting on 1 July 1981. By December, negotiations with the direct service 
organisation (DSO) had led to an agreement to reduce the workforce to 100 and 
increase labour ‘flexibility’, but the tender invitation had resulted in thirteen private 
companies expressing interest in the contract. Of these, five were under active 
consideration by the Council. All five offered to operate the service with fewer 
workers than the DSO. Proposed staffing levels ranged from a ‘high’ of 86 
(Ramoneur) to a low of 63 (Pritchards)
On 18 January 1982, having previously narrowed the field to a choice 
between Pritchards and the DSO, the Policy and Finance Committee awarded the 
five-year street cleaning contract to Pritchards Industrial Services Limited to start on 
1 March. Pritchards’ tender price was £787,775 compared with an estimated direct 
labour cost of £1.2 million.^i This decision was a defeat for the unions. The 
unions’ objection to privatisation was based on the likely impact on the jobs, wages 
and conditions of their members, both immediately and in the longer term, on a 
possible deterioration in service standards and on the principle that public services 
should not form a source of private profit. Failure to retain the street cleaning 
service in the public sector led to a re-evaluation of the unions’ strategy, the need 
for which rapidly became apparent as the Council turned its attention to the refuse 
collection service.
Pritchards’ contract with the Council contained provisions to impose penalties
^^London Borough of Wandsworth Department of Technical Services quoted in Benlow and Scott 
op. cit. pp8-9.
21Ward M (undated) Municipal monetarism: a study of nine years o f Tory rule in Wandsworth 
(London: Greater London Labour Party) pl3.
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up to and including terminating the contract if the specification was not met. This 
penalty system came into effect after an initial phasing-in period and the contractor 
immediately exceeded the level of penalties which gave the Council the right to 
terminate the contract. The start of the industrial dispute in the refuse collection 
service provided the Council with an excuse to waive the penalties for a period. 
However, even after the refuse dispute had been settled, the standard of street 
cleaning in Wandsworth continued to fall far short of that specified in the contract, 
to the extent that ‘on three separate occasions in 1982 and 1983, Pritchards’ 
performance was so bad that the Council had the right to sack them’.22
Having lost their own workforce, and not wishing to lose face, the Council 
declined to fire the contractor on every occasion when it had the opportunity to do 
so. Instead it sporadically suspended the penalty system and instituted a system of 
penalty-free zones. These measures enabled the Council to retain the contractor 
regardless of the standard of service provided. When Pritchards’ contract expired 
in 1986 the specification was redrawn and the tender awarded to Teamwaste at a 
cost 50 per cent higher than had been provided for in the Councils’ budget. 
Calculations by Michael Ward suggest that overall it would actually have been 
cheaper to retain the old direct labour force in the first place.23
The ‘dust’ and the 1982 election
However, it seems that Chope was determined to push through a widespread 
package of privatisation. Just when Pritchards were running into their first 
problems fulfilling the street cleaning contract they offered to take over the 
Council’s refuse collection service as well. Taking this offer as its cue, on 23 
March 1982, only six weeks before the local elections, the Council decided to invite 
tenders for refuse collection and at the same time to ask the trade unions to submit
22/6/4. p l7 . 
236/4. p l9 .
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proposals for -improving the cost effectiveness’ of the s e r v i c e . 2 4
The unions’ experience with street cleaning privatisation suggested to them 
that involvement in negotiations over the costs and organisation of the direct labour 
service was not in their interests while tenders were being invited from private 
contractors at the same time. The unions took the view that the Council’s 
ideological commitment to privatisation and the ability of the multinational 
companies involved to offer unrealistically low ‘loss-leader’ bids in order to gain a 
foothold involvement in the tendering process could only lead to a ‘victory’ for 
direct labour on the basis of under-cutting the private sector on staffing levels and 
pay and conditions. This, it was felt, was not in the interests of the members 
involved. This position is now widely accepted in the union movement and 
exemplifies the way local developments eventually fed into wider processes of trade 
union response.
Instead of becoming involved in the tendering process the unions launched a 
campaign of opposition to the whole exercise. The organisation of this campaign 
represented a development from forms of trade union action typical of the 1970s. It 
was seen as important to try to form a campaign which was based not merely on the 
manual trade union membership, but also on the ratepayers, NALGO, the local 
Labour Party branches, the Trades Council and tenants’ g r o u p s . 2 5  The liaison 
committee between white-collar and manual trade unions was able to build on the 
spirit of cooperation developed during the street cleaners dispute. It decided that 
the campaign should aim for an end to the tendering process and a ‘no privatisation 
agreement’ covering all the Council’s employees.
The Joint Union Liaison Committee decided to begin the campaign on 19 
April 1982, the day the Council was to invite tenders. The committee called a mass 
meeting of the workforce on 7 April and recommended that the campaign should
24wandswoith Borough Council (1982) Report by the Director o f Technical Services to the 
Policy and Finance Committee (mimeo) p i.
^^Benlow and Scott op. cit. jplO.
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involve industrial action. Two thousand workers from all sections attended the 
meeting and supported the recommendation. The national officers of the unions 
concerned also addressed the gathering.
The strike committee recommended that there should be a one-day strike of all 
Council workers. This would then be followed by a one week strike of all the 
manual workers with the refuse section remaining on strike thereafter and picketing 
waste disposal sites to try to prevent the Council using contractors to clear the 
rubbish. This action was relatively successful and some of the contractors 
withdrew early in the dispute. Following their earlier pattern of selective industrial 
action, NALGO brought key sections such as cashiers and telephonists out on 
strike, effectively stopping the Council’s administration from functioning. The 
union’s ability to pay generous strike pay to its members was important in 
maintaining support for the action.
The industrial action generated a lot of publicity. The unions produced their 
own propaganda and targeted the; broadcast media. The local newspaper, the 
Wandsworth Borough News, featured the dispute on page one for nine weeks in 
succession. The unions ‘felt more than pleased at the way the arguments came 
across’.26 Despite the relatively favourable publicity, however, the unions in 
Wandsworth found it extremely difficult to generalise the struggle to the 
workforces of other London Boroughs, the national union organisations27 or the 
local Labour group.
With the local elections approaching, the unions approached the Labour Party 
in an attempt to solicit guarantees that the tendering process would be stopped if the
26Benlow D, Ramage P, French M, Simmonds D and Whitfield D (1983) Public jobs for private 
profit: fighting contractors in Wandsworth (London: Wandsworth Trade Union Publications) p52. 
2^The then NUPE branch secretary, Dave Benlow brought an emergency resolution to NUPE’s 
1982 national conference which took place while the dispute in Wandsworth was still going on. 
Speaking in the debate he pleaded with the national union for support for the dispute. The 
Executive Council supported the resolution and it was carried by the conference, though only after 
the Assistant General Secretary had warned of ‘serious difficulties of logistics and practical 
problems’. See NUPE (1982) ‘Report of national conference’ in NUPE Report (London: NUPE) 
pl84.
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Labour Party was returned to power. While the General Management Committees 
of the constituencies in the borough supported the unions, senior figures in the 
Labour group on the Council initially declined to give the unequivocal guarantees 
the workers were seeking. Eventually all the Labour councillors did sign a 
statement of support, but it was given little publicity.28
When I asked one local trade unionist if the Council elections had been seen 
as something of a referendum on the issue of privatisation, he said:
No it wasn’t posed like that. This was the trouble. We were arguing that the Labour 
group should give it a high profile so that we could discuss the issue of what kind of 
council services people want. We thought this was an opportunity at least to do that, since 
that was one of the reasons we were out on strike. But the starting point was that council 
workers had a bad image, and I think there was a feeling they would be on a hiding to 
nothing if they made too high a profile.29
The ideological construction of Council workers which had developed during
the period of Labour control in the 1970s on top of the general memory of the
‘Winter of Discontent’ was clearly influential both in determining the response of
Labour councillors (some of whom had no firm roots in the Labour movement) and
in a rather different way in the process of self-criticism and transformation in union
strategies in the aftermath of the refuse dispute. A former officer of the NALGO
branch in Wandsworth told me that this perception of the manual workers was also
held by the white collar employees of the Council:
Getting [white collar] support around privatisation was not as easy as it might have been. 
The ‘dust’ was not a popular section. The perception of them conformed to the usual 
stereotype of people who started at five o’clock in the morning, clocked off at ten and then 
did their taxi job, ‘totting’,30 Christmas boxes [...] they weren’t the most popular group of 
workers. But I think there was a general perception that you just couldn’t let them go. It 
was quite clear to everybody that this was a key dispute that would be decisive one way or 
the other.31
However, Wandsworth NALGO was under no illusions about the impact of 
this perception on the Labour group:
The key thing was the election and there was a problem for us in that people were looking
28senlow et al. op. cit. p56.
29interview with the author, 16 January 1990. s
30Totting is the practice of retrieving items of value from the refuse for resale.
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to the election to sort it out. They were looking for Labour to come back and resolve it. 
As a union our strategy certainly hadn’t been to wait for Labour, because we didn’t trust 
them one inch. NALGO had informal discussion with a senior figure in the Labour group 
who was desperately anxious for us to call off the action because it was perceived as 
damaging Labour’s election prospects. This senior figure wouldn’t give us any 
commitment not to privatise the dust. I think they were influenced by a perception that the 
dust were a bunch of racist so and sos and didn’t have black workers and therefore their 
liberal revulsion at their perception of the dust probably got the better of them.32
In the event the dispute did not seem to do the Labour Party any electoral 
harm. Against the national trend the Conservative majority was reduced from 
eleven to five on 6 May, but this did nothing to weaken the Council’s resolve to see 
the dispute through. Once Labour had lost the election the NALGO leadership split 
between those who wished to continue with industrial action to support the refuse 
collectors, and those who argued for a return to work and negotiations. By this 
stage the strike fund which had been built up over years was running low, and 
despite the Conservatives’ reduced majority, the defeat at the election led some to 
question the legitimacy of continuing the a c t i o n .3 3
At a meeting of the membership on 12 May the decision was taken by two to 
one to call off the NALGO action. With the refuse section now out on its own it 
was only a matter of time before the dispute came to a bitter end. The management 
offered to let the unions see the private tenders before putting in their own 
proposals. On the basis of this and with no sign of national support the strike was
i
called off.
The lowest tender for the work came from Grandmet and this was accepted 
by the Council. The company took over the provision of the refuse service in 
Wandsworth in October 1982.
31lnterview with the author, 26 January 1990. 
32interview with the author, 26 January 1990. 
33Benlow et al. op. cit. p58.
Wandsworth: laboratory o f Thatcherism 115
Learning the lessons
The Council
The failure of the trade unions to prevent the privatisation of the refuse collection 
service in Wandsworth through either direct action or the electoral defeat of the 
Conservatives heralded the start of a programme of increasing privatisation in the 
Borough. The current leader of the Council, Sir Paul Beresford, identifies fifteen 
different services which have been privatised and claims that this has ‘saved’ the 
Council £19m, or an average of 30 per cent of the relevant budgets. Furthermore 
the use of competitive tendering procedures in a further eight services resulted in 
the work being retained,in-house and further ‘savings’ of £5.9m.34
The Council learnt from its early experiences of privatisation. After the initial 
poor performance of Pritchards the administration has become much more stringent 
in the vetting and monitoring of contractors. A former Labour councillor told me 
that the contract specifications developed by Wandsworth have been adopted as 
models by, among others, the Labour-controlled Association of London 
Authorities.35 The Council’s political opponents (including some in the union 
movement) agree that the standard of some of the privatised services is satisfactory. 
What causes concern is the conditions for the workforces involved and the low 
level of provision of some other Council functions such as social services: ‘on 
basic services - lighting, pavements, sweeping and bin-emptying - Fiona 
MacTaggart [the former leader of the Labour group] concedes it would be wrong to 
suggest that Wandsworth is not competent but “that is only two per cent of our 
budget’” .36
The unions
The unions were just as keen to learn the lessons of the street cleaning and refuse
34Beresford op. cit. plO.
35interview with the author, 9 November 1989.
36Quoted in Linton M (1990) Tf I can get it for £148 why pay moreV The Guardian 16 May p21.
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collection privatisation episodes. This was seen as important for future struggles in 
Wandsworth, and because of the conviction that the Conservative Party would try 
to generalise the model of local government which was developing in Wandsworth. 
Given the threat that this would pose to the union movement in the public services 
sector it was seen to be important that the unions should themselves seek to spread 
the lessons to other areas and to the national level.
For the trade unions, learning the lessons of the events of the early 1980s 
involved a twin process of self-criticism and transformation. By the time of the 
dispute over the privatisation of the refuse collection, the unions were already 
drawing lessons from their earlier defeat in street cleaning. The most notable 
developments were the refusal to participate in the tendering process, the decision 
to use industrial action, including solidarity action, the attempt to get a commitment 
from the Labour Party to halt the privatisation process if returned to office, and the 
emphasis given to publicity.
The decision not to participate in the tendering process stemmed from the 
preceding experience with the street cleaning dispute. It was increasingly seen that 
the Council was engaged in a political project to reduce the role of the public sector 
in the provision of services, and that nothing was to be gained from participating in 
the exercise. The decision to use industrial action stemmed from a belief that such 
means could potentially force the Council to reverse its policy. This conviction was 
based again on the strength and relative unity of the local authority unions in the 
area. The decision by the NALGO branch to establish a strike fund was of key 
significance in enabling NALGO members to participate fully in solidarity action, 
as was NALGO’s unusually strong steward organisation, particularly in the 
housing department and its high level of activism. The dependence of many in the 
local community on the social services department led to those workers being 
exempted by the unions from action. This recognised the importance of gaining 
public support, something which was also reflected in the high profile publicity
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campaign. The unions were largely happy with the publicity the campaign
received, but as yet there was little attempt to break down user alienation from
public services. The publicity still focussed on the high levels of unemployment in
the area, and while the campaign’s own newspaper, Wandsworth Call, stressed the
threat to services the eniphasis was on the level of service provision, rather than the
nature or quality of the services provided. The justifiable emphasis on high
unemployment might also be seen as something of a double-edged sword. While it
may encourage a defence of jobs, it can also frighten workers from taking action in
breach of contract in case this leads to dismissal. This is particularly a factor for
those workers engaged in solidarity action.
It was seen as important not merely to learn the lessons of the dispute but also
to disseminate them to other areas and to the wider labour movement. Soon after
the end of the strike and only one week after the Council had awarded the refuse
contract to Grand Met, Dave Benlow (NUPE branch secretary during the
campaign) and Ian Scott (the NUPE full-time officer with responsibility for
Wandsworth) participated in a seminar on the issue of privatisation at Ruskin
College in Oxford. There they presented a paper on the Wandsworth experience
which outlined the lessons learnt from the dispute. The papers from the seminar
were subsequently published as an edited collection that they might be read more
widely.37 In addition NUPE published Benlow and Scott’s paper as a separate
p am phlet.38  Another, slightly more detailed pamphlet was produced in
Wandsworth by the local union activists.39
These publications identify the major lessons for the trade unions from the
defeats in Wandsworth:
It must be remembered that Wandsworth Council was then at the vanguard of the 
developing attack on the public sector. It was Margaret Thatcher’s favourite borough, led 
by aggressive Tory hatchet men who boasted publicly at political conferences and seminars 
of their past and proposed achievements in privatising public services. It was politically
37Hastings S and Levie H (1983) P r/vatow n? (Nottingham: Spokesman ).
38Renlow and Scott op. cit.
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very important to the Conservative Party and its backers to sustain the momentum of 
privatisation at that early stage. [...] Crucially we were the first Trade Union organisation 
in local government to stand and fight in a major strike action [...] Wandsworth unions had 
to be broken to discourage active resistance elsewhere.40
The activists then go on to outline the preconditions for a successful
campaign. It is interesting to note that the space-time context of the action, which I
will discuss in some detail in Chapter Six, is central (albeit in different language) to
the trade unionists’ self-appraisal:
We thus confronted a strong, well-financed, nationally supported and dogmatic adversary 
with traditional localised Trade Union weapons, and these weapons proved to be not 
enough. It is now clear to us that against this particular enemy with our particular demand 
at that particular time, we would have needed all the weapons summarised below in order to 
win through:
What we had
- a joint organisation of all Council unions which was able to overcome some traditional 
sectional rivalries
- a local tradition of militancy, and a broad understanding of the issues at stake amongst 
most union members in the borough
What we lacked
- the support of a more general national campaign with national resources invested in our 
local struggle (ie more than just strike pay)
- supportive industrial action of other local government workers in neighbouring boroughs, 
and of workers in the local Branches of the national utility unions
- the active support of the local tenants and consumers of public services.41
To meet the need for a national campaign which could successfully coordinate 
action at local and national levels as appropriate they proposed the establishment of 
a permanent ‘Task Force’ to intervene rapidly with practical support for a local 
campaign when necessary. This body would be set up under the auspices of the 
TUG Public Services Committee, and would provide assistance with 
administration, publicity, media presentation, and liaison with tenants and user 
groups. They argue that this would resolve ‘in a practical way the difficulty of 
fighting local disputes which are the result of the Government’s national strategy on
privatisation’.^^
The suggestion of this policy as a result of drawing lessons from their
^^Benlow et al., op. cit.
40/6/4. pis.
41/6/4. ppl8-19, emphasis original. 
42/6/4. p21, emphasis original.
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campaign is related to the status of Wandsworth as a flagship borough, and this is 
one way that the local character of the authority had an impact on the unions’ 
evaluation of their strategy. The second suggestion of more support from 
neighbouring boroughs derives straightforwardly from the lack of such support in 
the Wandsworth campaign, and the awareness of the broader implications for the 
restructuring of the public services in general. Finally, the identification of a lack 
of active support from the users of services as a key weakness is partly simply 
because such support would assist the unions in realising their aims. It is however 
interesting that such a suggestion should be stressed by unions in Wandsworth, 
and this has to do with the rapidly changing social make-up of the area. I will 
explore the links between the characteristics of local areas and trade union policy in 
detail in Chapter Six.
New initiatives
It was not long before the unions had the chance to try to practice what they were 
preaching. Many (though not all) of the practical initiatives to implement the new 
approach were undertaken by NALGO, something which reflects the fact that 
NALGO’s organisation survived the initial attacks much better than did those of the 
manual unions. One example of a campaign will illustrate the path of events.
In July 1983 the Council invited Grand Metropolitan, which held the refuse 
contract, to conduct a study of the feasibility of privatising the management of a 
Roehampton housing estate. The union whose members would be affected by such 
a development was NALGO. According to a senior NALGO activist, the local 
branch quickly decided that a novel strategy should be employed to prevent the 
privatisation of housing management. The key element of this strategy was an 
alliance with users’ groups (in this case tenants’ associations) on the affected estate. 
This involved winning the confidence of tenants’ associations in Roehampton, 
campaigning jointly with them in opposition to privatisation, and combining 
adventurous publicity with traditional industrial action taken in conjunction with the
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tenants so that they were aware of why the workers were striking.
The focus of the campaign was the joint preparation of an alternative plan for 
the delivery of the housing management service. This was drawn up by the tenants 
and the shopfloor workers in the Roehampton estate office (regardless of which 
union, if any, they belonged to). The plan analysed why the service was unpopular 
and failed to command public support, and examined ways of improving the 
service so that the unions could be seen to be concerned about the quality of service 
delivery.
Starting from the premise that the plan would involve no cuts, they took the 
existing budget as given and designed a reorganisation of the service to counterpose 
against whatever Grand Met might produce. The willingness of the unions to enter 
into ‘severe self-criticism’ at joint meetings earned them the trust of the tenants who 
‘adopted the strategy enthusiastically’.
The fact that the unions were now on the attack on the issue of privatisation 
lifted morale. Some of the plan was put into action. The unions established 
evening housing surgeries staffed by the membership who took time off in lieu 
during the day. The aim of this was to see if the management would dare to 
challenge the new ideas by disciplining workers for taking the time off.
A one day strike was planned. At one meeting when some workers seemed a 
little reluctant to participate the tenants themselves insisted that they go on strike to 
show that they were in earnest. On the day of the strike a joint picket was 
established outside the housing office as a protest against the visit of the Grand Met 
representative to consult the office’s files. One of the unionists involved described 
the action:
you had to go through a small courtyard to get to the office so it was quite easy to
barricade. A whole group of tenants blocked-off the entrance and we were behind them.
And the Grand Met bloke couldn’t get in.^^
^^Interview with the author, 26 January 1990.
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The campaign thus undermined the Conservative critique of public services 
and justification for privatisation by showing that the union position had gained the 
support of the very people who were supposed to be dissatisfied with the service. 
The campaign also targeted the contractor directly through a picket of Grand Met’s 
headquarters and a consumer boycott of the company’s products. Unused to such 
political pressure the company was embarrassed by the attention and eventually 
pulled out of the project.
While this gave an important morale boost to the unions in Wandsworth, the 
weakening that the organisations had received meant that this sort of approach 
could not in the end prevent the Conservative project for the Borough continuing. 
In recognition of the importance accorded by the Thatcher regime its ‘flagship 
Council’, the leader, Christopher Chope, was awarded an QBE. - In January 1983 
he stood down to be replaced by Paul (now Sir Paul) Beresford. Chope entered 
parliament in the 1983 General Election and rapidly rose to junior ministerial rank.
5 The development of national 
union poiicy
This chapter considers the development of trade union policy at the national level. I 
have shown how the Thatcher administration placed considerable importance on 
ensuring that the restructuring of local government services was not restricted to a 
few isolated enclaves like Wandsworth. The government sought to generalise from 
the radical experiments conducted in a small number of right wing authorities.
Many of the trade unionists involved in the disputes in Wandsworth believed 
that it was the failure of the labour piovement to generalise in the same way from its 
experiences that was one of the major causes of their early defeats. This complaint 
was concerned with the lack of nationally-coordinated action in support of a local 
dispute. However such immediate action is not the only form in which the 
generalisation of experiences can occur, and even at this relatively early stage there 
is evidence that at least some of the unions recognised the threat posed by 
privatisation and competitive tendering. This chapter focuses largely on the 
changing responses of the unions to that threat. It will be clear from the arguments 
of the preceding chapter that this threat is only one component of a wider process of 
restructuring. It is therefore important to justify the more limited focus of this 
account.
Firstly, while it is only one component of the restructuring, it is a central one. 
It represents a attempt by the government to bring about a significant change in the 
relationship between the public and private sectors of the economy. Importantly, 
this change would be a change in the power relationship between the two. The 
public sector would become subordinate to both the requirements and 
organisational principles of private capital to a much greater extent than it has been 
in the past.
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Therefore secondly, it would act as an important part of the shift to a new 
mode of regulation which was outlined in Chapter Three. It would not be the only 
possible route out of the crisis of Fordism, but is part of a possible one. Whether it 
could succeed before its own contradictions overcome it is another question.
Thirdly, most of the trade unionists I spoke to argued that while privatisation 
and competitive tendering were only part of a wider process of change they were a 
key part. Thus if I am to investigate how trade union responses develop over time 
and space it is important to focus on an area where the trade unions see it as 
important to generate a response. i
Fourthly, given this situation, the response to privatisation and competitive 
tendering in local government has been one area where trade union action has been 
unusually vigorous and rapidly developing. It might be thought that this means that 
it is also unrepresentative of union responses to social change in general. Quite so. 
However it is not my intention to be representative in a statistical sense. (Although 
I hope that this study will illuminate other areas of trade union activity.) On the 
contrary, just as Wandsworth Borough Council and the Local Government Act 
1988 might be described as part of a ‘leading edge’ of a process of restructuring or 
even of a new mode of regulation, so the trade union response to these 
developments forms, I believe, part of a leading edge of the changing nature of 
trade unionism in Britain in the 1980s.
These four reasons, are reinforced by a number of practical considerations 
which require the object of study to be relatively closely delimited. In what follows 
therefore I shall consider first the initial individual national union responses to the 
early stages of privatisation. These policies tended to reflect the forms of trade 
union practice inherited from the 1970s. I shall then discuss the development of an 
alternative approach by an institution outside the mainstream of the labour 
movement. After considering the unions’ campaign to prevent the compulsory 
tendering legislation reaching the statute books I shall conclude by outlining their
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policy towards that legislation once it was enacted.
Initial developments
In the early stages (up to 1983) the national union organisations were responding in 
a number of ways. Firstly, they provided some direct support to those engaged in 
local action. For example the mass meeting of council workers in Wandsworth 
was attended by national officers of all the unions involved and motions of support 
were passed at national union conferences such as that endorsed by the NUPE 
conference in 1982. Where this fell short of what some local organisations were 
demanding was in failing to engage in national action beyond the particular dispute 
in progress.
Secondly, they formulated policy and advice concerning the appropriate 
response by local union organisations in the event of a privatisation threat. In 1982 
NUPE published two pamphlets titled Keep your council services public: say no to 
private contractors and Defend direct labour, while shortly afterwards the then 
GMWU published Privatisation and public services} These documents outlined 
the unions’ respective positions in relation to local initiatives to privatise local 
services. They exemplify certain characteristics of the unions’ approach at this 
stage: (i) each union produced its own pamphlet(s): there was no significant joint 
union work at the national level; (ii) the future wider threat of privatisation was seen 
as stemming from the voluntary replication of the Wandsworth approach rather than 
legislation; (iii) union action against the threat of privatisation was seen as 
essentially a local affair; and (iv) the fight against private contractors was to be on 
the basis of a defence of existing standards and forms of service, rather than a 
critique of the nature of current provision. For example:
these [campaign] measures will help to combat the climate of opinion which the
Government has tried to create of an image of the public service as bureaucratic and
^NUPE (1982) Keep your council services public: say no to private contractors (London: NUPE); 
NUPE (1982) Defend direct labour (London: NUPE); GMWU (1982) Privatisation and public 
services (Esher; GMWU).
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inefficient.^
Subsequently the unions were to argue that the representation of the public 
services as bureaucratic and inefficient stems as much from the direct experiences 
of the users of those services as from government propaganda.
Thirdly, the national labour movement institutions were engaged in a 
propaganda battle both against the government’s encouragement of privatisation 
and against private contractors.
At this stage, although senior members of the government were emphasising 
the supposed benefits of contracting out,^ there was little evidence that the 
government wanted to force widespread competitive tendering in local government. 
However, the unions were facing threats from compulsory tendering in two areas. 
In local government itself, the Local Government Planning and Land Act, which 
was passed in 1980, aimed to compel councils to compete against the private sector 
to provide building services. In the National Health Service it was clear that the 
DHSS was determined to insist that local Health Authorities put their ancillary 
services out to tender. In both these cases the unions involved were often the same 
ones whose members worked in the local government services subsequently to be 
affected by COT, namely the GMB, NUPE, NALGO and the TGWU.
Thus while national union action on local government privatisation was 
limited before 1983, the unions involved did see policies such as those pursued in 
Wandsworth as part of a larger shift in the production and provision of public 
services and in the relationship between the state and private sectors. For example, 
at NUPE’s annual conference in 1982 a resolution was passed with the support of 
the leadership which said among other things that
Conference notes the campaign being organised by Government and the contracting industry
to privatise public services and break up direct labour organisations in local authorities.
We recognise that this is being achieved by way of a concerted political campaign backed
up by legislation, which seeks to undermine local authority trade union and working
^GMWU op.czV. p22.
^Ascher K (1987) The politics of privatisation (London: Macmillan) p38.
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conditions and the whole concept of services based upon need, not profit.^
The early responses of the national union organisations were fairly traditional 
ones. By and large they consisted of the publication of guidelines for action which 
was otherwise to be organised at the local level. Although the unions may have 
seen a common threat, at this stage their policy formulation was taking place in 
isolation from one another. Campaigns were on the basis of defending, rather than 
criticising, the status quo and while lip service was paid to the need to pursue 
campaigns at the local level jointly with users and the other unions, there was only 
the most rudimentary guidance as far as the practical implementation of this strategy 
was concerned.
However there were some signs of change. In early 1983 NALGO launched 
a campaign against privatisation in the public services under the slogan ‘Put people 
first’. This lasted for three months and cost £lm . Such large scale general 
publicity campaigns had long been an aspect of national trade union activity on a 
range of issues. This one was sufficiently novel to attract grudging praise from the 
activists in Wandsworth. While insisting that their request for national union action 
had something very different in nund they stated ‘it would be irresponsible to 
dismiss this campaign out of hand, since after all it is the most imaginative effort to 
date by any Trade Union in this field’.^
After the re-election of the Thatcher government in May 1983 the character of 
the unions’ policies towards privatisation and competitive tendering in local 
government began to change more rapidly. Before considering how and why this 
occurred, however, it is important to consider the (in my view) crucial role played 
by an organisation outside the formal institutions of the trade union movement.
^NUPE (1982) ‘Report of national conference’ in NUPE Report (London: NUPE) pp 176-7. 
^Benlow D, Ramage P, French M, Simmonds D and Whitfield D (1983) Public jobs for private 
profit: fighting contractors in Wandsworth (London: Wandsworth Trade Union Publications) pl9.
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The SCAT initiative
Services to Community Action and Trade Unions (SCAT) is a ‘national housing, 
planning and public service project serving the labour movement’. Established in 
1973, s c a t ’s initial activities were concerned with housing issues. Originally it 
was funded by Shelter, the housing charity, but its increasing politicisation led to 
the establishment of SCAT Publications as a separate organisation. The group 
became increasingly experienced in campaigning with tenants groups and sees the 
development of campaign strategies as one of its main strengths.
After 1979 SCAT became more concerned with issues around the 
privatisation of public services. Being outside the mainstream of the trade union 
organisations enabled it to adopt a critical perspective on the existing state of public 
service provision, and on the forms of trade unionism which had built up within it 
which were discussed in Chapter Two. In 1983 SCAT began publishing ‘Public 
Service Action’: a newsletter which sought to inform the labour movement on the 
processes of privatisation and restructuring in the public services and publicise 
campaign initiatives.
In 1980 a senior member of NUPE’s London Division and an activist in 
SCAT started to work together on what was initially intended as an education pack 
for trade unionists on the subject of privatisation. However, by the time it was 
published in 1982 it had developed beyond its early aims and can now be seen as a 
key document in the development of labour movement policy on public service 
privatisation. The pack contained what was to become known as the ‘seven-point 
plan’. What distinguished this strategy from previous policies on privatisation was 
the implicit critique of both existing standards of public services and past union 
practices. This approach therefore acknowledges the extent to which the New 
Right critique of the public sector is in tune with the experiences of many users of 
public sector services.
The strategy represents a critique of many of the (implicit) assumptions
128 Responding to restructuring
underpinning the sort of defensive trade union action which failed to prevent the 
privatisation of street cleaning and refuse collection in Wandsworth and elsewhere. 
Drawing on the experience of fighting cuts in public services in the late 1970s, 
SCAT put a series of five new assumptions in their place. Firstly it was thought 
that ‘defensive demands alone are inadequate’ since they imply fighting to restore 
something which was already inadequate. Second it was recognised that the 
alienation of service users from public services meant that automatic public support 
was unlikely to be forthcoming. This means that thirdly, a successful defence of 
the principle of public provision requires a joint struggle by workers and users. 
Fourthly, given the alienation referred to, this must involve trade unionists in 
developing new visions of what public services involve and alternative forms of 
provision. Finally, reliance on traditional forms of industrial action will be 
inadequate.
Figure 5.1: The seven point plan
The ‘Seven Point Plan’
1 Developing alternative ideas and demands to improve services - this includes 
sections on demanding ‘no privatisation’ agreements with Labour-controlled 
councils, and developing workers’ and users’ plans.
2 Education and propaganda - including preparation of material for the workplace, to 
users of services and to the wider public, explaining the full effects of 
privatisation and describing the value and advantages of public services.
3 Building stronger workplace organisations and links with workers in other 
boroughs - through regular depot/section/department mass meetings, setting up 
local authority joint shop stewards committees and links with JSSCs in other 
areas.
4 Developing joint action and organising user committees with PTAs, tenants 
groups - why joint action is important and how to develop links with users 
including some recent examples.
5 Tactical use of industrial action and negotiating machinery - including the use of 
selective strike action, refusing to co-operate with management on various issues, 
refusal to collect charges and other forms of selective industrial action to 
strengthen a negotiating position. This must be done in conjunction with other 
action in order to minimise the alienation of the users of services.
6 Direct action by workers and users - including picketing, organising boycotts, 
occupations and campaigns to improve services - all to strengthen industrial 
action and build political support.
7 Counter offensive against contractors in public services - covering fighting the 
preparation of tenders, imposing conditions on contractors through the 
implementation of strong Standing Orders, and campaigning to remove existing 
contractors.
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These assumptions inform the practical strategy itself, which was outlined in 
one of the papers presented to the trade unions’ privatisation workshop at Ruskin 
College in 1982 (see Figure 5.1).
It will be immediately apparent that a number of these elements were present 
in the campaign in Roehampton to prevent the privatisation of housing management 
which was discussed in the preceding chapter. SCAT was involved in the 
publication of one of the accounts of the disputes in Wandsworth, and in the 
aftermath of their defeat the union activists there were keen to apply an alternative 
approach.
In Chapter Two I suggested that the forms of trade union action which 
developed with the growth of the public sector services in the 1960s and early 
1970s and with its subsequent retrenchment after 1976 could be characterised as 
‘defensive militancy’. These forms became routinised in the practices of public 
service unionism so that they continued to be used to fight battles for which they 
were no longer necessarily appropriate. The assumptions outlined above, and the 
strategy based on them, may be seen as an attempt to break the simple reproduction 
of public service trade unionism over time and to transform it so that it is better 
suited to the new terrain.
The campaign against iegisiation
It would be wrong to iniply that the seven-point plan has been adopted directly as a 
joint union policy on all aspects of local government restructuring. It has not. 
However it is an important component of, and in many ways was the trigger for, a 
shift in overall union policy which was simultaneously a shift in the ways trade 
unions and trade unionists in the public sector represent themselves to themselves 
and to others.
This shift involves a change in the way that the relationship between trade 
unions and the general public is represented. Specifically, trade unions have come 
to see and represent themselves as providers of a service to the public, rather than
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as production workers. Language is of crucial importance to this shift. Thus the 
public are referred to almost universally as ‘service users’. The choice of this term 
is deliberate, contrasting as it does with the government’s preferred label, 
‘customer’. The differing ideological connotations of these two descriptions are 
recognised by the unions and actively used as part of the challenge to the 
government’s policies. This is part of a broad attempt to identify the interests of 
‘users’ with those of trade unionists.
In addition to changes at the level of ideology there were a number of 
practical developments. The unions’ approach changed from an individual to a 
joint union one. The internal organisational structures of the unions were altered 
with new committees and research units established to deal with the government’s 
attempts to generalise competitive tendering. Links were formed or strengthened 
with other organisations such as the Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the 
Association of Direct Labour Organisations. An increasing weight came to be 
placed on research and intelligence. Initially this had been limited to gathering 
press cuttings: by 1989 it had developed to the level of a joint union computerised 
data base covering the private contracting industry and the progress of compulsory 
tendering in local government.
These changes occurred gradually and unevenly over a period of years. The 
impetus for many of them was the unions’ campaign to prevent the government 
introducing the compulsory tendering provisions which were ultimately embodied 
in the Local Government Act 1988. Before the general election of 1983 there were 
no signs that the government would move in this direction. However, the new 
parliamentary intake included Christopher Chope, formerly the leader of 
Wandsworth Councillor and Michael Forsyth, formerly a councillor in 
Westminster, and the author of an Adam Smith Institute pamphlet outlining the 
New Right justification for the private provision of public services.^
%orsyth M (1981) Re-servicing Britain (London: Adam Smith Institute).
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Ascher describes the campaign that these newly elected members waged from 
the backbenches to persuade the government to force all local authorities to engage 
in competitive tendering exercises^ However, while the election manifesto had 
promised to encourage local authorities to pursue tendering, it was not until late in 
1984 that the government finally committed itself to formal action.
Meanwhile, the period since the Wandsworth disputes had seen a significant 
decline in voluntary contracting out by local authorities. The TUC’s contribution to 
the development of a national trade union movement response had been to publish 
extensive evidence of the failures of private contractors to provide an acceptable 
service and the intense union publicity campaign may have contributed to an 
unwillingness among all but the most ideologically committed of local authorities to 
engage in privatisation.^
Despite the high profile opposition, in February 1985 the Government 
published a Green Paper entitled Competition in the provision o f local authority 
services. This document laid out proposals which, if enacted, would compel all 
local councils and some other public authorities to offer the private sector the 
chance to compete for the right to provide a number of services commonly provided 
by direct labour.
The Green Paper proposed that wide powers be given to the Secretary of 
State to decide which areas of council activity should be subject to enforced 
tendering. Strict financial accounting procedures would have to be followed by 
direct service organisations and financial targets (effectively a profitability criterion) 
would have to be met. Where local authorities chose to award their contracts in- 
house on a basis that the Secretary of State considered unfair or ‘anti-competitive’ 
they could be forced to close their direct labour operation and hand the work to the 
private sector.
^Ascher op. cit. pp38-40.
^TUC (1984) Privatisation file 1 (London: TUC); TUC (1984) Privatisation file  2 (London: 
TUC).
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This move was not entirely unexpected. The unions had already been faced 
with similar changes in the NHS which had been introduced through the 
mechanism of ministerial directives. They realised that backbench pressure for 
legislation was intense. They had also been contending with the provisions of the 
Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980. However the government had 
learnt from the 1980 Act that recalcitrant authorities would aim to circumvent the 
intentions of the legislation in various ways and the stricter proposals of the Green 
Paper were an (in the event partly unsuccessful) attempt to prevent the use of such 
tactics in the future.
The unions were therefore able to draw on their experiences of compulsory 
tendering in the NHS and local government building departments as well as the 
lessons they learnt in Wandsworth and its imitators in developing their respective 
responses to the new threat. At this stage the unions were still producing their own 
policies in relative isolation from one another.
GMB
Although it was issued before the detailed provisions of the Green Paper were 
known, the GMB’s privatisation policy was adopted in the context of increasing 
government pressure on local authorities to adopt tendering.^ Like other union 
policies before it places competitive tendering in the context of a wider shift 
towards private provision, and stresses the threat to union members involved. 
Against the government it argues that the financial savings privatisation is claimed 
to produce are short term and minimal compared with the longer term impact. It 
insists that the private sector does not provide better quality services, pointing to the 
level of defaults in local authority contracts. Finally it claims that the government’s 
claim to be rolling back the state involves the replacing of public monopolies by 
private ones, and does nothing to increase freedom of choice for the consumer, lo
^GMB (1984) Privatisation: GMB policy statement (Esher; GMB). 
^^Ibid. pp6-7.
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Having stated its objections to privatisation the GMB proceeds to outline its
policy to oppose it. In addition to the usual publicity campaign and membership
education programmes the union declares its support for industrial action to prevent
privatisation ‘wherever it is an effective way of resisting privatisation moves’.
However, in the light of subsequent developments the next clause is the most
interesting. It states that:
where there is a possibility of tendering ‘in house’ by direct labour in order to stop sub 
contracts going to privateers, the GMB will give every assistance and support to groups of 
members attempting to put in such tenders in order to preserve their terms and conditions 
and the quality of the service they provide.
The joint union policy developed at a later date and subscribed to by the GMB 
is that there should be no involvement of trade unionists in putting in tenders for the 
‘in house’ work. While the development of the joint union initiative was widely 
seen as crucial for a successful response the difficulties of uniting trade unions with 
different, and sometimes conflicting material interests, membership bases and 
political views has meant that in a number of ways joint union action has not been 
as ‘joint’ as it was hoped it would be. The GMB’s role as a private sector, as well 
as a public sector union, has been implicated in this. For example in the next 
paragraph of the 1984 policy document the GMB commits itself to unionising 
private contractors’ workforces, where contracts are lost to the private sector. The 
ease with which the GMB was able to adopt such a position stems from its long 
history as a union in the private sector, and from its determination to reverse the 
dramatic collapse in its membership through aggressive recruitment campaigns. 
This has laid it open to the charge from some in the labour movement that it has less 
of a commitment to preventing privatisation than NUPE which has in the past been 
a solely public sector organisation. It has also been suggested to me that in certain 
circumstances the GMB has a vested interest in allowing privatisation since that
^ I^bid. p l 3 .  
'^^ Ibid. p l 3 .
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might present it with a new workforce to organise in a service which had 
traditionally been recruited by another union.
In fact NUPE is also committed to recruiting the workforces of private 
contractors following a stormy debate at its 1982 co n fe ren ce .H o w ev er the 
differences of interests between the various unions affected by compulsory 
tendering have sometimes generated practical conflicts at the local level.
N U PE
The GMB’s policy statement ranged widely over the whole area of privatisation. 
NUPE and NALGO both produced detailed and closely argued responses to the 
Green Paper itself. NUPE’s document^^ was subsequently published as a 
campaign pamphlet titled Local services: the case against privatisation}^ 
NALGO’s arguments are contained in a report from its National Local Government 
Committee to its 1986 Annual Local Government Group Meeting.
NUPE’s case against the proposed legislation is set out under six h e a d i n g s .  
Firstly, the union argues that OCT represents ‘a fundamental challenge to the 
principles of local democracy and to the rights of elected councillors’. Pointing to 
the limited extent of voluntary contracting out in local government, NUPE draw the 
conclusion that councils have by and large chosen not to tender, a choice which in 
the future would be denied them. Secondly, the proposals imply a ‘serious 
reduction in the standard of provision of local services’. Here NUPE cites the 
failure of private contractors to provide services of an adequate standard.
Thirdly, the so-called financial savings will be more than offset by the costs 
of the tendering process, supervising contractors and redundancy pay. The union
l^NUPE (1982) ‘Report . . .'o p . cit. ppl77-84.
l^NUPE (1985) Evidence submitted by the National Union o f Public Employees on the 
Consultation Paper ‘Competition in the provision of local authority services' (London: NUPE) 
mimeo.
^^NUPE (1986) Local services: the case against privatisation (London: NUPE).
^%ALGO (1986) Fighting privatisation in local government (London: NALGO).
^^NUPE (1986) op. cit. pp4-5.
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points out that in any case savings can only come through cuts to standards, cuts to 
pay or greater efficiency. It is opposed to reducing standards and suggests that, at 
£101.25 per week, the then top pay rate for a local council manual worker on 
national pay scales ‘cannot be seen as excessive’. On the question of increases in 
efficiency the union argues that while they are always welcome, there is no 
evidence that the policy of ‘competition’ will produce more efficient services.
Fourthly, the proposals would see a deterioration in industrial relations in the 
local authority sector. Fifthly, elected councillors will lose control over the 
provision of the services for which they are responsible. Finally it was suggested 
that the change would have a deleterious effect on the local economic situation, 
through higher unemployment, lost tax revenues and higher social security benefit 
payments.
Unsurprisingly, since this document was prepared as evidence on the 
government’s proposals, it makes no reference to the sort of left critique of local 
services developed by SCAT. This gap was filled in 1987 with the publication of 
Better services}^ This pamphlet was predicated on the assumption that a 
successful defence of the public sector can only be mounted on the basis of a 
commitment to improve on existing standards of provision. Citing the involvement 
of SCAT in developing local initiatives, this document describes a range of case 
studies of attempts to make services more responsive to users and more open to the 
involvement of workers in the running of them.
NALGO
The response of NALGO is significant because, at least initially, NALGO members 
were not directly the targets of CCT.19 The importance NALGO placed on 
developing a policy of opposition to the legislation reflected the union’s perception 
of CCT as a wider threat to the principles of public service provision. NALGO
^^NUPE (1987) Better services (London: NUPE). 
^^NALGO op. cit.
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identified many of the same objections to the proposals as NUPE. It identifies 
women workers, disabled workers, workers who are members of ethnic minorities 
and lesbian and gay workers as particularly at risk from the changes.^®
To counter the government’s objectives, NALGO proposed its own:
- to return to direct labour all services which have been privatised and to reverse cuts which 
have been made in services;
- to prevent any further privatisation or cuts;
- to increase, improve and expand local government services, and make them more 
responsive; and to defend the democratic accountability of services;
- to defend, and wherever possible to increase and improve, jobs, pay and conditions of 
service;
- to increase NALGO membership and influence;
- to win equal opportunities, in all respects, as employees and as users, for women, black 
people, people with disabilities, gay men and lesbians.^^
Paragraph 5.4 of the document outlines a strategy which is very similar to the
seven-point plan discussed above. Interestingly it includes the statement that ‘in-
house tendering cannot [...] be a viable tactic except in the very last resort’. This
position seems to contradict the commitment of the GMB to ‘giving every
assistance’ to such initiatives.^
The strategy is based (as is SCAT’s) on the view that in the past services
have not necessarily had the support of their users:
Privatisation adversely affects both the users of services and the workforce. Their interests 
tiierefore, far from being opposed to each other as the advocates of privatisation claim, are 
in fact mutual. In view of this our actions must centre upon transforming this unity of 
interest into unity of purpose and unity of action. However, we cannot achieve this by 
viewing ‘users’ as passive bodies with whom there can be temporary ad hoc alliances when 
there is a problem, more or less disregarding them at other times. Neither can we ignore 
the fact that the scope, quality and character of many services are often held in very low 
esteem by those who rely upon them.^^
The key paragraph marking the explicit adoption by one of the unions of a
crucial aspect of the thinking which prompted the seven-point plan then follows.
Unlike the rest of the document it is printed in bold type for emphasis:
The National Committee is of the opinion that this problem needs to be confronted, and a 
first step in doing so is to state clearly and baldly that NALGO is not in the business of
paragraphs 4.8-4.14.
^^Ibid. paragraph 5.2.
^^GMB op. cit. p l3. '
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defending the indefensible. Insofar as many services are of poor quality, too narrow in their 
scope and unresponsive to the wishes of their users, NALGO must be prepared not only to 
say so but to set out to improve, expand and develop them and make them more responsive 
to people’s needs.^
The report went on to spell out in a degree of detail the action that should be 
taken at national, district and branch levels as part of the campaign against both the 
Green Paper and the threat of privatisation more generally.
NALGO subsequently produced a ‘campaign handbook’ in the form of a 
loose leaf binder which provided branches with practical advice on campaigning 
strategies and tactics. There are sections on, for instance, lobbying parliament, 
gaining publicity, direct action, and campaigning with other unions and with user 
groups and voluntary organisations.^^
Towards a joint policy
In a variety of ways, then, trade unions were responding to the government’s 
increasing commitment to competitive tendering and privatisation in ways which 
involved the more or less explicit adoption of the sort of approach originally 
advocated by SCAT. However it is important not to elide union policy and union 
action. In the first place official union policy is only one aspect of the political 
processes of the labour movement. Much of the formulation and effectiveness of 
such policies depends on more or less informal and complex processes of conflict, 
negotiation, compromise and happenstance within and between the various union 
organisations. By their nature these aspects of trade unionism are more difficult for 
an external researcher to gain access to than the public pronouncements and formal 
documentation. However, they are crucial to the actual development of trade union 
practices. Secondly, policy may be generated and approved at the national level, 
but this does not necessarily mean that it will be implemented by local branches (or
^^NALGO op. cit. paragraph 5.6.
'^ '^ Ibid. paragraph 5.7.
^^nALGO (undated) Fighting privatisation in local government: campaign handbook (London: 
NALGO) looseleaf binder.
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if it comes to it by the national executive committees). When I asked one of the 
architects of the seven-point plan what he thought of the union policies on 
competitive tendering he said ruefully that ‘everyone knew the words, but no-one 
knew what to do with it, so you could get up in conference and say it and that was 
right on, but no-one actually put it into practice’. 6^ As I shall show in the Chapter 
Six this was something of an exaggeration, but it indicates that there is no automatic 
translation from policy into practice.
To take the former point in more detail, I have been able to identify a number 
of ways in which informal processes appear to have been changing in response to 
the development of competitive tendering and privatisation. While the unions 
publicly were publishing their own individual policy responses to the government’s 
proposals, ‘behind the scenes’ there were moves to develop a joint union response. 
A senior member of NUPE’s national leadership told me that before 1982 there had 
been very little joint union action of any sort in local government. However, once 
unions began to develop their individual policies on privatisation it became clear 
that there was ‘virtually no difference’ between them.^^ In fact as I have already 
suggested there were a number of differences (for example on union involvement in 
tendering processes) however after some initial internal debates all the unions had 
rejected both the strategy of a national strike, and the idea that local authority 
officers should refuse to implement the legislation.
The campaign of resistance to the Green Paper was on the surface a 
traditional affair with publicity drives and general propaganda. Informally, 
however, the unions had been lobbying Conservative councillors around the 
country who were widely opposed to the idea of enforced tendering. The pressure 
this exerted within the Conservative Party may explain in part why the it took so 
long for legislation to be drawn up after the appearance of the Green Paper.
^^Interview with the author, 3 November 1989. 
^^Interview with the author, 30 January 1990.
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Parliament was originally scheduled to discuss the proposals during the 1986/7 
session, but in the event publication of the Bill was postponed until after the 
election. Sir Paul Beresford, the leader of Wandsworth Council, told me that in his 
view the Conservative-controlled shire districts were in some ways bigger obstacles 
to the government’s programme than the Labour authorities of inner London.28 
The same senior NUPE officer told me that as part of the campaign the unions were 
apparently feeding the local government press with information to ‘ensure fair 
coverage’.
However this campaign effectively ended in 1987 with the re-election of the 
Thatcher Government for a third consecutive term. Although legislation had been 
postponed for over two years the unions realised that it could no longer be 
prevented. Having previously realised that they might be faced with such a 
situation after the election, the unions, through the informal political processes 
alluded to, had been developing the basis of à joint approach. The NUPE officer !  
spoke located the source of this in an apparently separate development. In 1985 the 
officers with responsibility for local government services in each of the three major 
manual unions had come together to discuss the long term position of manual 
workers pay.
It was felt that the pursuit of traditional pay claims by traditional means had 
led to a steady erosion of the gains that had been made during 1978 and 1979. 
These officials therefore decided to adopt a new approach. The recent Equal Pay 
Act, which compels employers to pay men and women equally for doing work of 
equal value, was thought to be flawed, but it was thought that the employers were 
worried about its implications in local government where many jobs are done by 
women for substantially lower wages than those paid to men doing work of 
apparently equal value. In late 1985, the unions persuaded the employers to engage 
in a regrading of local authority manual workers’ jobs on the basis of equal pay for
^^Interview with the author, 12 March 1990.
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work of equal value.
According to the interviewee, the unions had a hidden agenda on 
privatisation. In line with the sort of thinking described above, they thought that in 
order to fight competitive tendering local government had to change. This in turn 
would require a considerable shake up of the bureaucracies and entrenched 
practices of local authorities and trade unions, and of the attitudes of union 
members. The huge regrading exercise would have this sort of effect by 
introducing a degree of turmoil into the system and lead to the removal of a lot of 
dead wood among full-time union officers and lay activists. Many people who had 
been serving their time for years in minor positions in the union were impelled to 
resign, their places being taken, or so it was hoped, by more enthusiastic 
replacements. It is impossible to establish whether this turmoil was in fact the 
premeditated outcome of the regrading exercise, or an unintended consequence for 
which I was given a post-hoc rationalisation. Nonetheless, it did have a significant 
effect as many of the more junior officials of all the trade unions involved told me 
in various parts of the country.
This sort of informal political process was thus of considerable importance in 
the development of a common approach to the threat of compulsory tendering. The 
first joint union action directed specifically towards the proposed legislation was 
also of this informal nature. The document Don’t panic! which provides advice to 
local government councillors and officers on dealing with the CCT was published 
in 1988.^^ Although it makes no formal mention of union involvement during its 
drafting, the trade unions affected were participants in its preparation from 1986 (as 
was SCAT).
Thus the period of the campaign against the proposals of the Green Paper 
was a period in which the trade unions’ formal policies converged, and their links 
with each other and other organisations were strengthened through mainly informal
^^AMA, LGRJ, LSPU and ADLO (1988) Don't panic! (London: AMA et al.).
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political processes. This was also a time when new organisational structures began 
to develop and research units were established. At the same time the content of 
union policies was evolving in a direction which increasingly saw union members 
as service providers, and the nature and quality of public services as the proper 
focus for union campaigns which should be conducted jointly with service users.
Who cares wins and beyond
These various developments meant that once the CCT proposals had been 
embodied in the Local Government (No 2) Bill 1987 the unions were able to 
produce joint policy proposals on how to deal with the legislation. Initial calls from 
the ultra-left in the labour movement to base the campaign on a refusal to implement 
the legislation, backed by mass industrial action, were defeated. Instead the unions 
developed a sophisticated strategy drawing on the experience of competitive 
tendering in the National Health Service, individual union policies and the SCAT 
initiative. All the four union conferences agreed to adopt the proposals as policy. 
The result, published in 1988, was Who cares wins: a trade union guide to 
compulsory tendering for local services}^
In this document the unions argue that they should aim to work with local 
authorities to minimise the threat to local government trade unionism. The 
cornerstone of this strategy was a rejection of the view that ‘cutting services, jobs, 
wages and working conditions is the only way to win contracts’ in-house.^i By 
contrast, the unions claim that it is possible to maintain and improve the quality of 
public services and retain service production in-house, while simultaneously 
defending the jobs, pay and conditions of the workforce and promoting equal 
opportunities. Furthermore the aim of defending the jobs and conditions of the 
workforce is to be achieved by means o/maintaining and improving the quality of
^®GMB, NUPE, NALGO and TGWU (1988) Who cares wins: a trade union guide to compulsory 
tendering for local services (London: GMB et al.). 
p li .
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services.
It is thus implicitly accepted by the unions that if cost is the only criterion, the 
private sector will win a majority of contracts. A trade union researcher expressed 
it graphically: ‘this is called the ‘limbo dance’ of getting beneath the contractor’s 
bid. [...] One doesn’t try and go beneath the contractors, because the contractors 
can always understep an in-house bid. [...] So the idea is that one provides a better 
service’.32 A full-time union organiser in Newcastle confirmed this view: 
‘competition has got to be on the basis of quality, rather than cost, because we can’t 
compete on the basis of cost, (certainly in building cleaning). Because there will 
always be people prepared to take jobs for £ 1.60 an hour, or even less’ .33
If it is not possible to compete on cost with the private sector, the alternative 
is to compete on quality. The mechanism for implementing CCT provides a vehicle 
for doing this: the specification. A principal objective of the trade union policy 
described in Who cares wins is to exert union influence on the drawing up of 
service specifications. This is to ensure that specifications are stringent both in 
their detail and in the level and quality of service required. The unions believe that 
this will give local authority Direct Service Organisations (DSOs) a competitive 
advantage over private contractors, since private contractors aim to compete largely 
on cost. This may of course change if contractors become more experienced, and 
better able to provide a higher quality of service.
The unions also argue that the specification procedure provides an 
opportunity for authorities to improve the quality of the services they provide, 
although the financial problems faced by local government make this difficult. 
Carried with this is an explicit acceptance that local authority service delivery in the 
past has often been of poor quality, unresponsive to the needs of users, and 
bureaucratised. Thus, as in the SCAT strategy, it is recognised that the ‘New
32lnterview with the author, 7 March 1989. 
33lnterview with the author, 14 July 1989.
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Right’ critique of local government services as bureaucratic and unresponsive 
contains some truth.
There is also a recognition that despite the iniquities and dangers of the CCT 
legislation, it has had the function of bringing the issue of local government service 
cost and quality to the fore, which otherwise showed few signs of happening 
outside a few specific authorities. One trade union employee said, T do not think 
that [CCT] is the way to go about [an] audit of the provision of council services, on 
the other hand it is administering an enormous kick up the backside to a lot of 
people who will benefit from a bit of a s h a k e - u p ’ .3 4
The unions have identified a number of tactics open to authorities in building 
an emphasis on quality into the specification. For example the specification can 
insist that employees have a certain level of training, or have obtained certain 
qualifications. This is true even for the so-called ‘Cinderella service’ of building 
cleaning, where the British Institute of Cleaning Science mns training courses for 
cleaners. Of course an authority would need to ensure that it’s own workforce can 
meet the criteria, and if necessary provide training so that they do. The unions’ 
hope is that by setting the standards of work required by specifications high 
enough, the in-house bid will be the only one which can fulfil the contract. Thus 
in-house bids will win even if they are not the cheapest.
The unions argue that the best way to exert union influence on the content of 
the specification is through ‘positive partnership with c o u n c i l s ’ 3 5  and suggest 
persuading councils to adopt a joint statement of policy with the u n i o n s . 3 6  In the 
(Conservative-controlled) London Borough of Enfield, for example, a joint 
union/council agreement has been reached giving trade unions extensive rights of 
consultation and participation in the compulsory tendering p r o c e s s . 3 7  (Although
34lnterview with the author, 7 March 1989.
et ah, op. cit.pW .
^^Ibid. pl6.
3^LGIU (1988) Involving unions in compulsory tendering (London: LGIU) p22.
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some trade unionists I spoke to saw risks in developing too close a working 
relationship with the employers.)
The unions recognise, however, that the tactic of influencing specifications is 
likely to succeed only where authorities are reasonably sympathetic to the policy of 
winning the contract in-house without worsening terms and conditions. Where this 
is not the case the unions’ argue that the option of industrial action must be 
considered to put pressure on the authority. ‘When councils won’t listen to union 
and community approaches aimed at maintaining good quality services, union 
members may need to consider whether industrial action would be an appropriate 
means of putting pressure on the council’.3^
Once the specifications have been set and contractors invited to inspect them, 
some authorities may draw up an ‘approved list’ of contractors. Unions may seek 
to influence this by using information on the past activities of contractors in 
publicity campaigns. Similarly, the unions advocate using to the fullest all the 
provisions of the Act which allow contractors who have submitted tenders to be 
vetted for financial integrity, track record and so on. This is a management, not a 
union, responsibility, but the unions advise that local branches should check that 
this is being done thoroughly, and if necessary provide extra intelligence on 
companies. One local union officer placed considerable emphasis on the role of a 
computer database containing information on contract service companies in the 
region: ‘We ... push these [company profiles] out to branches. What we are 
looking for is contract failures, financial instability. They can then take that to their 
local authorities and point out the inadequacies of companies in various areas’.
The in-house bid itself is drawn up by management, and though the unions 
expect to be informed of the contents of the bid, it is not their policy to be directly 
involved in pricing the tender. This would clearly seriously compromise their
^^GMB et al., op. cit. pl8.
^^Interview with the author, 17 July 1989.
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independence from management. However if the tender pricing is acceptable to the
unions then they will be prepared to support the bid. Conversely, if it involves
labour or other cuts they reserve the right to fight against it, including the use of
industrial action where necessary. As the unions put it: ‘Councils must recognise
that we won’t give them a blank cheque’. o^ ^
The final stage of the process is tender evaluation, in which the various bids
are compared and the choice of contractor, or DSO, is made. This again is a
management function, but the unions are concerned that it should not be done on
the basis simply of cost. SCAT argues that unions should have an input into the
tender evaluation to ensure that important non-cost criteria are taken into account.4i
These include compliance with the specification and contract conditions and a check
on the technical competence and financial health of the company: The importance
of this was stressed by one full time trade union officer I interviewed who was
concerned that evaluation had been neglected by unions in the past. Referring to an
authority where the in-house bid had lost most of the work to the private sector, he
said: < -
Between the councils and the unions [in the region], the strategy of making the 
specifications tight has by and large worked. The weakness is that we didn’t recognise early 
on how important tender evaluation was. In a way, that is where [named authority] was a 
failure. Any proper evaluation would have said that losing 120 jobs to save 12,000 quid 
was just not worth it.'^ ^
Throughout the tendering process, the successful implementation of the 
unions’ policies would seem to depend partly on the unions in an authority having 
the time and resources required to carry them out. For this reason, a certain amount 
of stress is placed on the need to negotiate arrangements with management to give 
unionists time off from work (‘facility time’) to develop a response to CCT.43 
This, like many other aspects of the approach I have been describing, depends on
^®GMB et al., op. cit. p li .
^^SCAT (1989) Public service practice 1: tender evaluation (London: SCAT). 
^^Interview with the author, 17 July 1989.
^^GMB et al., op. cit. pl7.
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the local council accepting, or being persuaded to accept, the involvement of the 
unions in the process. This is one reason why the national trade unions’ policy is 
likely to be subject to substantial local variations.
In addition to the development of joint union policy proposals there are a 
number of other initiatives in which the unions have been engaged in response to 
CCT. Perhaps the most significant of these has been the establishment of a Joint 
Union Privatisation research unit at NUPE’s national headquarters in south east 
London. The unit was set up on the lines of the NHS Privatisation Research Unit. 
However the establishment of the local government unit was delayed when the 
GMB declined to sign a joint agreement that participating organisations would not 
recruit members from one another’s ranks for a period of six months from the 
setting up of the unit. This led to the GMB being excluded from the operation and 
it now runs its own intelligence operation independently.
The unit, which began work in January 1989, involves NALGO, NUPE, the 
TGWU and now NUCAPS, following government pressure to introduce 
competitive tendering to the central civil service. The operation involves collecting 
and analysing information on private contractors, local councils, the extent and 
nature of existing contracting out and the progress of CCT through its successive 
phases. A regular bulletin (Privatisation News) is published with articles and data 
on these issues. The unit also responds to individual requests for information. 
Local union branches are supposed to direct requests for intelligence through their 
district officers, although in practice they are not turned away. Local government 
officers making inquiries in their capacities as employees of the council are told to 
go through the relevant union organisation. I was told that if the local authority 
was on good terms with its unions this would not present problems and that if it 
was not the unit would not wish to provide it with help.
The information disseminated by the unit is used by local union organisations 
in developing their local response to CCT. For example information (sometimes
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commercially sensitive) that a particular private contracting company had a poor 
financial basis might allow the unions to approach the council and point out the 
possible dangers of including it on the tender list. The unit has also been able to 
point out to the national Labour Party that past experience suggests that it is not 
necessary for Labour-controlled councils to cut services or wages to retain work in 
house. This is apparently to lead to instructions to Labour councillors from the 
Party to that effect.
Thus in the formulation of policy, in the content of policy and in research 
initiatives the unions affected by CCT have undergone a shift from many of the 
forms of trade unionism inherited from the past. The implementation of these 
policies varies considerably from place to place and there is therefore no guarantee 
that a similar shift to that which I suggested in the last chapter began to occur in 
Wandsworth will take place everywhere. The adoption and implementation of the 
national joint policy may be inadequate, or the changes at ‘the top’ may have come 
too late. To investigate this further it is necessary to focus once more on the shop 
stewards and local union branches. '
6 The geography of local trade 
union responses
Introduction^
The national union policies which I have been discussing are an important part of 
the story of trade union responses to restructuring in local government. However, 
without concerted locally-based action they are reduced to mere rhetoric. National 
publicity campaigns against privatisation seem to have only very limited chances of 
success in the face of determined legislative initiatives by radical right-wing 
governments. By intervening in the processes of restructuring themselves, on the 
other hand, individuals and groups can affect how those processes unfold in 
practice. While a complete change in policy would require at least a change of 
Government, the effects of a policy can be directly influenced by action on the part 
of those involved in its implmentation.
In this chapter, therefore, I want to examine in some detail how local trade 
union organisations and the individuals within them have responded to some of the 
changes with which they have been faced in the local government services sector 
during the 1980s. I will do this through case studies of local union activity in three 
local authorities in Newcastle upon Tyne, Manchester and Milton Keynes. I will 
also, for reasons which will become clear shortly, give further consideration to my 
case study of Wandsworth which I discussed in Chapter Four.
I When I selected these four places for detailed investigation I expected to find
I  considerable differences in the ways in which trade unions had responded in each 
\ case, and this was rapidly borne out while I was doing the empirical research.
^Some parts of this section have been previously published elsewhere in Painter J (1991) ‘Trade 
union responses to local government privatization’ Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 16:2 pp2l4-226.
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Initially I felt that the differences between the local responses were significant 
principally because of the role they could play in developing explanations along 
realist lines of the character of trade union responses. This role remains of key 
importance and I will outline the rationale for it and the way such explanations are 
developed in the next section.
As the research progressed, however, I became more interested in the 
differences between local responses in their own right, rather than solely in their 
function as a methodological tool. I thus wanted to explain why these differences 
arose: why different branches of the same organisations responded to the same 
national legislation in very varied ways and with divergent consequences. To some 
extent I found that explaining variations in union behaviour involved the same use 
of the case study approach as did explaining the nature of that action. For example, 
the case study technique clarifies that the relationship between the local Labour 
Party and the local trade union organisations is an important influence in trade 
union action. Since this relationship varies from place to place it is in principle 
straightforward to identify variations in it as an important influence on the pattern of 
variation in trade union action. As the research went on, however, I became | 
increasingly convinced that the problem of explaining social action and the 
geographical variations in it was both of considerable political significance and 
rather more complex than I had originally envisaged.
The political significance of the variation stems from three factors. Firstly, || 
developments at the local level can have an impact on wider processes. For 
example, the campaign in Wandsworth had considerable influence in the labour 
movement around the country. It was widely written about and discussed, and the 
subsequent formulation of policy took account of problems that had been 
encountered in Wandsworth.
Secondly, the overall success or failure of the unions’ strategies are 
determined (at least in part) by local variations in the conditions under which they
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are implemented. This is, or should be, of considerable political significance to the 
unions. For example, it may be that some sets of conditions which lead to the 
failure of union responses in certain areas are ones which unions and/or their 
members can influence. Other circumstances may be less easy to change, at least in 
the short term. For example, locally low levels of recruitment can lead to a less 
than effective responses to privatisation in some areas. This is a problem that 
unions can tackle immediately. By contrast, wider processes of capital 
accumulation (which influence the activities of private contractors, for example) are 
less easy (though not in principle impossible) for unions to confront.
Thirdly, geographical divisions between workers cannot be dismissed as 
‘regional chauvinism’ or ‘false consciousness’. Rather, they may be founded on 
differences in cultural and/or material circumstances. Only by understanding the 
causes of these differences can any difficulties they may produce be overcome.
The difficulties in explaining geographical variations in trade union action 
stem in part from the nature of human action itself. It is neither purely voluntaristic 
and willed by those engaged in it, nor is it completely determined by forces beyond 
the actors’ control. My initial attempts to account for the geography of trade union 
action were based on the assumption that it could in some sense be ‘read off’ from 
the uneven development of society and social relations. I was tempted to argue, for 
example, that if trade union action in Newcastle was qualitatively different from that 
in Milton Keynes, then it must be so because of the ‘sorts of places’ which 
Newcastle and Milton Keynes are. I think that an argument along these lines still 
has some validity as my empirical research will suggest. However, identifying the 
mechanisms which ‘link’ the nature of particular places with their characteristic 
forms of trade union action is not a straightforward task. Before discussing the 
specifics of the case studies, therefore, I will consider in more general terms how a 
theory of trade union action might deal with geographical variation while avoiding 
the twin traps of voluntarism and determinism. These arguments will be developed
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through a comparison of the concepts of ‘locality’ and ‘locale’, but before turning 
to these I want to deal with the related issue of the role of case studies in 
explanation.
Case studies and explanation
I have already suggested that the philosophy of critical realism has been of key 
importance in the development of my account. I now want to substantiate this 
assertion through a consideration of the practice of what Sayer refers to as intensive 
research. In contrast to the complementary practice of extensive research, which 
operates solely at the level of patterns of events, intensive research seeks in addition 
to probe the other levels of realism’s depth ontology in order to trace the causal 
connections between events and their generative structures and mechanisms.
The case study has long been part of the methodological stock-in-trade of the 
social scientist in general, and the human geographer in particular. Few would 
object to case studies being included in a research project to describe a 
phenomenon, or to illustrate a theoretical point. Where case studies are used in the 
process of explanation, however, their role is more controversial. For some, the 
use of case studies represents an unfortunate return to an idiographic human 
geography concerned solely with the uniqueness of places, and uninterested in the 
(supposedly scientific) exercise of empirical generalisation.
Those who take this view argue that case studies cannot provide 
explanations. Explanation is held to involve identifying Humean ‘laws of constant 
conjunction’, which take the form ‘if C then E ’. (Where C refers to the initial 
conditions, and E to the event to be explained.)^ The derivation of these laws 
requires the large-scale observation of sets of similar events and their antecedent 
conditions. Because a case study is a study of one event, or a unique combination 
of different events, it cannot provide the data for explanations of this type. Thus
^Gregory D (1978) Ideology, science and human geography (London: Hutchinson) pp33-4.
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case studies are represented as ‘mere’ description.
This (frequently unacknowledged) commitment to positivism was the focus 
of an increasing number of critiques from the early 1970s. Firstly, it was pointed 
out (by Marxist geographers among others) that the existence of general laws and 
principles does not necessarily imply the existence of empirical regularities. Thus 
by analysing the operation of capitalist social relations in space, Marxist research in 
geography aims to show precisely how it is that the empirically observable 
irregularities of the world are produced by the operation of more general social 
processes.
Secondly, a number of the critiques of positivism and empiricism accord 
considerable significance to case studies. In humanistic geography, for example, 
case studies provide a rich source of data (in qualitative as well as quantitative 
forms), which are interpreted with the help of hermeneutics and/or literary theory to 
provide a deeper understanding of senses of place. In contrast, realist philosophy 
sees case studies as providing examples of the operation of social processes in 
concrete geographical settings, which allow the possibility of causal explanation. 
For both these approaches case studies are more than ‘mere’ description. Rather
  ............................. - .................. ................. •  ------------------------   T—  -  f
they provide a range of empirical material which can be used to deepen our 
understanding and explanations of geographical phenomena.
Types of case study and explanation in human geography
Cases studies can fulfill a number of functions. Firstly, as traditional (idiographic) 
regional geography recognised, they are of value in themselves. A case study 
description of a place, or set of events, has intrinsic merit. In 1965 Haggett argued 
that ‘one can do little with the unique except contemplate its uniqueness’.^  Even if 
this were true, and I aim to show that it is not, the contemplation of uniqueness 
may nonetheless be interesting.
^Haggett P (1965) Locational analysis in human geography (London: Edward Arnold) p3.
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Secondly, even when explanation is held to consist in the identification of 
empirical generalisations, the case study may still be used for illustration. For
I
instance, a case study of part of Bristol might be used to exemplify the 
generalisation ‘inner-city areas are socially deprived’. Here the study is used as a 
typical case of a population of similar cases.
Thirdly a case study may be made because the phenomenon to be explained is 
actually unique. Thus the London Borough of Wandsworth has been considered in 
detail because of the unique to\q that it played in developing a ‘New Right’ 
approach to local government in Britain. Here I am not concerned with 
generalisation, but with the more general significance of the unique. These 
justifications for the use of case studies in human geography are all important, but 
on the whole uncontroversial. I will now consider the claim of critical realism that 
case studies can form part of the process of explanation itself.
Figure 6.1: Types of research
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154 Responding to restructuring
Sayer’s realist approach to social science attempts to go beyond the 
idiographic/nomothetic dichotom y/ In realism, explaining an event or set of 
events involves finding out how it was caused. Causation is one of the most hotly 
debated issues in the philosophy of science, and I do not intend to discuss its 
metaphysics in detail. However a brief outline of how cause is understood in 
realist epistemology is important because it is so central to explanation.^
In Sayer’s version of realism, the world is seen as made up of a number of 
different ‘layers’. This is referred to as ‘ontological depth’. The ‘common sense’ 
view of the world only sees the ‘surface’ layer: the layer of events. The aim of a 
realist analysis is to uncover in addition the social structures and mechanisms which 
are thought to generate these events. (Note that while the concept of depth is 
central to realism, it is not unproblematic. This is because the analytic category 
‘structures’ does not exist in physical space ‘behind’ the analytic category ‘events’. 
For this reason it is important to remember that the concepts of ‘depth’ and 
‘behindness’ are metaphors.) Events are generated when the causal powers or 
liabilities of structures are realised through the operation of mechanisms (Figure 
6 . 1).
According to realism, structures possess these causal powers necessarily, by 
virtue of what they are. The British state, for example, has the power to start a 
war, because it is in the nature of nation states that they have control over a 
legitimate means of violence. The British state retains this power regardless of 
whether it decides to start a war or not. However, the occurrence or otherwise of 
the event (war) will depend on contingent factors (such as the behaviour of other 
states, the attitude of the government) and on the relationship between them (such 
as the attitude of the government towards the behaviour of other states).
Thus explaining a particular set of events involves two interrelated processes.
^Sayer A (1984) Method in social science: a realist approach (London: Hutchinson). 
^For a fuller discussion see Sayer op. cit. pp94-106.
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One isi the careful conceptualisation of the structures whose causal powers or 
liabilities are realised in the event. The other involves concrete research to identify 
the particular set of contingent factors which enabled that realisation. In the case of 
the commodification of local government services, for example, a particular local 
authority has the power to commodify its services. This power may be realised if 
certain contingent circumstances pertain. These might include national legislation, 
the commitment of councillors and officers, the resistance or otherwise from users 
and the responses of trade unions.
The interaction between these various processes occurs in
particular places. Hence realist explanation of commodification of local 
government services would proceed in part through detailed studies of specific 
examples to find out how concrete outcomes were generated by the coming- 
together of sets of causally-powerful structures in particular places. This concrete 
research can then re-inform the original conceptual work and the process of 
explanation can thereby be improved.
This way of thinking of causality and explanation is a powerful critique of the 
conception of explanation as generalisation. It shows that ‘what causes an event 
has nothing to do with the number of times it has been observed to occur’ This 
idea provides the basis of Sayer’s distinction between extensive and intensive 
research.
Extensive research takes place solely at the level of events. It is concerned 
with the application of techniques such as large scale social surveys and aims to 
identify the frequency with which particular types of events occur and the patterns 
between them. The identification of empirical regularities in this way allows the 
derivation of Humean ‘laws of constant conjunction’. However, for realism and 
other post-empiricist philosophies of science, these Humean laws do not constitute 
explanation. From a realist perspective, as has been suggested, explanation
6/W.plOO.
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consists in the identification of the causal chains which link structures, mechanisms 
and events.
By contrast with but complementary to extensive research, intensive research 
aims to discover how the causal powers inherent in social structures are realised as 
events, under specific contingent conditions. Intensive research thus involves the 
use of two types of research: abstract research and co/zcrgre research. Sayer is 
quite clear about the difference between the two:
Abstract theoretical research deals with the constitution and possible ways of acting of 
social objects and actual events are only dealt with as possible outcomes. [...] Concrete 
research studies actual events and objects as ‘unities of diverse determinations’, each of 
which have been isolated and examined through abstract research.^
According to Sayer the main questions in intensive research concern ‘how 
some causal process works out in a particular case or limited number of cases’ and 
the researcher uses ‘mainly qualitative methods such as structural and causal 
analysis, participant observation and/or informal and interactive interviews’.  ^ This 
suggests that although Sayer does not discuss the use of case studies in detail, they 
are likely to form an important part of an intensive research programme. It is only 
through the detailed, qualitative analysis of particular cases that it is possible to 
identify causal chains, and thereby to explain why events occurred. Similarly, the 
identification of abstract social structures requires some knowledge of the events of 
which they are the cause. Thus intensive research using case studies is 
simultaneously theoretically-informed concrete research, and empirically-informed 
abstract research. This conception of the role of the case study is very different to 
those discussed in the preceding section. Here case studies do not only illustrate or 
exemplify explanations arrived at by other means. For realism they are the means 
which make explanation possible.
However, this does not mean that explanation through intensive research is
' I^bid. p216. 
^Ibid. p221.
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straightforward. As has been suggested, most accounts of the process of 
explanation revolve (correctly) around appeals for ‘detailed and in-depth conceptual 
and empirical s t u d y M a n y  writers, including Sayer, have tried to show what 
careful conceptualisation involves. In the case of realism, for example, it consists 
in the identification of abstract relations of natural necessity. This means that the 
objects of conceptual enquiry should be grouped together in ways which do not 
‘divide the indivisible and/or lump [...] together the unrelated and the 
inessential’. Causal analysis involves identifying how  these objects of 
conceptual enquiry are then related to empirical events. To explore what this 
involves in practice, I have turned to the anthropological literature and to Clyde 
Mitchell’s concept of logical inference.
Case analysis and logical inference
Mitchell’s discussion of case analysis is not grounded explicitly in realist 
philosophy. However, many of the points he makes resonate with Sayer’s 
conception of explanation. Mitchell defines a case study as ‘the documentation of 
some particular phenomenon or set of events which has been assembled with the 
explicit end in view of drawing theoretical conclusions from it’. He distinguishes 
cases studies from other ways of systematically gathering information on the 
grounds that a case study preserves ‘the unitary character of the social object being 
studied’.
For Mitchell the case study is essentially a heuristic device consisting in ‘a 
detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the analyst 11
believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical i 1
' .  11 
p r i n c i p l e ’ . The conclusions that may be validly drawn from the use of case ’ ^
^Massey D and Meegan R (eds) (1985) Politics and method: contrasting studies in industrial 
geography (London: Methuen) p 117. 
l®Sayer op. cit. p i l l .
llMitchell JC (1983) ‘Case and situation analysis’ Sociological Review 31:2 ppl87-211.
12/W . pl92.
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studies are of a different order from those that may be drawn from sample-based, 
extensive research. In sample-based studies, it is assumed that the sample is 
representative and that its distribution of characteristics reflects those of the parent 
population. According to Mitchell this form of inference is effective (within given 
statistical limits) as far as individual characteristics are concerned, but flawed when 
it comes to specifying the relations between characteristics. For this, logical rather 
than statistical inference is required.
Logical inference is that process ‘by which the analyst draws conclusions 
about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics in terms of some 
systematic schema - some set of theoretical propositions’.!^ Furthermore, ‘we 
infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider population 
not because the case is representative, but because our analysis is unassailable’.i^ 
As its name suggests, the method of analysis is logical reasoning. Unfortunately, it 
is in his discussion of logical reasoning that a number of ambiguities seem to me to 
enter Mitchell’s account. In order to explain precisely how it is that the method of 
statistical inference differs from that of logical (or causal) inference, he draws on 
Florian Znaniecki’s distinction between enumerative induction and analytical 
induction. According to Mitchell, enumerative induction is related to the 
procedures of statistical inference, while analytical induction is related to those of 
logical inference.
The object of enumerative induction is to identify characteristics common to 
all members of a particular class and only to these. This is done in two stages. 
Firstly the class in question is identified ‘by some identifiable, but not necessarily 
essential characteristics’.!^ Secondly some members of the class are selected and 
examined to discover which of their features are defining characteristics of the class 
as a whole.
!2/W . p200, emphasis added. 
^^Ibid. p200.
^^Ibid. p201.
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By contrast, argues Mitchell, analytical induction does not require that a class 
is identified before members of it are selected for study. Instead, individual data 
are studied in order then to assign them to their class(es), thereby describing the 
essential characteristics of the class(es). As Znaniecki puts it ‘analytical induction 
[...] abstracts from the given concrete case characters that are essential to it and 
generalises them, presuming insofar as [they are] essential, they must be similar in 
many cases’.!^
What seems to me ambiguous in Znaniecki’s formulation as outlined by 
Mitchell, is that what he refers to as analytical induction, is actually a form of 
deduction. This is because once the essential or necessary characteristics of an 
object have been identified, they must by definition be present in all members of the 
same class. Thus if careful examination of instance xi leads the analyst to the 
conclusion that it is a necessary characteristic of x ’s that they are y, then the 
statement ‘all x’s are y’ is (a) true, (b) general and (c) a deduction. It is a deduction 
because it must hold regardless of subsequent findings. So if the analyst later finds 
an instance which is not y, then it cannot be an x either, (Assuming of course that 
the original analysis was logically sound.)
If we allow for this confusion in the terminology, then Mitchell has presented 
two distinct logics by which conclusions may be drawn fi'om case study empirical 
material. In inductive logic, the analyst infers the characteristics of the population 
from the characteristics of a subset of the population. Deductive logic involves 
inferring the characteristics of particular individuals from the necessary features of 
the population.
How then does all this relate to Sayer’s account of explanation? It seems 
clear enough that the statistical procedures which Mitchell identifies as the 
appropriate method of enumerative induction are part and parcel of what Sayer 
refers to as extensive research. However, Znaniecki’s misnamed concept of
! ^ Znaniecki, quoted in ibid. p201.
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analytical ‘induction’ is not directly analogous with intensive research. If we 
remember that analytical ‘induction’ involves the identification of the necessary 
properties of objects, then it most accurately approximates to that part of intensive 
research which involves the careful conceptualisation of abstract structures. In 
other words it is what Sayer refers to as abstract research. Analytical ‘induction’, 
therefore, does not constitute what Sayer would call explanation. This is because 
the propositions of analytical ‘induction’ must hold true. They are concerned solely 
with necessity. By contrast, in Sayer’s realist account, explanation involves 
identifying how it was that the necessary properties of objects were realised or not 
under specific contingent conditions. This process is neither induction, nor 
deduction, but retroduction.
Sayer describes retroduction as a ‘mode of inference in which events are 
explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of 
producing them’.!^ The relevant question here is thus: ‘what structures and 
mechanisms must exist for the events to occur?’ This clarifies how case study 
research can provide access through unique events to general social processes. 
While the events which make up the case study may well be unique, they are 
generated by the operation of processes which potentially operate wherever the 
structures in question exist. This is why causal analysis (or logical inference) does 
not require a ‘representative’ case. Indeed, Mitchell points out that it may be that an 
unusually atypical case is actually better suited to this process of explanation. As 
he puts it, ‘it frequently occurs that the way in which general explanatory principles 
may be used in practice is most clearly demonstrated in those instances where the 
concatenation of events is so idiosyncratic as to throw into sharp relief the 
principles underlying them’.!^
By identifying some of the tensions in Mitchell’s account of the use of case
!2Sayer op. cit. p97.
! ^ Mitchell op. cit. p203.
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studies, I have tried to show more clearly what is specific about the realist 
conception of explanation adopted by Sayer. What Mitchell’s and Sayer’s analyses 
both suggest is that case studies not only can be a basis for explaining social 
phenomena, but also that in a realist account they should be that basis.
On doing more than one
Clearly much empirical research in human geography, even in a realist framework, Î i
. ■. . ' . II
involves studying more than one case, and drawing comparisons between them, ij 
When done well, this is much more than listing their differences and similarities. |) 
In fact, there are sound methodological reasons why doing two or more case j 1 
studies enhances the quality of explanation itself.  ^ j
The first reason for doing comparative work concerns the way causal 
processes and social structures are identified and explained. Because this relies on 
the conceptual and logical skills of the researcher as well as on his or her theoretical 
framework, it is possible for another researcher to study the same case and arrive at 
a different conclusion about the nature of the causal processes involved. This is 
partly because reality is complex and the identification of any social structure is 
necessarily an abstraction from reality. Abstractions have few dimensions, while s 
reality has many. Thus the same reality may be compatible with different 
abstractions. For example, two researchers in geography might study the 
distribution of life chances in a particular community. One might decide that the 
abstraction ‘patriarchy’ was of key explanatory significance, while the other might 
conclude that this status should be accorded to ‘capitalism’. In this situation, 1 
neither is ‘wrong’; rather they are both partial accounts. Of course the best research | 
might attempt to combine the two.!^
However, while all explanations are fallible, they are not all equally fallible. ] 
Thus the second reason for doing a number of case studies is that this may make
l^Foord J and Gregson N (1986) ‘Patriarchy: towards a reconceptualisation’ Antipode 18:2 ppl86-
211. I
Ts
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the explanation less fallible. This is because the sets of events which constitute the 
various studies are generated by the the different combination in different places of 
! processes which operate in all. Gaining access to these processes in different
combinations can serve to corroborate (or throw doubt on) both the original 
I explanation of the events, and the initial identification of necessary relations and 
I abstract structures.
( was on the basis of these reasons (and some practical ones) that the specific
cases were selected. The four local authorities were chosen because I knew, or 
confidently expected, that the trade union responses in each case would be found to 
be markedly different from the others. Following the argument outlined above, 
therefore, I felt that a comparison of them should provide the means for identifying 
their causes and thus for explaining them. I also considered some of the 
characteristics of local authorities which seemed likely to be influential in generating 
types of response, and aimed to select council^ which exemplified different 
combinations of characteristics, again with the object of enabling explanation along 
the lines suggested. These characteristics are set out in Appendix B. In the event it 
was the question of political control of the council which was of key significance in 
making the final selection, together with a partial understanding of the local labour 
movement s response to change which I derived from initial interviews with key 
actors in the national labour movement. The four cases are thus: Wandsworth 
(radical right council), Manchester (radical left), Newcastle (traditional ‘moderate’ 
left) and Milton Keynes (centre-right).
Explaining uneven deveiopment
To recap, local trade union responses vary significantly from place to place, and 
from a realist perspective, study of this variation is an important means to 
constructing explanations of the character of responses. The realist strategy for 
building causal explanation (whether based on comparative work or not) involves 
intensive research of which case analysis and the process of retroduction are key
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elements.
I have already suggested that my initial interest in the geographical variations 
in local trade union activity was largely methodological. That is, I saw them as a 
useful tool for explaining my empirical findings. Increasingly I came to see the 
geography of trade union responses as signficant in its own right, both because of 
its potential political importance for the trade unions and because of what it implied 
about the transition to any new mode of regulation. If that transition was to 
involve, among other things, struggles by private capital to reclaim the ‘public 
sector cities’ of Fordism and the strategies developed by trade unions in response, 
(see Chapter Two above), then I had to take seriously my own insistence that 
‘geography’ was implicated in the development of trade union action itself.
In order to show how this happens I will make two related arguments. The 
first, following directly from my consideration of Sayer and Mitchell, involves 
seeing geographical variation as the product of the combination of causal processes 
in different ways in different places. This perspective can help to clarify how trade 
union action is geographically expressed: a ‘weak’ version of why geography 
‘matters’. The second, ‘stronger’, argument is that trade union is also 
simultaneously geographically constituted. In other words that the places in which 
it occurs are not passive canvases on which the inexorable logic of wider processes 
is inscribed but in some sense also have an effect on its development.
In developing these two arguments I have drawn selectively on two 
literatures. The first is that in which the concept of ‘locality’ has been developed 
and debated; the second concerns the concept of ‘locale’ and the related issue of 
contextual theory. Before discussing the substantive case studies I want to outline 
my use of these concepts.20 I should stress that I do not see them as alternative
20Although the material is presented here in this order it is worth pointing out that the process of 
conceptual analysis occured partly during and even after the empirical research, and indeed stems 
from my experience of that research.
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concepts such that ‘acceptance’ of one would imply ‘rejection’ of the other/i 
L ocality
I mentioned above two reasons why comparative research is useful in developing 
realist explanations. A third reason applies when the phenomenon to be explained 
is geographical variation itself. To answer the question ‘why does x vary in this 
way’ requires not only an explanation of why x’ is like this here, but also of why 
it is like that over there. This requires that the differences in the way the causal 
processes combine are identified, which in turn involves doing case studies in 
different areas. This reason is suggestive of the close links between realism, the 
practice of ‘locality studies’, and the debate surrounding their use(fulness). If 
causal processes combine differently in different places, then the same general (in 
the sense of widespread) processes can generate very different local outcomes.
According to Massey, ‘the fact of spatial variation in national change [...] had 
immediate and obvious political importance’ during the 1980s. As she puts it, ‘it 
became important to know just how differently national and international changes 
were impacting on different parts of the country’.22 it was in this context that the 
idea of locality studies was developed and the proposal drawn up (by Massey) for 
the ESRC’s23 ‘Changing Urban and Regional System’ (CURS) research initiative. 
The research conducted under this programme involved the detailed study of seven 
‘localities’ selected to bring into relief different outcomes of processes of social and 
economic restructuring. Other research projects with similar or related briefs were 
also instigated.
Many of the protagonists in the ‘locality debate’ cite Sayer’s realist approach 
in explaining geographical differences in the outcome of restmcturing. In this light
2!pace Cooke? {19^9) Localities: the changing face of urban Britain (London: Unwin Hyman) 
plO.
22Massey D (1991) ‘The political place of locality studies’ Environment and Planning A 23:2 
p269.
2%conomic and Social Research Council.
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‘localities’ are concrete objects: the products of diverse determinations. Social 
processes operate across space and combine contingently with one another in 
different ways in different places to produce the varied character investigated by 
locality research.
Moreover, concrete outcomes can also influence the operation of wider 
processes. Geographical differentiation can have an ‘impact back’ on the forces 
which generated it, although whether it does so, and what form this takes, is, as 
Massey points out, an empirical question.24 Paradoxically, this recognition of the 
effectiveness of spatial form is at odds with Sayer’s own treatment of geography. 
Sayer regards spatial form as a largely contingent phenomenon:
[...] can we abstract content from form and hence have an aspatial science? The answer is a 
highly qualified yes, as regards abstract theory and an emphatic no as regards research which 
seeks to explain concrete objects and conjunctures. In so far as the former is concerned 
with structures and causal powers and mechanisms, but not their effects, it can abstract 
from the contingencies of spatial form [...]25
Yet the possibility that geographical variation has, as Massey puts it, 
‘stamped its own imprint on [...] wider processes’26 implies that causal 
mechanisms may themselves have a geography and thus suggests that space could 
be important in necessary as well as in contingent relations.22
And this is borne out by my case studies of local trade union action. They 
suggest, I will argue, that local trade union action in response to processes of 
restructuring are indeed at least partially the product of local circumstances. 
However, and this is crucial, I have not been able to identify straightforward causal 
links between the character of the localities and the action of trade unionists. 
Moreover, this is, or should be, a relief. I certainly had no wish to discover that 
political action is directly determined by its environment, even where that
^^Massey op. cit. p272.
2^Sayer op. cit. pl34.
2^Massey op. cz7. p271.
^^For example a multinational company has a necessary geographical form; the nation-state is 
necessarily linked to a territory.
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environment is predominantly a human, rather than a natural one. With hindsight it 
is clear that any attempt to read off’ the geography of local action from the 
unevenly developed patchwork of localities is miscast.
Firstly, using the category of locality’ would involve tackling the problem 
from the wrong end. As Massey has indicated the primary focus for locality 
research was on localities as outcomes of other processes. What /  am trying to do, 
I now realise, is to identify the causes and consequences of political action. 
Secondly, even if those causes could be traced to local phenomena it is far from 
clear that the concept of locality would clarify how that causality occurs: that it 
would expose the causal mechanisms.28 This is because a ‘locality’ is a concrete 
phenomenon: the ‘many-sided’ synthesis of multiple determinations. Any attempt 
to unravel the causal chains generating particular forms of action would inevitably 
involve unpicking the heterogeneity of the locality in order to identify precisely 
what it is about Manchester, for example, which contributed to a particular 
response.
None of this should be read as criticism of locality research conducted on its 
own terms. I have discussed it here in order to demonstrate how my ideas 
developed as I tried to interpret the geography of trade union action. I eventually 
reached the conclusion that what was required for such a task was a theory o f 
action which took seriously the significance of the places in which that action 
developed. Such a theory is not provided by the idea of locality, nor was it 
intended by those involved in locality research that it should be. For these reasons 
I want to turn now to Anthony Giddens’ concept of ‘locale’.
Phil Cooke has argued that localities’ can be the sources of political action: a phenomenon 
which he labels ‘pro-actiyity’. However the nature of the link between local political action and 
the concept of locality is obscure. If Cooke is claiming that political and social action often 
occur locally then he is hardly original. If, by contrast, he is claiming (as he seems to be) that 
there is some necessary characteristic of localities which generates pohtical and social action then 
it is not clear what this is. See Cooke op. c/t. p p ll-12.
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L ocale
The concept of ‘locale’ has been proposed by Giddens as part of his wider project 
to develop a theory of structuration, and my comments here are not intended as an 
uncritical endorsement of the whole of Giddens’ work. Bearing in mind my 
comments in the Introduction about the virtues of eclecticism I am happy to draw 
on aspects of Giddens’ theory, particularly since Giddens sees his position as 
‘compatible with a realist epistemology’29 a compatability which has been explicitly 
endorsed by Derek Gr e g o ry Ho w e ve r ,  as I shall suggest, there are a number of 
ambiguities and even inconsitencies in his use of the concept of locale which imply 
that critical re-working may be more appropriate than straightforward adoption. 
Some of these difficulties stem from the highly programmatic character of Giddens’ 
definitions and use of the term.
In this context of this study, Giddens’ work is interesting because of the 
central and substantive role it accords to time-space relations in the production, 
reproduction and transformation of social life. For Giddens, ‘time, space and 
“virtual time-space” (or structure) - the threefold intersection of difference - are 
necessary to the constitution of the real’,2! and thus ^social theory must 
acknowledge, as it has not done previously, time-space intersections as essentially 
involved in all social existence'?^
Giddens argues that his notion of structuration suggests how the flow of 
human agency ‘binds’ time and space. The social interactions involved in this are 
integrative. Social integration involves individual actors, while system integration 
involves relations between groups and collectivities. In both cases interactions are 
situated in time and space and this time-space setting, or context, furnishes the
^^Giddens A (1979) Central problems in social theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan) p63.
^^Gregory D (1982) ‘Solid geometry: notes on the recovery of spatial structure’ in Gould P and 
Olsson G (eds) A search for common ground (London: Pion) ppl 89-219.
^^Giddens (1979) op. aV. p55.
^'^Ibid.pSA, emphasis original.
168 Responding to restructuring
resources on which the actors draw in their interaction. Giddens labels this context
‘locale’. In an early formulation he defines it thus:
‘Locale’ is in some respects a preferable term to that of ‘place’, more commonly employed 
in social geography: for it carries something of the connotation of space used as a setting 
for interaction. A setting is not just a spatial parameter, and physical environment, in 
which interaction ‘occurs’: it is these elements moblised as part of the interaction.^^ 
Features of the setting of interaction, including its spatial and physical aspects [...] are 
routinely drawn upon by social actors in the sustaining of communication.^^
On a number of occasions Giddens refers to locales as the characteristic 
physical settings associated with different types of collectivities. He writes: 
‘virtually all collectivities have have a locale of operation, spatially distinct from that 
associated with o t h e r s a n d  ‘all collectivities have defined locales of operation: 
physical settings associated with the “typical interactions” composing those 
collectivities as social systems’.^  ^ What Giddens has in mind here are the sort of 
typical physical institutional arrangements associated with particular types of 
organisations. Thus the typical locale of the school is the classroom; that of the 
prison, the cell block; that of the bureacracy, the office; that of the army, the
barracks.27
However, in The constitution o f society, Giddens distinguishes between 
organisations and social movements and claims that ‘[ujnlike organizations, social 
movements do not characteristically operate within fixed locales’.38 In addition, he 
claims that ‘[t]he labour movement [...] is in certain ways prototypical of 
contemporary social movements’,39 and this might appear to suggest that the
This notion that locales are mobilised as part of an interaction (and thereby become partly 
constitutive of action) contradicts Cooke’s (mis)reading of Giddens. Cooke claims that the idea of 
local should be rejected because, inter alia, ‘it reproduces the passive connotations of community 
in the way it refers to setting and context for action rather than as a constituting element in 
action’. (Cooke op. cit. plO.)
34Giddens (1979) op. cit. pp206-7.
35/W . p206.
3 ^ Giddens A (1981) A contemporary critique of historical materialism. Vol. 1: Power, property 
and the state (Basingstoke: MacmilM) p39.
3^Giddens A (1987) Social theory and modern sociology (Cambridge: Polity) ppl53-162. The 
specific chapter concerned was originally presented as a lecture in 1984.
3^Giddens A (1984) The constitution of society (Cambridge: Polity) pp204.
39/W . pp204-5.
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concept of ‘locale’ is of no relevance to a study of trade unionism. Elsewhere,
however, Giddens makes it clear that he means the concept of locale to have ‘very
general ap p licab ility an d  that it applies in principle to all social interaction. The
reason for stressing the typical locales of certain types of institutions (barracks,
schools etc) is that in some cases locales can take on a fixed physical form, but that
this form does not completely specify the nature of a locale, and indeed some
locales may not have a physical form in that sense at all:
Locales provide for a good deal of the ‘fixity’ underlying institutions, althugh there is no 
clear sense in which they ‘determine’ such ‘fixity’. It is ususally possible to designate 
locales in terms of their physical properties, either as features of the material world or, 
more commonly, as combinations of those features and human artefacts. But it is an error 
to suppose that locales can be described in those terms alone [...] A house is grasped as 
such only if the observer recognizes that it is a ‘dwelling’ with a range of other properties 
specified by the modes of its utilization in human activity
The idea that ‘locale’ is applicable to all social interaction introduces,
however, a fiuther ambiguity. On the one hand Giddens implies that interactions
situated in time-space contexts (locales) necessarily involve the ‘co-presence’ of the
a c t o r s . 4 2  On the other he stresses that ‘locales may range from a room in a house,
a street comer, the shop floor of a factory, towns and cities, to the territorially
demarcated areas occupied by nation states’,^ 3 or to put it, as Nigel Thrift does,
more concisely, ‘a locale does not have to be local’.^  The apparent contradiction
here is partially resolved by Giddens’ comments on media of communication:
The shifting nature of the relations between the expansion of interaction over space and its 
contraction over time is obviously part and parcel of the ‘time-space convergence’ so 
prominent in the development of the contemporary social world. The global nature of 
social interaction in the modern era had gone along with the invention of new media 
reducing the distances involved in presence-availability. The telephone, and television 
video techniques, do not of course achieve the full presence of parties to interaction 
characteristic of ordinary ‘face-to-face’ encounters, but they do permit immediacy of time 
contact across indefinite spatial distances.^^
‘^ ^Giddens (1981) op. cit. p4Q.
^^Giddens (1984) op. cz7. pi 18, emphases added.
^^bid. p71.
43/W . p i 18.
‘^^ Thrift N (1983) ‘On the determination of social action in space and time’ Environment and 
PlanningD: Society and Space I'.lpAl.
'^^Giddens (1981) op. cit. p40.
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This perspective is reiterated in r/te <9/
Although the ‘full conditions of co-presence’ [a quotation from Erving Goffman - JP] exist 
only in unmeditated contact between those who are physically present, meditated contacts 
that permit some of the intimacies of co-presence are made possible in the modem era by 
electronic communications, most notably the telephone.'^^
And again:
All social interaction is situated within time-space boundaries of co-presence (whether or 
not this be extended via media such as letters, telephone calls etc.).^^
However, elsewhere Giddens insists that ‘co-presence’ must involve literal 
‘face-to-face’ interaction:
Interaction in contexts of co-presence obviously has characteristics not found in ‘meditated’ 
interaction —  via the telephone, recordings, the mail and so on.^^
Similarly,
interaction in contexts of co-presence , as face-to-face interaction, has definite properties 
which distinguish it from interaction with absent others. ‘Absent others’ include those 
who are ‘absent in time’ as well as those ‘absent in space’
Although I think that there is a genuine confusion here, it seems fairly clear 
that Giddens does regard a ‘locale’ as something which can have (potentially 
considerable) spatial and temporal extension. The interactions for which locales 
form the setting can therefore in principle be ‘time-space distanciated’. Time-space 
distanciation refers to the ‘stretching’ of social relations over time and space and 
can operate through the mechanisms of either social or system integration, or 
both.50 That is to say, distanciated relations may be produced and reproduced 
either through practices which involve the co-presence of actors, or through those 
which do not, or through the ‘intermingling’ of relations of presence and 
absence.51
'^^Giddens (1984) op. cit. p68.
'^ I^bid. p332. See i s o  Giddens (1979) op. cit. pl03. 
^^Giddens (1987) op. cit. pl37.
49/W . pl46.
^OGiddens (1984) op. cit. p377.
^^Giddens ^981) op. cit. p38.
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The social interactions which constitute trade union activity, I will propose, 
all involve the intermingling of present and absent actors in and through a whole 
variety of different locales of various sizes. These locales may not have an obvious 
physical expression, but they do have a geography. Without understanding this 
geography, we can never fully understand the constitution of trade union action.
Having clarified my reading of Giddens’ work I now want to explain how 
they can be helpful in analysing the relationships between the development of trade 
union action and its geographical context.
Trade union action in context: the role of institutions
As I have suggested, in Giddens’ schema the labour movement, or specific trade 
unions, are not thought to operate in fixed locales. I take this to mean that there is 
no typical institutional setting for trade union activity in the way that a classroom 
forms the locale of the activity of teaching. This does not imply, however, that 
trade union action is context-free and I want to suggest that all trade union activities 
(and all other social action, for that matter) are situated in locales, but that different 
activities involve different locales. Moreover, apart from that aspect of trade union 
activity which is directed towards the internal running of the organisation, all action 
involves interaction between the union (or individuals or groups within it) and other 
institutions^^ (or individuals or groups).
This means that the locale of union action is that setting which links the 
activities of the institutions or individuals concerned, or, more accurately, the 
context of union action is the relationship between the institutions. Now, this 
means that in most cases the locale of union action does not have a physical 
expression, in this sense of a building or fixed form, but as Giddens points out, 
such an expression is not necessary, only ‘ u s u a l ’ .^ ^
As I have suggested, the concept of ‘locale’ carries with it the notion that the
^^Including other unions. 
^^Giddens (1984) op. cit. p i 18.
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characteristics of settings are mobilised by actors in interaction. Its use here, 
therefore, is intended to emphasise the ways in which the institutional contexts of 
trade union action provide the resources for that action. Moreover, in the light of 
my empirical research, and as I aim to show in the next sections, it is these 
institutional contexts and their associated resources which are the key determinants 
of trade union responses. Consequently differences in the pattern of institutional 
relations between different places provide the principal explanation for geographical 
variations in those responses.
Local trade union activity can thus be seen as enmeshed in and constituted 
through a network of institutional relationships each of which forms a locale 
through which action is resourced. The geography of the network is likely to be 
complex, especially where trade unions are powerful organisations with many links 
to local, national and international institutions. Trade union action at the local level 
is not therefore purely the product of local phenomena, but it is always constituted 
through relationships (locales) which link the local level to wider circumstances.
The key connections in the network of locales are a matter for empirical 
investigation and will vary from place to place. In the case studies that follow I will 
discuss the significant relationships in each example. However the metaphor of the 
network may be illustrated through the schematic example shown in Figure 6.2.
These ideas seem to me to be entirely compatible with regulation theory and 
specifically with the concept of a mode of regulation. As I described in Chapter 
Two, the mode of regulation involves the contingent coming together of particular 
institutional forms. What I am proposing here is that understanding the role of 
political and social action (including struggle) in reproducing and potentially 
transforming those institutions involves examining the ‘fine grain’ as it were of the 
relationships between them.
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Figure 6.2; Institutions and locales
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Trade unions are continuously involved in what Giddens’ refers to as the 
‘reflexive monitoring’54 of their situation and use the knowledge this gives them to 
influence the future development of their own and other organisations. This means 
that the network of locales does not determine action. Rather it provides a set of 
resources on which unions and their members draw selectively in developing their 
strategies. By implication this means that each network also denies its trade union 
other resources. Locales are thus the enablers and constrainers of social action, and 
therefore are implicated in the ‘duality of structure’ which forms the keystone of the 
theory of structuration.55
What I aim to do in the case studies which follow is a form of what Giddens’
^^/W.pp5-6.
pp25-9.
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refers to as ‘the analysis of strategic conduct’:
In the analysis of strategic conduct the focus is placed upon modes in which actors draw 
upon structural properties in the constitution of social relations. The analysis of strategic 
conduct means giving primacy to discursive and practical consciousness, and to strategies of 
control within defined contextual boundaries. Institutionalized properties of the settings of 
interaction [or locales - JP] are assumed methodologically to be ‘given’. We have to take 
care with this, of course, for to treat structural properties as methodologically given is not 
to hold that they are not produced and reproduced through human agency. It is to 
concentrate analysis upon the contextually situated activities of definite groups of actors.^^
It is important to stress that the concept of ‘resources’ in these formulations 
involves a broad definition of that term. It includes not only material resources, but 
also cultural and ideological ones. The existence of a particular institutional 
relationship may be a resource in itself, by virtue of the ease of access it provides to 
decision makers in a local authority, for example. Similarly the reproduction 
through time of certain relationships may furnish ideological resources in 
developing action. For example a long standing relationship of cooperation 
between the trade unions and the Labour Party in a particular place might provide 
ideological or cultural resources in the sense that cooperation with the Labour Party 
can be represented ‘as the way we do things here’ and hence as somehow natural. 
Relationships between institutions which have been reproduced over time are 
embodied as knowledge in the minds of individuals and provide the practical 
understandings which predispose actors to one course of action or another.
This interpretation of the relationship between knowledge and resources 
provides the basis for a rigorous account of the role of ‘tradition’. Many 
interpretations of the geography of trade unionism refer to the particular labour 
movement traditions of different regions or localities and to the related concept of 
local political c u l t u r e s . ^ ^  jg frequently far from clear, however, how ‘traditions’ 
have causal power. References to tradition cannot explain why contemporary
56/W . p288.
^^For example Sunley P (1990) ‘Striking parallels: a comparison of the geographies of the 1926 
and the 1984-85 coalmining disputes’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 8:1 pp35- 
52. Sunley argues that the particular geography of industrial action in the miners’ strike of 1984- 
5 can best be understood as reflecting the continued influence of sets of local labour movement 
traditions stretching back to the 1926 strike.
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union activity takes the form that it does, since there is no necessary reason why 
trade unionists should always do what is ‘traditional’. The problems of this sort of 
account are highlighted by the situation in which action/a//^ to conform to tradition. 
If action ‘A ’ which is not ‘in character’ is not explained by local culture on what 
grounds can we assume that action ‘B ’ which is ‘in character’ can be so 
explained?^^
Seen as shared understandings of what is appropriate behaviour and action 
for trade unions and trade unionists, which are given practical expression in 
routinised (and therefore partly ««monitored) social activity, traditions are one form 
of ideological resources on which actors can draw. The existence of many other 
resources and the choices which actors are able to make in mobilising different 
resources for different purposes emphasises that the category ‘ tradition’ needs 
careful unpicking if it is to be useful in developing explanations.
The ‘complete’ context of trade union action at the local level is therefore the 
‘intersection’ of the various locales through which specific relationships are 
generated and reproduced. Contextual theory, of which Giddens’ is a foremost 
proponent, involves locating actors and groups of actors in the midst of the 
contingent relationships in which their actions quite literally ‘take place’. It is this 
perspective which I will use to inform the interpretation of my substantive case 
studies.
^M ike Savage has argued something similar in respect of political parties. Savage M (1989) 
‘Whatever happened to red Clydeside’ in Anderson J and Cochrane A (eds) A state o f crisis: the 
c/wng/rtg/flce (London: Hodder and Stoughton) pp231-243.
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Walking the tightrope: Manchester and Newcastie
Manchester City Council
With the reorganisation of local government in 1974, Manchester City Council was 
formed as one of the ten metropolitan district councils which made up the Greater 
Manchester Metropolitan County Council. The abolition of the metropolitan 
counties in 1986 left Manchester with a single tier of elected local government. The 
case study presented here is of Manchester City Council which shares the 
administration of central Manchester with Salford and Trafford District Councils.
The city o f Manchester
The history of Manchester in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
inextricably linked with the cotton industry:
In the early eighteenth century, Manchester was a small market town with about 10,000 
inhabitants. It lacked corporate status. In addition there were no craft guilds and few 
restrictions on industrial development. It was also located in a region with a high density 
of population, limited agricultural potential, and a lack of industrial employment, but a 
material environment supplying pure water and coal fuel which were essential for the 
bleaching, dyeing, and printing of cotton, and which could be used for industrial power. As 
a result, the region was ideally suited as a base for the development of the cotton industry, 
while Manchester was well placed to act as a commercial centre from which a putting-out 
system could be organised. [...] By the first decade of the nineteenth century the cotton 
industry had become the most important manufacturing industry in Britain, and cotton had 
overtaken woollen cloth as the most important export. [...] By 1851 [Manchester’s] 
population had reached 400,000.^^
Frederick Engels, writing at the height of Manchester’s prosperity, 
emphasises the role of commerce:
Manchester contains, at its heart, a rather extended commercial district, perhaps half a mile 
long and about as broad, and consisting alsmost wholly of offices and warehouses. Nearly 
the whole district is abandoned by dwellers, and is lonely and deserted at night; only 
watchmen and policemen traverse its narrow lanes with their dark lanterns.^®
As these observations suggest, Manchester was never purely an industrial 
city, and with the steady decline in the textile industry from the early years of the
^^Dunford M and Perrons D (1983) The arena of capital (London: Macmillan) pp268-9.
^^Engels F (1973, first German edition 1845) The condition o f the working class in England 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart) p77.
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twentieth century its significance as regional service centre was enhanced. More 
recent developments have added impetus to this shift. Deindustrialisation and 
industrial restructuring, particularly during the economic crisis of the 1970s, 
stripped industrial jobs in other manufacturing sectors, and increased the relative 
significance of the service sector.
Furthermore, a large proportion of jobs in the category of ‘other services’ are 
in the public services sector. This, combined with safe Labour Party control of 
local government (77 out of 99 seats on Manchester City Council were Labour in 
1989), a strong trade union movement in both the private and public sectors, a 
steady increase in the proportion of households in council housing (from 25.4% in 
1961 to 47.1% in 1981^^) and a heavy dependence on social security benefits,^^ 
identifies Manchester as both an archetypal ‘public sector city’ and one of the 
‘spaces for labour’ established during the period of Fordism. This does not mean, 
of course, that capital was absent from Manchester during this period. However, 
compared with many other places, labour, in part through the density of its network 
of institutional locales, had considerable power in Manchester, a power which can 
only be fully understood as the coming together of a range of contingently related 
factors.
Notwithstanding the increasing significance of services in the Manchester 
economy after the Second World War, manufacturing industry continued to be of 
considerable importance, even if it was no longer completely dominated by the 
textiles sector. The manufacturing sector was well organised industrially and 
included one of the major heartlands of female trade unionism. The proportion of 
women in paid employment in the North West of England has consistently been
6lMancester Planning (1987) Manchester’s population in the mid 1980s (Manchester: Manchester 
City Council) p36.
^^The proportion of the population dependent on supplementary benefit was 18% in 1979. By 
1987 this had risen to 33%. In 1987 52.3% of children attending Manchester schools were entitled 
to free school meals. (Mancester Planning op. cit. pp74-75.)
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amongst the highest of any region in the country63 and this was largely due to the 
predominance of cotton, with its high proportion of women workers. Before the 
war, Manchester had also developed as a centre for trade unionism among clothing 
workers, again including many women.64 Male-dominated unionism in 
engineering was also significant with Lancashire forming one of the heartlands of 
the then Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.^^
Hilary Wainwright argues that this particular local mix of trade union 
histories is central to the institutionalisation of the politics of the labour movement 
in Manchester.66 In contrast with her other case study of Sheffield, the dominant 
unions in Manchester after the Second World War did not place a high priority on 
getting their people elected at the municipal level, preferring to concentrate on 
influencing the selection of MBs. The separation between the local Labour Party 
branches and the trades councils in Manchester and Salford stemmed from the 
Trades Disputes Act 1927 and its restrictions on the political activities of trade 
unions. Increasingly the engineering unions, in particular, became linked to the 
Communist Party, rather than the Labour Party. In addition Manchester’s role as a 
service centre led to a growth in individual membership of the Labour Party among 
groups who were unlikely to be part of the institutions of the labour movement.
In contrast to Sheffield, the effect was to deprive the Labour Party of a ready 
source of new political talent willing to serve on the City Council. The Council’s 
Labour Group became dominated by an older generation who were, if not exactly
^^Marshall M (1987) Long waves of regional development (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education) 
ppl25-6.
^"^Dobbs SP (1928) The clothing workers of Great Britain (London: Routledge) pp48-55 and 
ppl33-135. Dobbs notes that although the major craft union of the interwar years, the politically 
conservative The Amalgamated Society of Tailors and Tailoresses, was formed and had its 
headquarters in Manchester, the politically radical industrial union, the Tailors’ and Garment 
Workers’ Trade Union was particularly strong in the city and included among its objectives the 
maintenance of a political fund and the education of its members on ‘independent working class 
principles’.
^^Massey D and Miles N (1984) ‘Mapping out the unions’ Marxism Today May ppl9-22. The 
AUEW is now the Amalgamated Engineering Union.
^^Wainwright H (1987) Labour: a tale of two parties (London: The Hogarth Press) ppl 14-126.
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reactionary, were old-fashioned in their politics. At the same time the local Labour 
Parties were ‘more tolerant of heterogeneity’ a stance reinforced by the local 
strength of women’s trade unionism.
All of this meant that a whole cohort of younger political activists were 
cutting their teeth outside the formal politics of the council chamber. With roots in 
the women’s and peace movements, community campaigns and the struggle for gay 
and lesbian rights, this ‘missing generation’, as Wainwright dubs them, found a 
vacuum they could easily fill when they decided in the 1970s that their campaigning 
activities required formal political expression if their objectives were to be acheived.
Thus the radical left was able to gain control of the City Council with relative 
ease, and without relying on the support of the major local bastions of the labour 
movement: the manufacturing unions. From Wainwright’s arguments, it can 
already be seen that the political strategy is crucially dependent on the relationship 
between the institutions involved. These links (locales) provide the opportunities 
(resources) through which action is constituted.
The impact o f local government restructuring: municipal socialism under pressure 
The new urban left thus had relatively weak links with the private sector unions in 
manufacturing. For Wainwright this partly explains the difference in policy 
emphasis between Manchester and Sheffield, where the links were much stronger. 
In Sheffield, she suggests, the Labour Group’s close relationship with the steel and 
engineering unions predisposed it to economic policy initiatives and particularly to 
measures to increase employment.^^ By contrast the emphases in Manchester were 
on equal opportunities and peace, reflecting the background of the new councillors, 
with economic policy being accorded a much lower piiority.^^
'^ I^bid. ppl 16.
^^Indeed in 1981 Sheffield Council was among the first local authorities in the country to 
establish a separate Employment Department. (Boddy M (1984) ‘Local economic and employment 
strategies in Boddy M and Fudge C (eds) Local socialism? (London: Macmillan Publishers) 
pl66.)
^^Wainwright op. cit. ppl21.
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In 1980 Manchester was the first city in the world to declare itself a nuclear 
free zoneJ® The Council has adopted a comprehensive equal opportunities policy 
covering discrimination on the grounds of ‘colour, creed, ethnic or national origin, 
disability, age (below 65), sex, marital status, sexuality, trade union activity or 
responsibility for dependants’l l  Beyond the specific area of employment the 
Council has provided financial and other support to women’s organisations, anti- 
rascist activities and gay and lesbian rights campaigns^^ In addition the Council 
has been particularly concerned to democratise its procedures and make elected 
representatives more accountable. For example Wainwright describes a number of 
initiatives towards the decentralisation of the control of council services.'^^
Of course, the new urban left is not actively antagonistic towards trade 
unionism: far from it, and Susan Halford points out that in the context of the equal 
opportunities programme there is explicit attention given to involving the trade 
unions concerned in the development of p o l i c i e s . 7 4  There are two characteristics of 
the relationship between the Council and the unions which are significant and 
which again stem from the sets of institutional relationships I have been describing.
The first of these is that the radical left (as is often the case in large cities) has 
a particular affinity with public sector trade unionists. This is a group to which 
many of the activists belong and one which was growing rapidly during the period 
of development of the new urban left’s politics.'^^ In addition the development and 
maintenance of public service employment and public service provision is 
characteristically emphasised by the left, leading to a commonality of interest with
^^Manchester City Council (1987) Manchester: a nuclear free city (Manchester; Manchester City 
Council).
Manchester City Council (undated) Equal opportunity in employment - policy statement 
(Manchester: Manchester City Council) p i.
^^Manchester City Council (1989) A-Z information guide to council fgrvfcgf (Manchester: 
Manchester City Council)
^^Wainwright op. cit. ppl24-5.
^"^Personal communication, 14 August 1990.
^^The significance of these links has recently was recognised by the Thatcher Government which 
outlawed the practice of ‘twin-tracking’, in which individuals working for one local authority are 
members of the council in another.
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the public service trade unions. The second is that where the radical left does seek 
a close relationship with the trade unions this is frequently on the basis of 
participation: of involving the unions in the decision-making process. This 
characteristic is particularly significant in the development of trade union responses 
in local government restructuring in Manchester, and I will return to it shortly.
One of the key characteristics of ‘municipal socialism’ has been a 
commitment to resisting attempts by central government to control local expenditure 
and impose cuts in budgets. In Manchester it was the old Labour Group’s decision 
to introduce cuts which led to the breakaway of the radical left, and eventually to its 
gaining power in 1984. Ironically the introduction of the poll tax in 1990 has 
forced the left to introduce cuts of its own.'^^ However for several years in the 
mid-1980s the aim was to maintain the level of council services despite continual 
pressure from the Conservative government to reduce expenditure. Such policies 
directly affect the Council’s own workforce, and consequently the trade unions in 
local government. Negotiations between the Council’s unions and members and 
officers are thus continually in progress as socialist councils have sought to 
minimise the impact of government policy on workers and residents alike. There 
are thus two sides to the relationship between the Council and the unions. The 
more political side referred to above and this industrial relations aspect. These tend 
to converge where unions are brought into the policy-making machinery of the 
Council not through their representation on the City Labour Party organisations, 
but as representatives of the Council’s own employees. The development of 
responses to the provisions of the Local Government Act exemplifies this in 
particularly stark ways.
While the Government’s legislation lays down stringent conditions regarding 
the tendering process,' '^  ^local councils have a degree of autonomy in developing or
'If Sunday Correspondent (1990) ‘Why Manchester must pay more for its past’ 14 January. 
' 'See Appendix A.
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restructuring their service provision to improve the chances of retaining the work 
in-house. Many councils who have a policy of trying to retain service production 
in the public sector have tried to ensure this by cutting budgets and staffing levels 
so that the in-house bid is lower than those from the private sector. However, as I 
outlined in Chapter Five, the trade unions reject this view, since it represents a 
major threat to the jobs and working conditions of their members. Instead they 
advocate a strategy of competing on quality rather than cost. The City Council has 
accepted this position too, at least in principle:
Manchester Council is determined to protect jobs and services from the effects of enforced 
tendering as far as possible. Part of die process is to review thoroughly existing services, 
improve the quality and expand services where possible.^^
However it sees this policy as having far-reaching implications:
This means changes in working practices, increased flexibility and a willingness to change 
and adapt to new circumstances. This can only be achieved through close and constructive 
working relationships between Council Members, unions and workers.^^
In practice this has involved the restructuring of those departments which are 
affected by CCT. As in many other authorities it has been decided to centralise 
service provision within new departments. Whereas in the past each department 
was responsible for its own cleaning, catering and so on, in future all civic catering 
will come under a new organisation, ‘Manchester Fayre’, while ‘Manchester 
Operational Services’ will have responsibility for vehicle maintenance, refuse 
collection, street cleaning and buildihg cleaning.
The aim of these changes is to render the new organisations better able to win 
contracts than the private sector. In many cases there have also been substantial 
changes to the working practices and conditions of employment of the workforce. 
These sort of changes are the subject of negotiations between management and 
unions in the new organisations through the forums of ‘service groups’. For the
^Manchester City Council Enforced Tendering Team (1989) Team profile (Manchester: 
Manchester City Council) mimeo, p2.
79/W . p2.
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unions this largely involves responding to management proposals for change, 
negotiating an agreement and then balloting the members. For the Grounds 
Maintenance tender, for example, the management negotiated an agreement with the 
unions which would mean gardening staff working a 45-hour week during the 
summer, but only a 34-hour week in the winter in order to concentrate staff in the 
busy summer season. This was accepted by the workforce by a 2:1 majority.
These types of negotiations and agreements represent little more than the 
application of normal collective bargaining procedures to new Council proposals. 
What is different here is the greater willingness of the unions to compromise than 
has been the case in the past, in order to help the authority keep the work in the 
public sector. As a senior NUPE official in the union’s North West Region put it:
we have had to be prepared to negotiate job losses, organisational changes, in some cases
conditions of employment, and in some cases pay to actually beat the contractor.^®
Several unionists I spoke to said that they had no ‘bottom line’ below which 
they would not go in negotiations.
As I have already indicated, national union policy does not see this sort of 
approach as adequate. If local unions merely respond to initiatives from councils 
determined to push them through because of the threat of privatisation then the 
result is likely to be job losses and cuts in services. To try to prevent this, the 
national strategy argues in favour of a joint union/employer approach, so that the 
union point of view is taken into account in the formulation of Council policy, not 
merely as a response to ?ifait accompli. In Manchester a joint working arrangement 
has been established to ensure a trade union input during these earlier stages.
The strategy o f joint working: participation or incorporation?
To implement the Council’s policies on CCT and to coordinate the tendering
8®Interview with the author, 3 October 1989. In many cases a considerable degree of 
restructuring, particularly labour shedding, had already been undertaken before the negotiations on 
CCT proper began.
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processes in different service departments, the Council established a permanent unit
in the Town Hall under the Chief Executive. The team consists of a leader, policy
workers, administers and representatives from the four unions. The establishment
of this unit was a Council initiative, as was the decision to involve the trade unions
in this formal way. As I have already suggested the Council committed itself from
the start to retaining services in-house and safeguarding jobs and services ‘as far as
possible’. In this respect Manchester differs significantly from Newcastle, which I
consider below. In Newcastle most of the initiatives came from the trade union
side. Although in Manchester the unions are part of the Council’s policy
formulation and implementation structure they are not the key initiators of policy.
The trade unionists I spoke to were happy to accept that the changes
introduced in the way policy was formulated and in the way services were provided
were Council, rather than trade union led. As one union organiser told me:
The City Council recognised that their existing structure was not geared for preparing the 
Council for competitive tendering! So they’ve set up a special unit called the Enforced 
Tendering Team under the Chief Executive’s Department. [...] They recognised also that 
the involvement of the trade unions was vital, not part way through, not at the end, but 
right at the very beginning.^ 1
The unions in Newcastle said that it had been a struggle to persuade the 
Council to involve the unions. In Manchester there was some initial negotiation 
regarding the status of the union representatives, and the Council did agree that they 
would be ultimately responsible to their unions, rather than the team. However in 
practice shop stewards had found that the trade union representatives’ loyalty to the 
Council had on occasion been a barrier to completely frank discussions within the 
unions. A branch officer I spoke to told me that at times the union representatives 
had not divulged information on the tendering process because of the confidentiality 
to the Council. The representatives denied conflicts of interest however:
^^nterview with the author, 4 October 1989.
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I am responsible to my Branch. I am also responsible to the team leader for my work 
programme.... There are some things which are confidential, but if it affected the jobs and 
conditions of the members, then I would have to let it out. But if it affects the 
confidentiality of the letting of the contract if it is a purely commercial matter, then clearly 
I have got a duty to the team to keep it quiet. I have not found a conflict of interest yet.®^
There are differences here between the unions, however, and there is also 
evidence that the unions’ own policies are not always wholeheartedly endorsed by 
their members, especially where individuals have ‘done well’ out of the 
reorganisation of service provision. One NALGO activist who is employed as a 
manager in one of the new direct service organisations saw no conflict at all on the 
grounds that the interests of the unions and those of the Council were identical:
Q: What is your view of enforced tendering?
A: It could be seen as blessing and I welcome the challenge, although I don’t like the way 
it has been applied by the present government. Competition is a good thing since it 
involves running council departments more like the private sector.
Q: And is that positive assessment the same regardless o f whether you are wearing a 
management hat or a trade union one?
A: Yes, from all points of view: NALGO, manager, rate payer, employee. I see it as an 
opportunity.^^
This is not to say that trade unionists act purely out of self-interest, but it
shows how the context in which an individual is located can influence their views,
by providing the ‘resources’ for making sense of their situation. On the outcome of
some recent negotiations one NUPE activist was much more disillusioned:
I think our biggest stumbling block has been the Council. OK, they are supposed to be 
socialist, but you might as well have been talking to Tories. Dreadful. They wouldn’t 
give an inch. For these low paid workers a fiver is a lot of money. They don’t realise that 
people are struggling!...] I think it is going back in time.^4
The representatives on the Enforced Tendering Team recognised that they 
were potentially in a difficult position, but took the view that at least in principle 
they had the ear of the Council’s officers, even if practical consultation procedures 
sometimes left something to be desired. This is one way in which aspects of the 
setting for action (in this case proximity and access to Council officers) are
^^Interview with the author, 5 October 1989. 
^^Interview with the author, 11 October 1989. 
‘^^ Interview with the author, 12 October 1989.
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mobilised as part of the action taken by trade unions.
While the representatives on the enforced tendering team have a direct input 
into the development and implementation of the Council’s CCT strategy, the same 
cannot be said of the grass roots activists and lay members. By contrast with the 
situation in Newcastle (see below) the distance (metaphorically and literally) 
between the Council decision makers and the shop stewards and branch secretaries 
has meant that there is only very limited grass roots involvement.
As far as I could tell the only involvement of lay members was in briefing 
sessions either at union meetings or in the form of workforce briefings organised 
by the Enforced Tendering Team. The latter would be addressed jointly by 
management as well as unions, which presumably makes it difficult for differences 
in the positions of the two to be aired.
The lay activists I talked to claimed that there was very little communication 
between the Enforced Tendering Team in the Town Hall and the grass roots of the 
unions, and there was certainly only the most limited involvement of shop stewards 
in the drawing up of service profiles and specifications, in constrast to the situation 
in Newcastle. This may improve with the development by the union 
representatives on the Team of trade union newsletters separate from that produced 
for the workforce by the Team as a whole. However the unions have been unable 
to produce a joint union newsletter, which epitomises an important characteristic of 
the union response in Manchester: its disunity.
This particularly affects the relationship between NUPE and the GMB, since 
the TGWU’s membership is fairly small. Those I spoke to all candidly admitted 
that NUPE and the GMB were engaged in an open recruitment war. The history of 
this dispute long predates the implementation of CCT and is connected to the 
internal power struggles of the City Labour Party and the ruling Labour Group. 
However some argue that the implementation of CCT has heightened these tensions 
somewhat. An influential member of the GMB admitted that his union was using
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CCT as a means of recruiting new members (many of whom have in the past been
members of NUPE). Meanwhile NUPE takes the view that if its members’ jobs
are privatised or transferred to another department it will follow them, even if they
have moved to an area traditionally organised by another union. According to a
senior NUPE full-time official in the region:
Our policy is that if our members go down the road into the private sector, we follow 
them, simple as that. And of course we have done, and that has brought us into conflict 
with the general unions.^^
The view of one of the GMB’s regional organisers was similar:
On the face of it it seems reasonable. When you really get down to the nitty gritty it is 
very difficult. It differs from authority to authority. There are good officers in all unions 
and they all strive to protect their own membership, without aggravating our relationship. 
But in some areas, one union in particular is hell-bent on securing its membership at all 
costs. I’ll name it: it’s NUPE.^^
The result of this conflict is a failure of the unions in the region and in the 
City to work together as closely as elsewhere, or in some cases to work together at 
all.
It is impossible to tell whether inter-union conflicts would have been 
mitigated if the Council had given less of lead in the development of CCT strategy, 
possibly forcing the unions to bury their differences and generate a common 
response. However, it is clear that the system of joint working between 
management and workers has important implications for the nature of the trade 
union response. Put most starkly the evidence from Manchester suggests that joint 
working carries two dangers. Firstly, that the union hierarchies become 
incorporated into the formal processes of decision-making in the Council and 
thereby risk losing the independence which some see as a vital guarantee that 
unions prioritise the interests of their members over those of the employer. 
Secondly, that key union actors become separated organisationally from their lay
^^Interview with the author, 3 October 1989. 
^^Interview with the author, 3 October 1989.
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members and grass roots activists so that those members and activists do not 
participate so fully in the processes of policy formation and implementation than 
they otherwise would.
The risk of incorporation is one that in principle the unions take seriously. In 
practice, however, there are so few oppportunities for trade unions explicitly to 
influence public policy that when they are offered positions such as those held by 
the secondees to the Enforced Tendering Team in Manchester they tend to welcome 
them. The problem with this, according to some activists, is that even a radical 
Labour council may at times be forced into a position of implementing changes 
detrimental to the interests of trade unionists. Whilst in theory the trade unions 
have reserved the right to oppose such developments, and insist that their 
representatives are accountable to the unions, in practice such sanctions are 
something of a last resort. In day to day situations it is difficult to see how 
unionists could pursue an independent line if they are part of formal council 
structures without those structures breaking down.
In Newcastle, by contrast, as I shall show below, trade union activists
rejected the idea of joint working from the beginning and explicitly recognise the
dangers of incorporation. Much of the development of trade unionism in response
to CCT in Newcastle has been predicated on the need to maintain very close links
with grass roots shop stewards and lay members and where possible to involve
them in the practical process of implementation. In addition, lack of strong formal
organisational links with the Council in Newcastle has allowed the unions to
develop policy jointly with user groups in a way which has not happened to any
great extent in Manchester. There the links with users where they exist have been
made through the Enforced Tendering Team, rather than by the unions
independently. When I asked whether unions had made moves to involve service
users one official of the GMB said:
As far as the privatisation structure around the local authorities is concerned the only two 
people that need to be involved is the management and the employees. No one else needs 
to be involved, no one knows the job better than those guys. So we have not involved
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anybody outside the actual people who’s doing the work.^^
An important constrast between the two cases, as my discussion of the 
Newcastle situation will show, is the lack of any sense of transformation in the 
practices of public service trade unionism in Manchester. The situation in 
Newcastle has been exploited by the unions as a means to bring about a renewal of 
grass roots trade unionism while in Manchester I found the dominant ethos among 
trade union officers to be ‘business as usual’.
Spacesfor labour: old and new
The network of locales in which trade unionism in local government in Manchester 
is located is crucial to understanding why it has responded in the way it has. I 
described this idea of a nework as being made up of the relationships between the 
institutions through which trade union strategy and tactics are mediated. In line 
with the comparative method I have adopted, the significance of the Manchester 
case will only become fully apparent in the light of the other cases.
An important link is that between the various unions. In Manchester the 
battle for membership means that inter-union relations are marked by a degree of 
suspicion, if not outright hostility. This has made joint initiatives such as 
newsletters very difficult to develop.
The relationship between the City Council and the local government unions is 
of paramount importance. The initiative to involve the unions came originally from 
the council placing the unions immediately in a subordinate position. Cooperation 
offered by the Council, was, in Giddensian language, an aspect of the setting of 
action used by the unions in developing action. Along with the offer of joint 
working came involvement in the development of policy and more mundanely an 
offer of office accomodation.
This latter is significant because in contrast to the situation in Newcastle
^^Interview with the author, 3 October 1989.
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which will be discussed below, the trade union representatives on the Council’s 
Enforced Tendering team work in the teams’ own open plan offices. In this sense 
they develop their action in what Giddens describes as a ‘front region’ of the locale, 
under the eye of the Council.^ ^  Most of the time this may cause no problems, or 
have positive benefits. For example it also ensures that the Council is to some 
extent under the eye of the unions. However, in the event of any conflict of interest 
between the Council and its workers, the effect is to separate the trade union 
secondees from their members, and deprive them of a readily available private 
space (‘back region’) in which to discuss their tactics. The lack of contact between 
the secondees and the membership was a recurrent theme in my interviews with 
shop stewards, who by contrast with Newcastle, have not been involved very 
much in the development of trade union actions, to the extent, in some cases, of 
feeling actively excluded.
If the office arrangements are a form of physical locale, with significant social 
consequences, the policy of joint working is the political relationship which they 
symbolise. In joint working the trade unions are not independent of the Council’s 
policy-making process, but a part of it, with the result that their ideas and expertise 
are fed directly into the Council’s strategy. There are enormous benefits to this for 
the unions, and it compares extremely well with the treatment of the unions in many 
local authorities. The danger that it carries arises again when the interests of the 
council and those of the workforce diverge. In this situation, without an 
independent strategy, the unions may find their priorities determined more by the 
needs of the employers than the membership.
What structuration theory suggests, however, is that actors use their 
knowledge of their own circumstances to take advantage of the opportunities 
presented in their locales of operation. In the case of Manchester, it may be that the 
strategy of joint working was the best available to the unions in the light of their
^^Giddens (1984) c/7. aV. ppl22-6.
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knowledge of the likely consequences of rejecting it. With a political tradition 
involving historically weak links between the labour movement and the local 
authority in the City, the offer of cooperation from a radical left Council was too 
good a gift horse to look in the mouth.
In this sense the strength of the engineering and textile unions in the city, 
which saw a particular space for labour being developed ‘in the lions’ den’ of 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth century competitive capitalism, may be giving way 
to a new sort of space, in which the public sector can be protected from wholesale 
takeover by the private, but on the basis of a degree of re-incorporation of labour 
into the decision-making processes of the local state.
Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Council
Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Council is one of five local authorities making up the 
former Metropolitan County of Tyne and Wear. The others are North and South 
Tyneside (at the mouth of the River Tyne), Gateshead, which faces Newcastle 
across the river and Sunderland on the River Wear.
The city o f Newcastle
If Manchester was founded on cotton, Tyneside is synonymous with ship-building 
and coal-mining. The North-East region as a whole produced over a quarter of the 
global output of ships in the first decade of the twentieth century, but by 1974 this 
proportion had fallen to just 0.37%.^^ Employment in shipbuilding and ship repair 
declined rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1971 22,000 Tynesiders were 
employed in the industry. This figure had fallen to 16,000 by 1984 and to just 
4,000 in 1987.90
The coal industry, which provided the original impetus for the development
^9Hudson R (1986) ‘Producing an industrial wasteland: capital, labour and the state in North-East 
England in Martin R and Rowthom B (eds) The geography of de-industrialisation (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan) pl71.
90Robinson F (1988) ‘Industrial structure’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial Tyneside
(Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) ppl8 and 25.
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of ship-building, was the oldest in the country ‘and, consequently, was one of the
first to be exhausted’.^! By the early 1980s little remained of the mining industry
on Tyneside. Heavy engineering, another Tyneside staple, also suffered badly in
the recession, but nonetheless provided 29,000 jobs in Tyneside in 1984.92 The
area’s status as a ‘problem region’ dates back to the recession of the 1930s, of
which the most enduring symbol is probably the Jarrow Crusade. Unemployment
in Jarrow on the south bank of the Tyne reached 80% following the closure of
Palmer’s s h i p y a r d . 9 3  High levels of unemployment relative to other regions are
also a significant feature of the area. In 1986 21% of the total workforce in
Newcastle City was unemployed.
The coal, shipbuilding and heavy engineering industries were dominated by
jobs for men rather than women, and this is reflected in the low proportion of
women who were in paid employment compared with the national average. Until
the early 1950s the North region consistently had one of the lowest economic
activity rates for w o m e n . 9 4  The regional rates have converged in recent years, but
the legacy of the past remains, most notably in the male-dominated traditions of the
labour movement in the North-East. Moreover:
The labour market remains strongly segmented by gender. The industrial and occupational 
structures of male and female employment differ considerably. Women are clustered in jobs 
generally characterised by low pay, low skill levels and low status, often with poorer 
conditions and fewer prospects for promotion [and, we may add, lower levels of 
unionisation - JP]. Moreover, a large proportion of women work in part-time jobs, which 
usually means lower rates of pay and poorer conditions than in comparable full-time 
jobs.95
Many ‘women’s jobs’ are found in the service industries, and like 
Manchester, Newcastle has long had a thriving commercial sector supported 
initially by the coal industry and then developing into a regional service centre more
9 1 /W . p l2 .
92/W . p29.
93Dunford and Perrons op. cit. p322.
9'^Marshall op. cit. ppl28.
95Robinson F (1988) ‘The labour market’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial Tyneside 
(Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) p65.
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generally. Although the recession of the early 1980s saw employment contract in 
Tyneside’s main private sector employer (retail distribution), some private sector 
services did grow throughout the period, most notably financial and other 
professional services. In Newcastle itself it is the public services which are of 
overwhelming importance, however, with 40% of all jobs. This relative 
importance of the public sector is if anything even more a consequence of the 
collapse of traditional manufacturing industries than is the case in Manchester.
During the post-War period, then, Newcastle became another ‘public sector 
city’ (in 1981 46% of households lived in local authority housing) and another of 
the ‘spaces for labour’. But it was a space secured on the basis of a very different 
labour movement history and, as a result, a very different labour movement 
politics.
The formal politics of the labour movement in Newcastle, centred on the City
Council, is dominated by the right-wing patemalistism of the local union bosses
and senior councillors. Outside the formal political structures, however, there are
traditions of radicalism, which while less secure, do provide some resources with
which alternative strategies might be developed.
The first of these is the shop stewards movement of the 1970s, which while
most immediately concerned with issues ‘at the point of production’ did feed into a
wider radical socialist movement, as David Byrne describes:
Industrial politics [...] on Tyneside was syndicalist, organized around shop-stewards in 
engineering and the shipyards with lodge officials and the activists of the Seaman’s Reform 
Movement playing a similar role in mining and shipping. [...] It was this tradition, 
frequently ‘unofficial’, which maintained Tyneside industrial militancy in a range of 
important disputes in the 1960s and 1970s, including the 1966 seamen’s strike, and the 
1972 and 1974 miners’ strikes. Although the main basis of action was immediate issues, 
the leading militants were frequently part of the wider socialist movement in the area and 
many were associated, however loosely, with the ideas of the Institute for Workers Control. 
The Communist Party never had much influence on Tyneside other than among seamen. 
The leading ‘rank-and-file’ activists of the 1960s and 1970s generally regarded themselves as 
anti-Stalinist leftists. This was in no small part a remnant of ILF influence from the 
1930s and 1940s. [...] This tradition has by no means wholly disappeared, although the 
power of the shop-stewards movement is now massively reduced [...]. It survives in some 
large-scale engineering plants and in the pits and has also been taken up in public sector 
employment in the National Civil Service [ ...] , the Health Service and Local
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Authorities?^
The shop stewards’ movement, of course, was of national significance 
during the 1970s, and, as I mentioned in Chapter Two, was occasionally the source 
of prefigurative activity in which ‘workers’ plans’ were developed to demonstrate 
how industry could be run for the benefit of the workforce and society in general. 
The Vickers’ Shop Stewards’ Combine Committee was at the cutting edge of these 
initiatives and, while it was a national organisation, one of its main bases was in 
Newcastle where Vickers had its principal p l a n t s . 9 7  This grassroots approach 
engendered a radicalism which operated outside the paternalist labourism of the 
City Council.
The local left was sufficiently strong during this period to support a radical 
bookshop. Days of Hope, which was a focus for socialists outside manufacturing 
industry as well. Indeed community action was another source of strength 
particularly for workers in the Community Development Project (CDF), which had 
two of its eleven sites on Tyneside.98 One was in Benwell in Newcastle, West of 
the City Centre, not far from the Vickers plant at Scotswood and originally built to 
house workers from the plant.99 The other was at Percy and Trinity, two 
communities in North Shields.
The CDP was established in 1969 by the Home Office at the end of the 
Wilson administration with a view to tackling poverty through providing 
communities with the resources and expertise to undertaken their own 
development. Joan Higgins and her co-workers have documented the process of 
radicalisation which the activists in the CDP underwent during the early 1970s as it 
became clear that the problems they were trying to tackle were caused by wider
^^Byme D (1989) Beyond the inner city (Milton Keynes: Open University Press) p77, emphasis 
added.
^^Beynon H and Wainwnght H (1979) The workers’ report on Vickers (London: Pluto Press). 
^^Higgins J, Deakin N, Edwards J and Wicks M (1983) Government and urban poverty: inside the 
po//cy waging proem  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) p i3.
^^Robinson F (1988) ‘Introduction’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial Tyneside (Newcastle: 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) p6.
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processes of economic r e s t r u c tu r in g ,  The reports produced by the CDP were 
critical of government policy and eventually the Project was wound up. Its legacy, 
however, was to contribute to the emergence of what John Gyford labels the ‘new 
urban left’.^^i Furthermore, Gyford identifies the Tyneside projects as particularly
significant in the process of radicalisation. 102
The impact o f local government restructuring: boss politics in a cold climate 
Whereas in Manchester the new urban left had taken the route of formal political 
involvement through the council chamber, in Newcastle the strength of the old- 
fashioned paternalism, dominated by the GMB, meant that community activists and 
radical shop stewards were denied the opportunities of engaging in local electoral 
politics to the same extent. I take this to be a crucial difference in the pattern of 
labour movement politics in Manchester and Newcastle and one which was in part 
responsible for the different strategies adopted the unions towards the 
restruucturing of local government: joint working in Manchester and independent 
campaigning in Newcastle.
As I suggested above, in Manchester, prior to the growth of the radical left, 
the local Labour Party branches were worthy, if lacklustre organisations, barely 
supporting an ‘old guard’ of moderate councillors. This weakness stemmed, 
according to Wainwright, from the lack of an organisational base in the unions. In 
Newcastle, the local Party branches were (and to some extent still are) if anything 
in a worse s t a t e . H e r e ,  however, the problem is not the lack of a union 
involvement, but rather a surfeit of union involvement of a particular type.
The largest trade union in the area is the GMB and it dominates Labour Party 
politics in Newcastle. For many on the left in the labour movement, Newcastle 
conjures up an image of paternalistic, undemocratic, machine politics, run by an
lOOHiggins et a l, op. cit. pp29-41.
l^^Gyford J (1985) The politics of local socialism (London: Allen and Unwin) pl8. 
p34.
103)^ainwright op. cit. pl39.
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elite of trade union barons and Labour Party bosses, and little changed since the
scandals of the early seventies when T Dan Smith, the leader of the City Council
was imprisoned for corruption. Wainwright, writing of the present leader, Jeremy
Beecham, documents the system of patronage that is used for buying off
o p p o s i t i o n .  1 0 4  i n  their survey of Tyneside politics Peter Hetherington and Fred
Robinson explain it like this:
Tynesiders generally accept their lot in an area dominated by a conservative political 
machine, which happens to be Labour and is funded largely by two powerful unions which 
tend to pull the strings. Tyneside —  like the wider North East —  is one of Labour’s 
traditional bastions but has never been noted for its political radicalism. The party sits 
securely on generally large majorities. All four Tyneside Councils are Labour-controlled 
and all the parliamentary constituencies, with the exception of Tynemouth, are held by 
Labour MPs. This strength has bred complacency, over-dependence on a union machine —  
notably the [...] GMB —  and weakness where the party should be strong: at the grass 
roots.
This centrality of the regional trade union hierarchies to policy-making in the
area amounts to a corporatism which has survived the elimination of such stmctures
at national level. A prominent labour movement activist in the city claims that this
is a phenomenon which is strengthening:
all of the efforts that have taken place over the last ten years [...] to destroy consensual 
politics and to take apart that post-war tri-partism between the public sector the private 
sector and the trade union movement, might have succeeded to some extent at national level 
[...] but it hasn’t succeeded at regional level in the north. [... Qjuite the reverse. Thus 
what you have is a process of continuing involvement, in fact probably increased 
participation, in ‘the running of the r e g i o n
The scope that this situation gives for an oppositional politics based on a 
radical transformation of the traditional practices of trade unionism in the area might 
appear to be limited. However, as I shall suggest, there are strong signs that in 
local government services such a shift may be, if not fully underway, at least 
getting up steam.
As Wainwright points out, Newcastle under Beecham’s labourism was a
104/W. ppl36-7.
l^^Hetheringtpn P and Robinson F (1988) ‘Tyneside life’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial 
(Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) p204.
^^^interview with the author, 20 July 1989.
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high-spending local authority, and much of that was popular and benefitted 
working class areas, When financial restrictions began to bite, they did so 
gradually. While no-one on the City Council would claim that local government 
has not been under attack from the centre, there have been no attempts to engage in 
the oppositional strategies adopted in Sheffield, Manchester, Brent, Lambeth and 
most notably Liverpool. According to one senior councillor to whom I spoke, 
although the Labour Group does not like the new legislation it accepts it and abides 
by the law.i®^ By the late 1980s, therefore, Newcastle City Council had seen a 
steady, but gradual decline in its capacity to act locally, but had not engaged in 
developing radical strategies in response: a steady as she goes mentality prevailed.
The effect of this incremental impoverishment was to produce a Council 
which, by 1988, was a poorer and weaker authority, but one which had undergone 
little major restructuring. Many of the radical developments in local government, 
whether rightward (as in Wandsworth) or leftward (as in Manchester) had passed 
Newcastle by.
The Local Government Act 1988, therefore, seems to have been one of the 
first occasions on which the Council has been forced into significant qualitative 
change in the way it operates its services. According to trade unionists, at least, 
this challenge too found the Authority without a radical response, and this provided 
the opportunity for the development of a union-led response, as one local activist 
told me:
What we have learned from the start is that within this authority there was a massive 
vacuum. People did riot have ideas on what to do. We had ideas and we never waited. We 
decided from the start that it was not a matter of responding to what management were 
proposing, we would actually take the initiative and fill the vacuum.
l^^wainwright op. cit. pl37.
lOSpor example, on Tyneside the Labour Party accepted seats on the board of the Tyne and Wear 
Urban Development Corporation: a centrally-imposed, unelected and private-sector dominated 
vehicle for urban redevelopment along Thatcherite lines. 
l^^Interview with the author, 15 September 1989.
^l^Interview with the author, 18 July 1989. -
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The result of this is that the impact of Compulsory Competitive Tendering on 
local government in Newcastle cannot be understood independently from the 
strategies of the unions.
Thecampaignagainstcompulsory tendering: towards transformation 
Much of the trade union work in Newcastle in developing the response to the 
introduction of CCT has been based around the Corporate Joint Trade Union 
Group. This forum brings together all the unions with members working for the 
authority. Once plans for legislation for CCT were announced, but before the 
publication of Who Cares Wins, the group agreed a joint union strategy similar to 
that developed by SCAT. They then approached the City Council for their 
response. According to one leading activist, the Council initially took the view that 
the way to compete against private contractors was to cut wages, conditions'^and 
jobs, and made little reference to the role of trade unions. The unions challenged 
this: ■
we did a lot of lobbying and talking to councillors. We organised seminars when we 
brought up speakers ... and we invited all the Labour councillors and the Chief Officers, to 
hear how we should be responding. [...] At the same time there were a couple of officers 
who had a lot of sympathy with the way we were going [...] working with them we 
eventually got a strategy adopted by the authority which was based on the trade union 
approach. In broad terms that actually became the regional strategy.  ^^  1
The ‘regional strategy’ referred to was produced by the North Eastern Regional
Joint Trade Union Group to provide a guide to action throughout the North East of
E n g l a n d .  1 1 2  The next step was to get the authority to provide facility time and
allow the trade unions an input into the process:
we then got an agreement [...] about the trade union input and an approach that directly 
involved the trade unions, and for this authority —  people couldn’t believe it had been done 
compared to what had gone on in the past —  we got an agreement that we would have full­
time release for two stewards in each of the key services. 112
l l l f n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  a u t h o r ,  1 8  J u l y  1 9 8 9 .
112North Eastern Regional Joint Trade Union Group ( 1 9 8 8 )  Trade union strategy to combat 
te/KJerwg (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: NUPE, N A L G O  and G M B ) .  : , .
112fnterview with the author, 1 8  July 1 9 8 9 .
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This agreement on the allocation of resources to the trade unions to develop
independent structures has been crucial to the development of the unions’ response
to CCT in the city. It has meant that the joint union structure has been able to
generate initiatives and proposals, which have then been adopted by the Council.
Through this the unions see themselves as gaining political credibility, which
ensures they are listened to in the future, while remaining independent of the
Council’s policy-making machinery.
This led to the formation of the Joint Trade Union Group’s anti-privatisation
working group. This consists of a convenor and deputy convenor (who are senior
shop stewards) for each of the services affected by CCT. There is an agreement
between the two main manual workers’ unions (GMB and NUPRH^) that in each
case the convenor will be from one union and their deputy from the other. There is
an explicit policy that the convenors in services with largely female workforces
(particularly building cleaning and catering) should be women. This has not been
so in the past. For example, school caretakers (usually male) are part of the
cleaning workforce which is otherwise overwhelmingly female. However, it is
normally the caretakers, who have full-time jobs, who become shop stewards and
convenors. Until very recently the part-time cleaners have not held positions in the
union. A similar situation has existed in catering. Now the convenor for catering
services is a woman, and there are moves to ensure that the two convenors for
cleaning are women as well. The catering convenor told me that she worked very
well with her (male) deputy and:
if any one has problems either can answer them. But I often get more wanting to speak to 
me, because I think they can relate more to a woman. [...] Up until two years ago I was 
the only woman steward on school meals and catering - we had postal stewards - but we 
didn’t have anyone who was a c t i v e . ^  15
By contrast by 1989 all the members of the catering joint shop stewards’
ll^Each represents about half the manual workers in the authority. 
115interview with the author, 18 July 1989.
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committee were women, with the exception of the deputy convenor, and in time he 
would return to his job, and be replaced by a woman from the committee. (The 
Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee system was still being built up in in the authority. 
Each committee consists of a number of stewards from both unions in a particular 
service and according to one senior convenor, it is increasingly these committees 
which are taking decisions about union strategy in the authority.)
Once the unions had gained adequate resources to develop policies towards 
CCT, they were able work in detail on the tendering process itself. In the authority 
the first service to go through all the stages I have described above was school and 
welfare catering. According to the convenors, all the initiatives on improving 
service delivery and developing the specification came from the unions. In the 
spring of 1988, fifteen months before the catering contract was due to start, the 
unions decided that it was important that the authority should have a food policy. 
The joint union group organised a seminar with the London Food Commission, 
which brought together a range of interested groups including parents, teachers, 
school governors, trade unionists and community groups and drew up a policy 
which the authority was then persuaded to adopt.
The unions’ second demand was that areas of the catering service then 
contracted-out be brought in-house. For example, in the past the Civic Centre 
Banqueting Suite had used private caterers. The unions requested that when the 
contract expired in April 1989 the service should be provided in future by a council 
workforce on union-agreed pay rates. In spite of scepticism from councillors and 
officers that the Council could run such a service, this demand was achieved. The 
unions were also concerned about the poor up-take of meals in schools, and asked 
that a marketing campaign be organised to improve this. One member of the school 
kitchen staff claimed that as a result of improving the decor in school canteens both 
the take-up rate and the children’s behaviour have improved. The trade unions 
have also been closely involved in the establishment of school ‘catering
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committees’, bringing kitchen staff, parents and teachers together to take decisions 
on the organisation of the service. Thus Newcastle has seen the considerable 
involvement of service users in the response to CCT in line with the ideas 
expressed in the SCAT strategy.
When the draft specification had been produced by the authority, the unions 
organised a day seminar attended by shop stewards and members of the catering 
committees. A detailed analysis of the specification was drawn up, and according 
to union activists, most of the amendments suggested by the seminar were accepted 
by the authority. A key amendment was that the catering committees should be 
consulted before any changes to the service are introduced. The final demand was 
that when the management had drawn up the DSO bid, the unions should be told 
the labour element of the bid and given the chance to fight it if it was unacceptable. 
In the event, the labour element was acceptable. Only one firm expressed any 
interest in bidding for the contract, but did not do so. The contract was awarded to 
the catering division of the new DSO, known as ‘City Works’. As the process of 
competitive tendering takes its course the unions are aiming to follow a similar 
policy in the other services over the five year phasing-in period.
I argued above that the unions in Manchester had found it difficult to develop 
a response to the threat of privatisation independently from that of the local 
authority. The strategy of joint working, which can be justified by reference to 
national labour movement strategy, carries the risk that unions will be incorporated. 
In Newcastle they have been more able to maintain their independence and hence 
their radicalism, and this has been one of the the hallmarks of the local response. 
Local authority unions in Newcastle have used the challenge of CCT to undertake a 
transformation of their traditional forms of organisation and political practices. I 
shall indicate below how this transformation is related to the setting or locale in 
which it has occurred. Before doing so I will briefly outline the main 
characteristics of the changes: in gender relations, community links and inter-union
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relations.
The historical marginalisation of women in the local authority unions in the
City was part of a wider pattern in the area, which derives from the growth of the
labour movement in the region around male-dominated heavy industries such as
ship-building. This situation contrasts markedly with the north west of England,
for example, where the female-employing textile sector produced a different sort of
labour movement. The threat from competitive tendering led the unions to realise
that involving part-time women workers in union activity was a priority if the
strategy was to be successful. A deliberate policy was adopted of bringing women
into positions of power at the grass-roots level so that the response in services like
catering with largely female workforces could be influenced by the women
involved. One full-time union organiser told me that he had spent much of the last
six months recruiting and training fifty new women shop stewards in cleaning and
catering. One of those stewards suggested that for all the problems caused by CCT
it had at least made the unions ‘take some notice of the women for the first time’.
The need to involve the users o f local government services is part of the
national policy of the union movement in responding to CCT. In Newcastle,
however it is something which cuts across the grain of a traditionally inward-
looking labour movement. A local campaigner contrasted the way the unions
would once have responded to an event like the proposed closure of a shipyard
with what was required today:
The traditional response is usually to get a march together and get on the train to London. 
But to the credit of all involved on the trade union side, they sat down and thought ‘what 
can we do to save these yards.’ [...] And the answer is that it isn’t just a trade union and 
labour movement campaign. [..J  The campaign involved churches, the business 
community, [...] community organisations [...] and all political parties.^l^
A similar transformation in local authority trade unionism has been required 
in fighting CCT. This is clearly seen in many of the initiatives in the catering
^ ^ ^ i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  a u t h o r ,  2 0  J u l y  1 9 8 9 .
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service, particularly the involvement of parents and teachers in the drawing up of
the specification and in the monitoring of work through the catering committees.
These initiatives may have important implications for the way trade unions respond
to changing social structures more generally. If the economy is becoming more
dominated by service industries, then the characteristics of those industries should
play a significant role in the development of trade unionism in the future. In
particular traditional forms of industrial action have a more immediate and visible
impact on consumers in the service sector than in manufacturing. For them to be
successful, it may be important to gain the active support and involvement of
service users in a way which is not the case in other sectors.
Finally, the relationships between the trade unions in the authority have
traditionally been at least competitive, if not actually hostile. This was particularly
true of the relationship between the two main manual workers’ unions, NUPE and
GMB. Writing of the GMB, Wainwright draws the distinction thus:
Their main rival is NUPE, which in the north-east has come up from behind. Its northern 
region bears all the signs of a union which has had to struggle for its position. It is one of 
NUPE’s most radical campaigning divisions. And one of the reasons for this is that it had 
to organise the unorganised and the difficult-to-organise, while the GMB had long ago sown
up [«c] the main municipal workforces.^
According to those at the top of the regional union hierarchies, strained 
relationships are largely the product of personality clashes at the grass-roots. By 
contrast, grass-roots activists made the point that as far as ordinary members and 
shop stewards are concerned it makes little difference which union they belong to 
and are happy to be represented by stewards and convenors from either. In their 
view it is the organisational ambitions of the senior full-time officers, and the 
competition for members that that engenders, which are the sources of conflict. 
What is not disputed, however, is that inter-union cooperation, rather than 
competition, is required if the response to CCT is to succeed. The Joint Union
^^^Wainwright op. cfr. pl41.
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Groups at both regional and authority level are symptomatic of a new cooperation 
between the unions involved, as are the Joint Shop Stewards Committees. It is 
clear that a united response has been of prime importance in ensuring that 
management took union demands seriously.
Making the links
If traditional paternalist trade unionism does give way to more participatory 
structures in local government in Newcastle, it will be because of the way in which 
local action has drawn on its institutional settings. The independence of, but close 
links to the City Council is neatly symbolised by the office arrangements which 
contrast with those in Manchester. In Newcastle the trade union anti-privatisation 
campaign has office space in the Civic Centre, but they are offices of its own and 
not shared with Council Officers. Within the locale which is the setting for 
interaction between the unions and the council, the unions’ offices are a ‘back 
region’ where policy can developed ‘out of sight’ of the council. Shop stewards 
use the offices regularly, meeting there socially between shifts, developing 
campaign strategies, and holding discussions in the Joint Shop Stewards’ 
Committees. These arrangements express the unions’ independence of the council, 
and this has been a stance developed in explicit contrast with the joint working 
arrangements of Sheffield and Manchester. As in Manchester, however, policy 
arose because the unions took advantage of the opportunities presented by their 
setting, in this case an offer of facility time and a ‘policy vacuum’ in the Council.
The local traditions of radical trade unionism were also important and the 
leading convenor drew explicit links between the unions’ strategy against CCT and 
the shop stewards movement which had been so prominent on Tyneside. Other 
institutional locales were also of crucial importance. The relationship with capital 
was influential: the absence of any strong interest from private companies was a 
product of their perception of Newcastle as a labour movement stronghold where a 
long struggle would be required to ‘regain the space’. This is one example of a
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‘non-local locale’. Another is provided by the knowledge of the SCAT strategy 
developed originally in London, but providing the basis of the response in 
Newcastle.
The development of links with users was crucial. The catering committees 
are a case in point: the close links between the school catering staff, children and to 
a lesser extent parents could be developed into a means of building up the 
committees, but this required the women working in the kitchens to be brought into 
positions of power in the local union structures. This may be seen as another 
example of the unions capitalising on aspects of their setting to develop a response.
Good relationships between the unions, especially at the grassroots, were 
also of key importance and again these were mobilised as a resource in developing 
action. The locale in this case was given formal expression in the joint union 
groups which met at various levels in the unions’ hierarchy. .
In Newcastle, then, the unions fighting CCT are at the centre of a particularly 
dense network of institutional links or locales. This, together with the underlying 
strength of trade unionism in local government on Tyneside has enabled them to 
preserve the spaces of labour in that region, but on the basis of considerable 
transformation of the existing practices of union organisation. In the other two case 
studies in Wandsworth and Milton Keynes the settings of action were also 
significant, but in very different ways.
Coping with marginaiistion; Wandsworth and Miiton 
Keynes
London Borough of Wandsworth
The story of trade union responses to the restructuring of local government in 
Wandsworth has been detailed in Chapter Four, and I don’t intend to rehearse the 
narrative here. Instead the time has come to reconsider the actions of the trade 
unions in Wandsworth in the light of my discussion of the concept of ‘locale’.
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The front line: a lost space reclaimed?
In Manchester and Newcastle the first round of the battle by capital to reclaim its 
lost spaces was won convincingly by labour, albeit on rather different bases. In 
Wandsworth it was decisively lost. Coming some six years earlier, Wandsworth 
was in some senses the front line of the struggle.
During the refuse collection dispute institutional settings strongly influenced 
the trade unions’ actions. The weak links with the local Labour Party were 
particularly disabling especially in the run up to the local elections, and these were 
compounded by the lack of any institutional connections with users or user groups.
The existing practices of trade unionism in the Borough were dominated by 
the defensive militancy which had been so successful in the 1970s, and it was these 
resources which the manual unions were thrown back onto. The strong support 
from NALGO demonstrates the significance of financial resources which enabled 
NALGO to pay its members throughout the period of industrial action.
The local political context was such that the radical right Council was seen as 
rnerely a flash in the pan, while the local economic context was used by the unions 
to emphasise the threat of increased unemployment implied by contracting out. The 
first of these was unfortunately mistaken, although Wandsworth did not become a 
safe Conservative Council until 1990. The second of these was the only 
propaganda focus of the campaign, and meant that the Conservative critique of 
inadequate public services was not addressed.
In subsequent disputes, such as that over the proposed privatisation of 
housing management, the institutional locales were rather different, reflecting the 
beginning of attempts to transform traditional practices. The relationship forged 
with tenants’ groups was of crucial significance and the joint campaign was 
successful. This commitment to working with users came as a result of a 
reappraisal of the tactics adopted in the previous disputes.
Non-local locales were important too. In the first dispute the lack of a
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national union campaign, despite the ‘flagship’ nature of the changes, was 
identified by the unions as a key failing. There were also few good links to 
workers elsewhere in London. By contrast the Council was strongly supported by 
national government and was developing links with the private sector.
The relationship with the Council was eventually the key to the failure of the 
campaigns. In the face of overwhelming commitment to private provision the 
unions’ apparently secure network of labour movement resources proved to be 
somewhat threadbare. This begs the question, of Course, of how a working-class 
area dominated by Labour politics for most the 1970s could become a bastion of 
municipal Thatcherism in the 1980s. Just as trade unions have their locales of 
operation, so too do local councils and among the most important of these is the 
demographic composition of the area. The locales which enable or constrain the 
development of union responses are themselves therefore the product of other 
interrelations. In Wandsworth the image of the area as an enclave of new right 
politics, with low local taxes but limited social services has reinforced a 
demographic shift which was already underway. Today a particular type of person 
is moving into the Borough ensuring that the former Labour area is safely in 
Conservative hands.
The gentrification of the inner-London suburbs has had political as well as 
social effects. Formerly working class area like Battersea now ‘seem to attract 
Sloane Ranger Conservatives and the City new Right’. T h i s  process has been 
encouraged by
a policy of social and political restructuring through the labour market. [...] The policy in 
Wandsworth is to reduce Labour support through a massive selling off of the council stock 
to a new class of home owners. This is council-encouraged gentrification, and 17,000 
(40%) of Wandsworth’s 42,000 council homes have been sold —  to sitting tenants or to 
developers for conversion into luxury apartments. The chair of Wandsworth’s property 
sales committee was quoted in The Guardian (June 19,1987) as saying that, T don’t think 
any of us have ever tried to hide the fact that we have sought not just to run Wandsworth 
more efficiently, but to change Wandsworth into a Conservative borough that will stay
ll^Hamnett C (1990) ‘London’s turning’ Marxism Today July p31.
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Conservative irrespective of national swings.’^
This also has a profound impact on the ability of trade unions to respond to 
future threats. If the population of the Borough is increasingly wealthy and 
increasingly Conservative, then it will be more and more difficult to develop links  
with the users of services.
As private capital and right-wing politics move in to reclaim some of their lost 
spaces the network of institutional locales which sustained the Labour movement 
thins out. Then the isolation of trade unionists within their own workplaces 
becomes a crucial barrier to radical action.
In the final case study I will consider the situation in Milton Keynes, where 
this isolation is as acute as anywhere in the country.
Milton Keynes
Milton Keynes is a new town, or, as the Development Corporation would have it, a 
new city. Unlike the other three case studies, which are all covered now by a 
single tier of local government, Milton Keynes is the province of three different 
local authorities with different and sometimes overlapping responsibilities. This 
case Study considers the area occupied by the Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation (MKDC) which includes all the main built-up areas in the Borough of 
Milton Keynes with the exception of Newport Pagnell in the centre of the Borough 
and Olney in the north. As this implies, the area covered by the Borough Council 
is bigger than that occupied by the ‘designated area’ of the MKDC. The Borough 
covers one sixth of the area of Buckinghamshire in the north of the County, and 
Buckinghamshire County Council is thus the third of the three local authorities with 
responsibility for the area.
The new city o f Milton Keynes
Local government in Milton Keynes cannot be understood without reference to the 
^^^Ibid. p31.
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new towns programme in Britain, which is, according to Paul Lawless and Frank
Brown, ‘the most important achievement of the post-1945 town planning
m ovem ent’. 120 Development in the new towns was controlled by development
corporations which were appointed by the Government. They were the prime
agents in the acquisition of land and the planning of its development by private and
public sector bodies. Fourteen ‘Mark I’ new towns were designated between 1946
and 1950 including Stevenage (the first), Harlow, Basildon and Bracknell. Many
of these were to take ‘overspill’ population from London. Interest waned during the
1950s when only one further designation was made, but revived in the 1960s. The
‘Mark II’ towns began with Skelmersdale in 1961. Milton Keynes was one of the
last and was designated in 1967.
The designated area included the existing small towns of Stony Sratford,
Bletchley and Wolverton, of which the last two were important centres for the
railway industry. The population of the area in 1967 was approximately 40,000
and it covered land administered by five Urban and Rural District Councils. At the
time of local government reorganisation four of these, together with four parishes
from the fifth, were amalgamated to form the Borough of Milton Keynes. The
planning of the city was linked to explicit social goals, which read (with hindsight)
as almost naively optimistic. A similar optimism characterised the hope of the
planners that the built form of the city could be used, in conjunction with planned
economic development, to achieve these goals:.
From the beginning the Corporation has taken the view that the planning of the new city 
should be related to clear and explicit social goals. The Corporation intends that the Plan 
should describe and define the character of life which it is the new city’s aim to provide and 
which the proposals are intended to acheive. This applies not only to the physical plan for 
the new city but to all the other proposals, social and e c o n o m i c .  ^ 21
Employment was initially concentrated in the existing settlements, particularly
120La^less p and Brown F (1986) Urban growth and change in Britain (London: Harper and Row) 
pl33.
12lMilton Keynes Development Corporation (1970) The plan for Milton Keynes: volume one 
(Milton Keyens: MKDC) p9.
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Wolverton and Bletchley. This meant that in 1971 just 28% of the economically 
active male population was employed in non-manual occupations compared with an 
average for South-East England of 4 2 .7 %.i22 Employment in the North of the 
City was dominanted by the stongly unionised British Rail Engineering Works at 
Wolverton and in the South by manufacturing industry in Bletchley. Trade 
unionism was overwhelmingly male and organised along traditional lines. The 
NUR123 and ASLEpi24 were major local trade unions and their organisations in 
the area were marked by a distinct lack of radicalism.
Employment growth since the early 1970s has included jobs in the 
manufacturing sector, but distribution and services have been of the greatest 
significance. The trade unions have found it difficult to get a foothold in these 
industries. By 1981 40% of households had heads in non-manual occupations and 
although the proportion of employment taken up by manufacturing was, at 31.5%, 
above the British average, the industrial structure of the Borough was dominated by 
distribution, catering, transport and other services, with 58.1% of all
employment. 125
The locally low levels of unionisation in the new industries and offices of the 
private sector, combined with the rapid growth of employment in these sectors is a 
particularly stark manifestation of the trends in unionisation discussed above in 
Chapter One. To its credit the national leadership of the labour movement identified 
Milton Keynes as a key area for future union recruitment. Writing of proposals by 
TUG General Secretary Norman Willis to rejuvenate the TUG Bassett claims that
what Mr Willis is trying to do is carve out a new role for the TUC by proposing it plays a
central role in the area of union recruitment: mounting and governing TUC and union
Champion AG, Clegg K and Davies RL (1977) Facts about the new towns: a socio-economic 
digest (Corbridge: Retailing and Planning Associates) p i54.
^23National Union of Railwaymen.
^24Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen.
125pigures derived from Central Statistical Office (1981) Key statistics for local authorities 
(London: HMSG) pp31 and 59.
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membership drives in non-union areas such as Milton K e y n e s . ^ 2 6
Nonetheless it remains the case that outside its historic and declining 
strongholds, the unions have very low levels of penetration in the private sector in 
Milton Keynes.
The principal area which has seen both expansion with the growth of the city, 
and a degree of unionisation has been public services. Many of the manual 
workers who joined the Development Corporation or the Borough Council when 
they were first established had experience of local government employment in other 
authorities, and experience of local government trade unionism. According to a 
local trade unionist I spoke to, workers who had moved into the area from London 
were more radical than the local ‘old hands on Bletchley and Newport PagnelT 
[councils]. The Londoners had ‘some sort of an industrial background’ and 
consequently ‘knew the crack’, but they were in ‘a small m i n o r i t y ’ . ^ 2 7  the early 
1980s membership in the NUPE branch which covered the Council and the 
Corporation was rising through recmitment but, the interviewee claimed, there was 
‘no solid commitment to trade unionism’ which was seen as ‘a bit of an insurance
p o licy ’.128
Today, contracting out has reduced the manual workforces in local 
government in the area. The number of manual workers directly employed by the 
Borough Council in Milton Keynes is dramatically lower than in the other case 
studies. In Manchester, for example, there is one City Council manual worker for 
every 35 residents while in Milton Keynes there is one Borough Council worker 
for every 537 residents. 129 Of course the Development Corporation and the 
County Council also maintain manual workforces, but the difference is nonetheless
126BassettP (1988) ‘Less policy, more action’ Financial Times 22 July.
I27interview with the author, 6 December 1989.
128interview with the author, 6 December 1989.
129pigures derived from Manchester City Council (1988) Official handbook 1988189 (Manchester: 
Manchester City Council) and Borough of Milton Keynes (1989) Facts and figures 1989190 
(Milton Keynes: Borough of Milton Keynes).
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dramatic. Even allowing for these small workforces, the numbers of union 
members on the manual side are very low. One full time officer told me that by the 
late 1980s there were just 150 NUPE members in the Council and Corporation 
workforces and that most of these were concentrated in horticulture. 120 Small 
pockets of craft unionism also exist and are significant for the response to 
restructutring. In the building maintenance service the EETPU organises the 
electricians and the plumbers and the UCATT organises the painters and decorators 
while the bricklayers are GMB. (The GMB also organises the Council’s transport 
workers.) As is in many areas, the craft unions are strong with 100% membership 
in the relevant trades, but they are small in number.
In Milton Keynes, as elsewhere, it was difficult to obtain exact membership
figures for any of the unions, but unionisation on the non-manual side is also low,
though almost certainly higher than in similar occupations in the private sector. A
full-time official estimated the number of NALGO members in Milton Keynes as
being in the low hundreds.^21 NALGO members in local government in Milton
Keynes are among the most moderate in the country. The organisational structure
of NALGO is one which accords considerable autonomy to local branches. In
Milton Keynes this autonomy was excercised in the early 1980s when the branch
agreed to give eight weeks notice of industrial action in exchange for two additional
salary increments. A NALGO full-time officer said that this had led to
a philosophy and culture in Milton Keynes of ‘we don’t take strike action’. [This] is 
something perhaps that they will have to look at in future because at the moment the 
services which have been identified for privatisation are mainly manual worker dominated in 
terms of who provides the actual service. There are certain implications for office staff, but 
they have not really felt the chill wind as it were. But clearly once you start talking about 
architecture, finance, legal services and all the rest of it, then I think they will start to
130-phe horticultural activities of local government in Milton Keynes are of considerable 
importance, since a green image of the city is one which its planners and public relations officials 
are very keen to stress. At the time of my research (1989) the gardening staff seemed to have been 
partly insulated from major restructuring by the lack of pressure for cuts in the service or for 
privatisation.
^21lnterview with the author, 5 December 1989.
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realise that the axe is about to hit the jobs that they are d o i n g .  2^2
During NALGO’s national pay dispute in 1989, the Milton Keynes branch 
was the only one in the country which did not participate in the national action.
The impact o f local government restructuring: a triple structure influx 
This limited and weakly organised pattern of public sector trade unionism in Milton 
Keynes has had to face an almost continuous process of change in the provision 
and management of local government services in the city. Much of this 
restructuring has stemmed from the consequences of the dramatic growth of 
population and economic activity on a greenfield site. In other cases change has 
been more directly politically inspired. The developments have been somewhat 
disparate, but they have rarely worked in the trade unions’ favour.
The new city has grown rapidly since 1971 and continues to expand: by 1989 
the population of the Borough had reached 176,000. However, this bald figure 
disguises major changes in the political economy of urban development in the city. 
The city was designated in the era of Wilsonian modernisation and this is reflected 
in the Plan. The public sector was clearly expected to play a crucial role in service 
provision for the population. For example, the Plan laid stress on the role of ‘a 
comfortable, fast and convenient’ public transport system, 123 and calculated that 
the superior effieciency of the road network would ensure that a bus service 
charging fares at afate per mile ‘commonly accepted’ would be ‘at least twice as 
good as is commonly found today’.124 Following the deregulation and 
privatisation of public transport in the 1980s by the Thatcher Government, no 
resident would recognise this as a description of the local bus service.
Although greater stress was placed on private sector housing development 
than had been the case in other new towns in the past, 125 it is clear that the planners
122interview with the author 5 December 1989.
122Milton Keynes Development Corporation op. cit. pl5. 
124/W. p34.
125Milton Keynes Development Corporation op. cit. pp53-56.
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envisaged public sector housing to be the main provider of accomodation at least in 
the medium term, with the longer term goal that 50% of the residents should be in 
owner occupation. By 1988 this figure had already reached 70% and with the 
development of further public sector housing at a near standstill and a high priority 
being given to both selling public housing to sitting tenants and encouraging private 
developers to build new houses it looks set to rise still further.
Although the originators of the new towns programme appear to have given 
little thought to the winding-up of the Development Corporations, the expectation 
appears to have been that the assets of the Corporations would be transferred to the 
relevant local authority when the time came. 126 r  is expected that the MKDC will 
be wound up in 1992, but it is far from clear that there will be a transfer of 
responsibilities to the Borough. Indeed a number of developments suggest that the 
Corporation has been seeking alternatives to public provision after its demise.
In 1988 the Development Corporation unilaterally ended the agency 
agreement with the Council under which the Council managed the Corporation’s 
rental housing stock. National legislation had given local authority tenants the right 
to opt out of local authority control en masse. The Council perceived this as a 
threat to its hopes to take over the ownerhip of the Corporation’s housing after 
1992. It attempted to pre-empt any such move by conducting a survey of tenants to 
discover the preferred future owners of the housing stock. Angered by what it 
claimed was a misuse of the Council’s position in trying to influence the tenants the 
Corporation ended the agreement. It is clear that even if it was not acting under 
direct instructions from central Government the Corporation was certainly adopting 
a position entirely compatible with that of the centre. It may not be coincidence that 
the announcement coincided with a visit by the Housing Minister, William 
Waldegrave, when he visited a new housing scheme and met MKDC officers.
^26Aldridge M (1979) The British new towns: a programme without a policy (London: ROutledge 
and Kegan Paul) pp84-5.
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This incident had profound effects for some of the workforce and these will
be discussed below. It exemplifies the changing character of the Corporation from
its original role as a vehicle for Keynesian modernisation based on planning
towards a private-sector dominated agency of central goverment, rather along the
lines of the later Urban Development Corporations. If Newcastle and Manchester
can be seen partly as spaces for labour and the public sector, Milton Keynes has
become a space for de-regulated private capital in financial services, high
technology manufacturing, retail and foreign inward investment.
The determination of the MKDC to transfer its operations to the private sector
in advance of its inevitable demise is also shown in the support it has given for its
professional staff to engage in management and employee buy outs of their
departments. In many new town development corporations, architects, accountants
and planners have been made redundant. In some cases, including that of Milton
Keynes, they have then been effectively re-employed as private contractors after
they have used their redundancy payments to set up as private companies. This
strategy was condemned by the House of Commons:
The MPs reserve[d] their strongest criticism for the Department of the Environment, 
accusing it of failing to examine the operation. They point[ed] out that Milton Keynes did 
not keep costing records of the new ventures ‘to demonstrate that propriety, regularity, and 
the need for value for money had been observed’. 2^7
The relationship between the Development Corporation and the Borough
Council has thus been of key importance in the pattern of change in local
government in the area. The Borough Council too has been undergoing significant
change throughout the 1980s. To a very large extent these stem from the dramatic
demographic growth in the area. According to a very senior official at the Council,
local government in Milton Keynes is growth-led, rather than recession-led as it might be 
in other areas. In addition there is the question of in-migration and forming a society which 
means not only infrastructure and services, but also providing potential for non-organic 
growth. There is a different demographic profile in MK from anywhere else in the country. 
It is child led, with a high proportion of single parent families and a significant proportion
^^ '^ The Guardian, 14 June 1991.
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o f  ethnic minorities. ^ 2 8
This has led to a model of local administration which, the interviewee
informed me, was ‘nearer to Westminster than to Sheffield’ but which was not
driven by the demands of a wider political project. The reason for such a model is
that rapid growth means that ‘the single motivation has been to do it’ no matter
how. The dramatic economic and social changes in the area mean that the provision
of services has had to be viewed from a highly pragmatic perspective. In some
cases it seems that hiring outside contractors, for example, has been quite simply
the only way to get the job done in the time available.
As the same officer put it, and in contrast with Manchester and Newcastle,
where a complete reorganisation was undertaken for CCT, a wholesale change in
departmental structures
would not be our first priority. We have been experimenting with different forms. Some 
management start ups and some ‘aggressive’ new DSOs. It is heavily dependent on the 
officers. What we often aim for is a very effective DSO not to preserve DSOs, but to 
provide the service. Let’s see who’ll do the best job.^29
This view was supported by a full-time union official:
The willingness to let contracts to the private sector probably stems from the difficulty of 
recruiting staff. If it stays in the public sector, either there are staff shortages, and the 
service isn’t provided, or there are budget overruns. Therefore the officers aren’t putting up 
much of a fight to keep things public.
The dominant ethos is thus one of practical managerialism, a tendency which 
is reinforced by the political situation in the Council, which was ‘hung’ throughout 
the 1980S.141
As is often the case, this led to considerable power accruing to the officers of 
the Council. When I asked about the relationship between officers and members 
the senior officer told me:
Generally the relationship is good. There is a very large degree of delegation of authority to
128interview with the author, 21 February 1990. 
129interview with the author, 21 February 1990. 
l^^Interview with the author, 12 December 1989.
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officers, which is good.^ ^^  ^ Milton Keynes is changing so rapidly that if all decisions had 
to be referred to the members nothing would get done. To keep things running smoothly, 
especially because it is a hung Council, there are regular meetings between the top 
politicians, the Chief Executive and the Directors of Finance and Law.^^2
This lack of effective political control is a feature of ‘hung’ councils but that 
is not to say that Party politics is absent from local government in Milton Keynes. 
Throughout the 1980s the Labour Party was the largest group on the Council, but 
the Council was controlled by an alliance of the Conservatives and the centre 
parties.
This control by the right was particularly evident in the industrial relations
situation on the Council in the early 1980s, when according to my interviewee
management practices were ‘fairly neanderthal, [...] fairly repressive’. A decision
to privatise the refuse collection service was characteristic of the sorts of policies
being pursued at the time only in right-wing local authorities like Wandsworth, and
this will be discussed in more detail below. The existence of a tradition of private
provision meant that no major initiatives were taken to resist CCT, although it had
considerable impact on the way in which services were managed:
This year saw the impact on the Finance Department of the administrative workload 
brought by the introduction of the Community Charge in 1990, together with additional 
costs. This has come at the same time as Government legislation on putting council 
services out to competitive tendering and officers have had to put in many hours on 
preparing specifications for building cleaning, catering, landscape maintenance, vehicle 
maintenance and management of leisure facilities. To cope with what is virtually a change 
of culture for local government, the Council began a review of its own structure and plans
l^lThe Labour Party gained control in May 1990.
l^^Symptomatic of this delegation was my own experience of trying to arrange an interview with 
the Council’s leader. The reply to my request came in the end from the senior officer whose views 
I have quoted:
Dear Mr Painter,
You wrote to Councillor H on 23rd January regarding a research programme
about the change in the nature of local government in Britain since 1979.
Councillor H has passed your letter to me and suggested that it might be more
helpful if you were to discuss the theme which you are investigating with myself as
Councillor H felt that I might be able to make a greater contribution to your
research than he could. [...]
Yours sincerely.
By contrast, in all the other cases studies I was able to arrange interviews directly with either the 
Leader, the Deputy Leader or the Councillor responsible for compulsory competitive tendering, 
^^^interview with the author, 21 February 1990.
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to implement its findings next year [1989-90 —
There are, however, some areas in which there is a commitment to public
provision, including horticulture. As one full-time union officer put it:
Parts of the service elected members are proud of and want to keep, like horticulture, 
because of the prestige and the high quality provided by the in-house work force. As a 
result officers bent over backwards to keep it in-house, they were convinced that no-one 
could do it so well. They divided the city into two, largely on a geographical basis and let 
the first 50%. The contract was designed to make it unattractive to the private sector, by 
lumping lucrative bits like grass-cutting in with the rest.^^5
The staff shortages mentioned above are particularly acute in the white collar 
grades where the Council has brought in a performance related pay structure which 
breaks away from nationally negotiated salary scales. NALGO nationally opposes 
such policies, but the autonomy of the local branch and its relative weakness in 
Milton Keynes meant that the national union was unable to prevent the system 
being introduced. As well as helping tackle recruitment problems the Council sees 
this change as part of shift from ‘industrial relations’ to ‘human resources 
development’ —  paralleling management ideology in the private sector, and 
according to the senior officer I spoke to, leading it.
The problems o f isolation
NALGO’s responses at the local level to the changes in local government in Milton 
Keynes have been to go along with, or even actively to support the policies of the 
Council. According to a NALGO full-time official, NALGO’s District Council 
covering Milton Keynes voted to accept the principal of management buyouts, 
which are rejected by the national joint union strategy on CCT as merely another 
form of privatisation. In addition, as I suggested above, the local branch struck 
what was effectively a no strike agreement: probably the first ever in the public 
sector.
l^Borough of Milton Keynes (1989) Annual report 1988189 (Milton Keynes: Borough of Milton 
K^nes) p i 8.
^^5jnterview with the author, 12 December 1989.
'^^ i^nterview with the author, 21 February 1990. . ' "
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Among the manual workers responses to local government restructuring have 
been more vigorous, but not very much more effective: it will clearly be a long, 
slow haul to establish new traditions of public service trade unionism in the area. 
However there are signs that all is not lost. In the early 1980s the manual unions in 
Milton Keynes were defeated in the battle over street cleaning and refuse collection. 
As was the case in the early battles in Wandsworth, the strategies adopted were 
those of the defensive militancy of the 1970s. Unlike Wandsworth, however, there 
were few resources available to the unions in terms of support from other unions or 
familiarity with, and commitment to, radical trade unionism. There was therefore 
little chance to learn the lessons and begin the process of transformation which was 
started in Wandsworth. However, the continued presence of the craft unions in the 
workforce, who were not involved in the earlier dispute, did provide a small pocket 
of continuing commitment to trade unionism. This was threatened in 1988 with the 
decision of the MKDC to revoke the housing management agreement, which 
covered, among other things, maintenance. The craft union shop stewards 
campaigned successfully to prevent the privatisation of the service. However, it is 
difficult to see this small victory as the basis for a reinvigoration of local 
government trade unionism in the Borough.
In late 1981, as had happened in Wandsworth a year earlier, Milton Keynes 
Borough Council used the threat of privatisation to force the refuse service workers 
to accept a programme of cuts and efficiency improvements. Three of the thirteen 
refuse vehicles were taken out of service. In return for this the council agreed that 
privatisation would not be raised again for a year. 1^7 During August and 
September of 1982 industrial relations in the refuse service deteriorated dramatically 
with the Chief Executive of the council withdrawing trade union facilities for the 
shop stewards and refusing to negotiate with the NUPE branch secretary and chair.
Community Action (1983) ‘Muck, money and mass sackings in Milton Keynes’ Community 
Action 63 ppl6-26.
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Instead the management would only negotiate with workforce representatives they 
had approved. The secretary had previously been sacked for trade union activity in 
1981, and the chair worked not for the council, but for the Development 
Corporation.
The union’s tactics were to mount a campaign to persuade the council not to 
privatise the service. However the vigour of the campaign was patchy. 
Management’s attempts to obstruct the normal conduct of trade union activity and 
their direct approaches to the workforce which intimidated some workers from 
taking action meant that the efforts of the branch officers and shop stewards were 
frustrated. Leaflets which were to have been delivered to residents by refuse 
collectors while on their rounds were found dumped. The then branch secretary 
puts this down to a combination of apathy and fear of disobeying management 
directives:
The members were supposed to deliver them on the rounds, but under pressure from the
supervisors many were tipped.
On 4 October 1982 the council voted by a margin of one to invite tenders for 
the refuse and street cleaning services. Two days later the Bletchley trades council 
voted unanimously to mount a campaign against privatisation, but this too was to 
be unsuccessful. The organisation of the branch was in disarray. One shop 
steward had been sacked and one forced to resign by the council. Another was off 
sick and the fourth resigned when his colleagues at a mass meeting insisted on 
hearing what a private contractor might o ffer . 149 Without strong committment 
from the workers and no effective shop steward or lay officer organisation to 
develop it, the campaign was ineffective. On 21 December the contract was 
awarded to Exclusive Cleansing Group to start on 1 April 1983.
On the first day of the new contract a small number of the more radical trade
148lnterview with the author, 6 December 1989. 
Community Action op. cit. p20.
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unionists, those with a London background, took direct action by surrounding the 
Civic Offices with dustcarts, but in the absence of any support from the rest of the 
workforce this was doomed to be simply a defiant gesture. The Branch Secretary 
of NUPE at the time told me that the ‘locals were hostile to an outsider like me’i^° 
and like the actions of the Londoners this suggests that the importation of radical 
traditions from elsewhere is not necessarily a route to success.
The company which took over from Exclusive when the contract came up for 
renewal was Municipal Cleansing, a subsidiary of Lee-Ray Engineering. Lee-Ray 
Engineering is owned by the former Conservative leader of the Council and its 
former Chief Executive Officer. Municipal has apparently signed a single union 
agreement (a so-called ‘sweetheart deal’) with the GMB, suggesting that any 
support that NUPE might have sought from the other union would not have been 
forthcoming. The competition for members found in Manchester is evident here 
too, then, but whereas the strength of the joint working approach in Manchester has 
enabled it to survive such strains, the absence of strong union organisations in 
Milton Keynes means that divisions in the labour movement can be fatally 
weakening.
Another division was one within NUPE itself and stemmed from the uneven 
adoption in the area of NUPE’s reorganisation plan proposed in the Warwick 
Report. This report which the national union organisation commissioned from 
Warwick University in 1974 proposed the establishment of a full shop steward 
system. This had apparently been adopted in the Development Corporation but not 
in the Borough Council. Although the council workers had elected stewards, they 
were less experienced and effective than those in the Development Corporation. 
Members with problems continued to consult the branch officials in the first 
instance. A certain degree of hostility is also seems to have existed from the 
Council stewards towards the relatively more militant and better organised
l^^Interview with the author, 6 December 1989.
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representatives in MKDC. Again' this made it difficult for the workers in the
cleansing department to gain wider support.
This defeat did not result in the complete eradication of manual trade
unionism in the Council. The craft trades were always strongly organised with a
developed system of shop stewards, and when one of their departmental
strongholds was threatened with privatisation in 1988 the outcome of the dispute
was rather different. The decision of the MKDC to terminate the housing
management agreement with the council meant that the future of the Council’s in-
house building maintenance department was thrown into doubt. The management
of the organisation was concerned that there was not enough work among the
council’s own properties to justify maintaining a separate DSO. In addition the sale
of housing under the ‘right to buy’ legislation was decreasing the council’s stock.
At about the same time the council was gearing up for the reorganisation
which would be required to deal with the CCT legislation. Management
consultants were commissioned to generate proposals for the restructuring
involved. They suggested that all the affected services should be brought under
one DSO with a unified management structure headed by a General Manager. The
council accepted this proposal. In addition, however:
The Consultants [^/c] view is that the Council should take the opportunity to concentrate 
on making the DSO’s [ z^c] truly competitive before considering any company option 
[including management start ups].l^^
In the event, the Council did not follow this advice and agreed that where 
management of existing Direct Service Organisation wished to bring forward 
proposals to buy-out the assets and run the department concerned as a private 
company, then they would be accepted, provided a majority of the workers who 
would be affected agreed to the proposals. A Labour Councillor told me that:
the management suggested heavily that all DSO units should draw up plans for MBOs.
l^lReport by Council officers to the Policy and Resources Committee.
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Transport did put one in, but the manager wasn’t really committed to it.^^  ^ Management 
services also did. The managers of the Building Maintenance DSO proposed a management 
buy-out [MBO] along the lines of the ones in Bath District Council.^^
The apparent logic of this decision was that a private organisation would be able to 
take on work for other clients and thereby maintain its viability in the face of the 
council house sales and the ending of the management agreement with the 
Corporation.
The union response to the proposal reflects many of the problems of
organising in areas where traditions of trade unionism are weak and fragemented.
In the first place the local union hierarchies were by no means opposed to the MBO
proposals. This is despite the fact that national union policy is opposed to buy-outs
on principle since they involve the privatisation of a public service, and because,
while the immediate prospects in the private sector may appear bright, the long term
security and protected terms and conditions which the public sector can potentially
provide are lost. At the national level it was only in NALGO that I found slight
equivocation over this issue. Notwithstanding the joint union position, one
national official in NALGO told me that, ;
this is an area where we can conflict with the manual unions quite easily. It is our policy 
that we do not support management buy-outs because they are privatisation by any other 
name. They don’t have a high success rate and we are against them on principle. But then 
what do we do with reality? We have districts where our members are making the decisions 
and they are being told that the best option is to take the business on themselves. So what 
do we do? ^ 4^
As I stated above, the local District Committee of NALGO did indeed support 
the idea of MBOs. The full-time officers of the craft unions whose members would 
be directly affected by any decision decided to leave it up to their membership to 
decide. The local political activist who was the moving light behind the campaign 
to oppose the use of a buy-out argued that this stance represented an abdication of
l^^According to a Labour Councillor, the workforce voted 62-4 against the proposal. 
l^^Interview with the author, 29 November 1989. Bath DC is famous (notorious?) among anti­
privatisation campaigners for its strategy of management buy-outs.
1^4interview with the author, 11 May 1989.
224 Responding to restructuring
leadership, and that the local union officers should have taken a principled stand to 
defend the public sector. However, the unions concerned were all unions with 
large private sector memberships and they have generally had a more ambivalent 
attitude to privatisation than some Labour Pary activists or NUPE, for example.
A campaign was launched to try to persuade a majority of the workforce to 
vote against the MBO proposal and thereby to retain the building maintenance 
service in the public sector. This campaign mobilised the shop stewards of the 
various craft unions involved, and was coordinated by a local Labour Councillor, 
with a particular interest in housing. It was hoped that by putting forward the case 
for retaining the service in-house enough workers would vote against the proposal 
to defeat it. The arguments were put forward by word of mouth (the entire staff 
numbered only about 50), and through a regular newsletter. It was suggested that 
the management were not putting out balanced information concerning the 
prospects of a private company and were not investigating alternative sources of 
work in the public sector.
According to the shop stewards involved, the campaign held weekly meetings 
from June 1989 to discuss tactics and the progress that was being made, as one of 
them explained:
N------------approached us and got the meetings going. We though we should get both sides
of the story on the management buy-out. We published a newsletter which contained the 
facts, such as how much of the market was really being won. At first the blokes thought 
that if they didn’t go private then they would go down the pan.1^5
There were also differences between the various trades. A UCATT member 
claimed that
the main block [against privatisation] was the painters. They were always against. The 
painters don’t work at the depot, they don’t meet other tradesmen. The managers managed 
to split it down the middle.
By contrast the carpenters were mostly in favour of the buy-out. These
^^^Interview with the author, 12 February 1990. 
^^^Interview with the author, 12 February 1990,
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differences seem to stem partly from the differential impact of the proposed post­
privatisation bonus scheme, and the perception of the amount of work that would 
be available for the different trades in the private sector.
The lack of support from the full-time offices was felt to be an important 
impediment to success, with the EETPU officer going as far as to write to the 
management condemning the campaign’s newsletter.
A second ballot was taken and the 46 votes cast by manual workers were split 
evenly for and against the proposal for an MBO. With no clear majority in favour 
of privatisation, the MBO proposals were rejected by the Council.
While this action was a success, it must be counted as a relatively modest one 
in comparison with the advances towards local government restructuring that have 
been made in Milton Keynes. It is difficult to see it becoming the basis of a 
reinvigorated grass roots trade unionism in Milton Keynes as the actions in 
Wandsworth and Newcastle have, albeit in rather different ways. When I spoke to 
the shop stewards involved in the campaign, the overwhelming attitude was one of 
disillusion. Many had worked all their lives for local councils; none had felt their 
work to be so undervalued as it is in Milton K e y n e s .
Gaining a foothold
This combination of weak organisation and low morale means that the prospects for 
public service trade unionism are bleak. This challenge has been taken up by at 
least one of the manual unions, NUPE, whose full-time officer for the area has 
committed herself to developing the membership in the area. Initially this might be 
through a system of ‘postal stewards’ where one member takes responsibility for 
the distribution of material to the others. This is already underway in the Hosptial. 
Then,
links between the members in different services could be developed in order to share
15'7’^ e  existing involvement of private contractors for various tasks in the building maintenance 
service was a particular source of frustration, since the private sector’s standards were felt to be
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resources and expertise: the Open University, the Borough Council and the Hospital all
have NUPE members who could usefully pool their experience.^^^
The full-time officer identified many of the causes of the underdevelopment 
of trade unionism in the area, and all of these are related to the locales in which 
trade unionism takes place.
First, the area is on the geographical fringes of many of the trade unions’ 
adminstrative areas. Most of the unions have their main area offices outside Milton 
Keynes (NUPE’s is in Oxford, NALGO’s in Reading) which means that there is 
less contact between the full-timers and the local branch officers, and no 
opportunity for social contact. In addition, within NUPE the area has always been 
the responsibility of the Assistant Divisional Officer, whose main responsibilities 
lie in the overall organisation of the union’s Division. In this it differs from other 
parts of the Division which have officers whose sole concern is the membership in 
the area.
Second, the generally conservative politics of the area mean that local 
authorities are not keen to grant time off for trade union activities. Trade unionists 
have to work in their own time on union matters, and in an area with few traditions 
of trade union activity this makes it difficult to recruit stewards.
Third, high staff turnover (a product of the ‘tightness’ of the labour market) 
results in a very transient workforce which is difficult to organise. Manual staff in 
some public services in the area have turnover rates in excess of 100% per year. 
The tightness of the labour market ought to work in favour of trade unions since it 
gives them in principle a degree of power. But in order for this to occur a certain 
threshold percentage of the workforce would need to be brought into membership, 
so the unions are in a Catch-22 situation.
Fourth, Milton Keynes’ status as a new town means that it has not developed 
much of a social centre which might form a focus of trade union activity. The
sÿnifïcantly lower than those of the council workforce. 
^^Interview with the author, 12 December 1989.
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interviewee would like to start using unspent branch funds on social activities in the 
local area to begin to build up something of a labour movement culture. This could 
be linked to education initiatives as had been done in the Division where she had 
previously worked. While shop-stewards in well organised areas often regard the 
full-time officers as conservative meddlers in their local affairs, in areas where trade 
unionism is acutely underdeveloped, commitment from a full-time officer to 
recruitment and education would seem to be a key prerequisite for future success.
All the cases of trade union action I have discussed here are closely 
influenced by the massive underdevelopment of the membership base and the 
limited traditions on which to draw. In addition the domination of policy by 
Council Officers has encouraged a particular managerial ideology of ‘getting it done 
regardless’ which has militated against the development of stable relations with the 
workforces. Finally, the split between the Borough and Corporation has divided 
public sector workers in the city and made the development of a united response 
acutely problematic.
Despite its distant roots in the tradition of post-War modernisation based on 
public sector investment and services, Milton Keynes has developed from the start 
into a ready made ‘space for capital’ any attempt by the organisations of labour to 
make inroads there will depend on developing forms of trade union organisation 
which are sensitive to this peculiar geographical context.
Conclusion
At the beginning of the Chapter I suggested that a research method based on case 
studies allowed both the characteristics of trade union action and its causes to be 
identified. I argued that a comparative approach would assist in this by disclosing 
the causal processes through which trade union action develops. In addition 
comparison allows the pattern of geographical differences in trade union action to 
be examined and its causes explained. It is clear from the studies I have presented 
here that the geography of local trade union responses to the restructuring of local
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government are geographically constituted as well as geographically expressed. 
The instutional settings of trade unionism, which I have labelled locales, vary 
widely from place to place, and I believe that my research shows that it is these 
settings which are of crucial significance in both enabling and constraining the 
development of trade union action.
In each of the case studies I have presented what is in effect a narrative of 
certain events which took place in each of the local areas, which I thinkcmTclarify 
the operation of the causal processes. This in turn allows the elaboration of some 
more general points about what it is about ‘places’ which produce certain forms of 
trade union action in response to change and how these local responses build up to 
produce the unevenly developed landscape of local government trade unionism. I 
began to show what this involved by using the concept of locales to show how 
particular combinations of the settings of action generated very different sorts of 
responses in different places.
I now want to step back from the detail of the empirical cases and take this 
process further by drawing out some of these more general points about the causes 
of trade union action at the local level and its relationship to locales. At the 
beginning of the chapter I suggested that comparison between cases was a vital part 
of the explanation of both the character of the cases themselves and of the 
differences between them. I now want to substantiate these claims with reference 
to the case studies.
Firstly, in realist terms, the case studies I have presented do indeed suggest 
that it is the particular idiosyncratic combination of relations in a place which is the 
source of the differentiation of responses. Secondly, a comparison between the 
different cases indicates which particular sets of relations are central to the 
generation of action.
We can see that although it is straightforward to show that institutional 
relations take a particular form in one place, it is only by showing that they also
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take a different from in another place that the significance of the relationship for the 
overall response is clarified. In Newcastle, for example, considerable emphasis 
was placed by the unions on developing a joint strategy with the users of services. 
If Newcastle is considered in isolation the significance of this is not immediately 
apparent: since joint campaigns of this sort had been encouraged by the national 
trade unions in the Who Cares Wins document, the Newcastle example might 
appear to be merely the application of policy at the local level and it might be 
assumed that similar responses would be found elsewhere. When the cases of 
Manchester and Milton Keynes are examined as well, however, it becomes clear 
not only that the Newcastle strategy is not an illustration of some general 
phenomenon, but also that the alliance with users of particular significance to both 
the nature of the response in Newcastle and its uniqueness. Moreover the absence 
of such alliances elsewhere can also be seen as an important derterminate of the 
responses in those places too. However it is only because it is seen to be important 
in Newcastle that the significance of its absence elsewhere is made clear.
Drawing these sorts of comparisons between the different cases allows the 
identification of a set of key institutional relations or locales whose existence or 
otherwise, and whose character may be seen to be the most important influences on 
the nature of the local trade union responses. Some of these institutional settings 
are themselves the product of more general processes operating at the national or 
international scale. Thus the limits to relationships between trade unions and 
councils are partly determined by national legislation affecting local government and 
the trade union movement. In each case, however, it is the particular local 
manifestation of these processes, as the result of their combination with other 
circumstances in the local area, which affects local union action.
The first key relationship is that between the unions and the local authority. 
In all the case studies the character of this relationship was clearly of crucial 
importance in enabling and constraining particular types of union response.
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Moreover, the comparison between the different studies demonstrates this centrality 
because it shows how different qualities of union-council relations can dramatically 
affect the unions’ responses. The significance of joint-working in Manchester, for 
example contrasts with that of independent negotiation in Newcastle, outright 
hostility in Wandsworth and marginalisation in Milton Keynes.
The relationship between unions and local political parties (especially the 
Labour Party) is also significant, as is shown by the comparison of the ‘disowning’ 
of the unions by Labour in the early dispute in Wandsworth, the close, but 
paternalistic links between a particular union and the Party hierarchy in Newcastle, 
the importance of the commitment of an individual councillor in Milton Keynes, 
where the underdevelopment of trade union institutions means that individual 
agency can be particularly influential, and the historically distant links between 
unions and Party in Manchester leading to a particular form of subsequent 
incorporation of the unions into the council.
The relationship between unions and users has already been touched on. Its 
signficance in influencing the union response may be seen particularly from the 
contrast between Newcastle and Wandsworth. In Wandsworth, the alienation of 
users from the refuse collection service meant that the support of users was not 
forthcoming, by contrast in Newcastle that support was actively built up. This 
lesson was also subsequently learnt in Wandsworth too as the dispute over the 
privatisation of estate management indicates.
Union-union relations are crucial too. Where these are relatively harmonious, 
as in Newcastle and Wandsworth, they have a positive impact on the unions’ 
campaigns. Where there is hostility and disunity as is the case in Manchester, or 
where there are simply very few links, as in Milton Keynes, the impact tends to be 
deleterious.
Finally, there are a set of relationships which demonstrate that a locale is not 
necessarily local. There is the relationship between local and national union
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organisations, and the use or otherwise that is made of the national campaign 
materials, or the support that is provided (or not provided) nationally for particular 
local disputes. This was particularly apparent in Wandsworth, where the early 
disputes did not gain the sort of support that the local activists felt was required. 
The links that the unionists in Newcastle were able to forge with SCAT were 
particularly significant, as were there use of other organisations and individuals in 
there initial campaign around CCT. They were able to bring people up from 
London for there seminars and meetings which might not have been possible for 
local unions with less good links.
The relationship with the regional union hierarchies is also influential. In 
Milton Keynes the acceptance by the NALGO district of the idea of management 
buy-outs was important, as was the organisational structure of the regional unions 
which tended to focus attention on areas away from Milton Keynes. Some of the 
regional officers in North West England tended to take a ‘seen it all before’ attitude 
to CCT which led them to play down the extent to which a fundamentally new 
strategy was required.
The links to private capital are not on the whole direct ones, but they are also 
important. In particular nationally available intelligence on the activities of private 
contracting companies has been important in a number of places in substantiating 
local campaigns.
These sets of relations appear as a result of the comparative study of the four 
areas to be the most significant in setting the scene for particular forms of trade 
union response. However, they cannot be added together arithmetically. Their real 
significance arises from their interaction in different places. What might appear to 
be promising preconditions in one place can fail to be realised because of the 
influence of other processes. By contrast two or more sets of conditions which on 
their own might appear of only limited import can be very influential when they 
interact. Thus the overall union réponse in a place is the product of the overlapping
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network of locales which I described at the start of the chapter. It is this 
intermingling of what Giddens would call relations of presence and absence which 
provide or deny the unions and their members the particular combination of 
institutional resources which can allow the development of the responses. Thus 
both the density of the network of locales and its local, regional and national extent 
is important in characterising the ‘complete’ setting for trade union action.
All of these settings are being used and altered by the activities going on 
through them. It is in these sorts of ways that new institutional forms develop 
which may, through the process of struggle which such development involves, 
become dominant in the local area. This clearly resonates with the regulationist 
arguments about the impact of crises on social institutions which were discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. But what it also suggests is that the development of those new 
forms will be highly uneven, and that the eventual dominance of certain forms in a 
new national mode of regulation is likely to be geographically differentiated, 
contested and incomplete. I will return again to this issue in Chapter 8.
Before doing so, however, I want to consider how the characteristics of 
places beyond simply the network of locales of trade unions have implications for 
the development of radical union responses to all sorts of social and economic 
change. In addition to their own network of locales there are of course other 
networks which are likely to bear on the unions’ responses. The local authority in 
each place and the private cotracting companies all have their own networks, which 
overlap and interact with the unions’ networks but which are also distinct from 
them. This suggests that the ‘settings of settings’ are also crucial and that, as 
Giddens points out, the features of settings may be taken as given for the analysis 
of strategic conduct, but should in the end be seen as also the product of social 
action. This brings the argument back to the character of the places where the 
union action occurs: the character which is in fact encapsulated in the concept of 
locality.
7 Place and trade union power
Contextual theory and trade union action
In the previous chapter I began to show what an interpretation of trade union action 
which takes seriously the constitutive role of geographical context might look like. 
I suggested that the trade union strategies developed in response to local 
government restructuring may be seen as emerging from the particular time-space 
settings, or ‘locales’ in which they are situated. Furthermore, the crucial locales in 
these cases were the networks of institutional relationships in which the unions are 
enmeshed. In some cases (such as Newcastle and Manchester) the ‘positive’ 
connections in the networks are dense and well-developed. In others, including 
Wandsworth and especially Milton Keynes, they are more sporadic and 
discontinuous.
Understanding the causes of these differences is of considerable political 
importance. While it is never going to be possible to ‘replicate’ straightforwardly 
the ‘successful’ responses in other places, precisely because the settings are so 
varied, it is possible to draw lessons from the cases I have presented concerning the 
sources of trade union power and the necessary preconditions for its realisation. 
Settings, as Giddens has pointed out, may be methodologically ‘bracketed’ and 
taken as givens in particular pieces of research. However, he insists that context 
too is a product of human agency and conflict and is therefore potentially 
transformable. I began to touch on this in my discussion of the changing 
demographic structure of Wandsworth, in which the ‘locales’ of union action were 
being deliberately remade by the local Council, and unconsciously ‘squeezed’ by 
the movement into the Borough of affluent middle class voters.
These changes have worked against the trade unions in Wandsworth, but 
there is of course no reason in principle why the opposite should not also occur in
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other times and places. Contextual theory, of which Giddens’ work is one variant, 
suggests that the geographical settings for action enter into the constitution of 
action. However this does not mean that action is somehow ‘trapped’ by 
geography. The settings are themselves in a process of transformation through 
action.
This may be seen in what I have rather grandly referred to as the battle by 
private capital to recapture its lost spaces. This should not be taken to mean that the 
spaces are somehow ‘naturally’ the province of capital and that their ‘control’ by 
labour is some temporary aberration, nor that labour cannot itself actively seek to 
reclaim spaces that it has lost. The outcome of the struggle is by no means a 
foregone conclusion. However, any attempt at reclamation must begin from the 
existing set of contexts. A key question thus emerges: can the places in which trade 
union action occurs be a source of power to the labour movement, or must they 
always limit its ability to develop trade union practices and a progressive politics? 
The answer may determine to a significant extent the geography of any ‘post- 
Fordist’ mode of regulation.
The urbanisation of iabour?
‘Space’ and ‘place’ in the work of David Harvey
David Harvey’s ‘historico-geographical materialism’ is one of the most 
sophisticated accounts of the operation of capitalist social relations in space 
developed since the radicalisation of human geography in the early 1970s. His aim 
is explicitly to formulate a ‘revolutionary’ theory capable of informing the practices 
required for a wholesale transformation of capitalist society. ^  Yet despite this 
objective, the impression that Harvey’s work creates is one of a world whose 
geography is sculpted by the restless dynamic of capitalist accumulation. Each set 
of geographical barriers to accumulation is destructively overcome by a ‘spatial fix’
^Harvey D (1982) r/ze//wzVj to capzVû/(Oxford: Blackwell) p451.
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in which old places are devalorised and new ones thrown up. While the uneven
development of capital is its liberator, as well as its prison, geography only ever
seems to disable the development of progressive responses by. labour.
These differences are highlighted in Harvey’s use of the twin concepts of
‘space’ and ‘place’. ‘Space’, for Harvey is a key source of social power:
Command over space, as every general and geopolitician knows, is of the utmost strategic 
significance in any power struggle. The same principle also applies within the world of 
commodity exchange. Every supermarket manager also knows that command over a 
strategic space within the overall construction of social space is worth its weight in gold. 
This value of space lies at the root of land rent. But spatial competition is always 
monopolistic competition, simply because two functions cannot occupy exactly the same 
location. Capture of strategic spaces within the overall space can confer much more than 
its aliquot share of control. [...] Control over strategic land parcels within the urban 
matrix confers immense power over the whole pattern of development. And although the 
liberation of space and the annihilation of space by time erode any permanent power that 
may attach to control of strategic spaces, the monopolistic element is always recreated 
afresh. Indeed, control over the production of spatial organization then becomes 
fundamental to the creation of new spatial monopolies. The importance of such monopoly 
power is precisely that it gives rise to monopoly rent and can thereby be converted into 
money.^
And, Harvey goes on to argue, a similar proposition can be advanced for the
space of social reproduction, in the household, for example, or in the operation of
political processes in the state. Under capitalism, Harvey suggests, space becomes
commodified and hence homogenised:
Builders, engineers, and architects for their part showed how abstract representations of 
objective space could be combined with exploration of the concrete, malleable properties of 
materials in space. But these were all just islands of practice, light chorological nets 
thrown over a totality of social practices in which all manner of other conceptions of place 
and space —  sacred and profane, symbolic, personal, animistic —  could continue to 
function undisturbed. It took something more to consolidate space as universal, 
honriogenous, objective, and abstract in most social practices. That ‘something’ was the 
buying and selling of space as a commodity. The effect was then to bring all space under 
the single measuring rod of money value.^
The effect of this, according to Harvey, is to replace an earlier emphasis on 
the absolute qualities of particular places with a concern for space in general; 
‘abstract’ space in which the significance of locations is grounded in their 
interrelations rather than their inherent qualities:
the whole basis of urbanisation had to change. The preindustrial city had to be disciplined, 
^Harvey D (1989) The urban experience (Oxford: Blackwell) pl86.
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weaned away as it were from its mercantilist proclivities, its monopolistic practices, and its 
assertion of the primacy of place over a capitalist organization of space in which relative 
rather than absolute locations had to dominate.4
Harvey recognises, however, that the ‘homogenisation’ of space is never
complete. Firstly, the ‘capitalist organisation of space’ never totally subsumes the
pre-capitalist ‘assertion of the primacy of place’. Residual economic and political
forms, and pre- or non-capitalist social practices may rg-assert the ‘primacy of
place (though they will not inevitably do so). Secondly, the same processes
propelled by accumulation which serve (in Harvey’s view) to homogenise space
and eliminate the absolutes of place lead simultaneously to the fragmentation of
abstract space. Thus the stage is set for a struggle over the occupation, use and
significance of space. Drawing on Henri Lefebvre, Harvey comments:
The homogeneity of space is achieved through its total ‘pulverisation’ into freely alienable 
parcels of private property, to be bought and traded at will upon the market. The result is a 
permanent tension between the appropriation and use of space for individual and social 
purposes and the domination of space through private property, the state, and other forms of 
class and social power. This tension underlies the further fragmentation of otherwise 
homogenous space. For the ease with which both physical and social space could now be 
shaped - with all that this implies for the annihilation of the absolute qualities of place and 
of the privileged territoriality of traditional communities sealed off in aristocratic, religious, 
or royal quarters (among others) - poses a serious challenge to the social order. In whose 
image and to whose benefit is space to be shaped?^
For Harvey, however, the struggle over the appropriation of space in pre-
revolutionaiy circumstances seems to have a foregone conclusion. As the dominant
group loses control of some spaces it retains its power by shifting the locus of
control into those areas it still occupies:
The bourgeoisie will always seek to shift authority, powers, and functions away from the 
spaces it cannot control into the spaces within which its hegemony prevails.^
Thus, according to Harvey, the growth of municipal socialism in the late 
nineteenth century fuelled the growth of the nation state:
The more the bourgeoisie lost control over urban centers, the more it asserted the dominant 
role of the nation state. It reinforced the authority of the spaces it could control over the
^Ibid. pl77.
^Ibid. p28. ,
^ Ib id .p m .
Place and trade union power 237
places it could not7
It is fruitful to see the struggles of trade unions over local government 
restructuring in these terms. As Harvey’s analysis confirms, that these are 
simultaneously struggles over the control of space. The municipalisation of public 
services in the post-war era saw private industry lose control not only of valuable 
markets and production facilities, but also of sites, land, property and crucially of 
political and symbolic spaces as well. The domination of inner-city economies by 
the public sector which I have discussed above represented the lost geography of 
capital.
Now Harvey’s argument implies that such losses can be sustained for as long
as capital can exploit its influence over other spaces (including other countries) in
ways which allow it to maintain accumulation. Ultimately, howevdr, the immanent
crisis in the Fordist regime of accumulation asserted itself and alternatives had to be
developed if capitalism was to survive. In Britain capital and the state began to
experiment to see if it was possible to reclaim the lost spaces. The,ensuing struggle
has been the focus of this study.
In Harvey’s account such crises can only be resolved in one of two ways.
Either the crisis leads to a revolution and the complete elimination of capitalist social
relations, or the imperatives of capital accumulation are re-imposed without
mitigation as brutally as before:
What seems so extraordin^ is that the overall rhythms of accumulation remain broadly 
intact in spite of the variations in the intensity of working-class struggle. But if we think 
it through, this is not, after all, so extraordinary. We still live in a capitalist society. And 
if that society has survived, then it must have done so by imposing those laws of 
accumulation whereby it reproduces itself. To put it this way is not to diminish working- 
class resistance but to show that a struggle to abolish to wages system and the domination 
of capital over labor must necessarily look to the day when the capitalist laws of 
accumulation are themselves relegated to the history books. And until that day, the 
capitalist laws of accumulation, replete with all of their internal contradictions, must 
necessarily remain the guiding force in our history.^
^Ibid. p57. 
' I^bid. p33. 
^Ibid. pl89
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Whatever merits such a formulation has for Harvey’s own political project, it 
is rather inadequate'as a characterisation of the struggle over local government 
restructuring which I have considered here. Moreover it fails to take into account 
the differences between accumulation before and after the crisis which regulation 
theory seeks to analyse. These shortcomings stem, I believe, from two aspects of 
Harvey’s account which relate to his treatment of the relationship between ‘place’ 
and social (as he would have it, class) struggle.
Class and community
Harvey notes two ways in which ‘geography’ can be an impediment to capitalist 
urbanisation. Firstly, as I have already discussed, the drive to accumulate 
dissolves the absolute qualities of particular places into a universal and 
homogenous space, which, precisely because it is universal, becomes the object of 
struggle. Secondly, the dissolution of absolute qualities of place is never 
completed. Place continually reasserts itself, either in residual form, or through the 
differentiation of universal space into urban regions each exhibiting tendencies 
towards ‘structured coherence’ through the interaction of the process of 
accumulation and relatively inelastic urban labour markets.^
The first impediment can be overcome, so the argument goes, because capital 
can always out-manoeuvre the appropriation of some spaces by oppositional 
forces. As I have outlined, Harvey suggests that it does this by shifting the locus 
of power to those spaces it does control, or when this becomes inadequate because 
of crisis, it attempts a new spatial fix by retaking the lost spaces. Thus is capitalist 
hegemony re-asserted. The second impediment, that of place, can also be 
overcome. The ‘production of space’ (through the circulation of capital) tends ‘to 
run up against sensitivity to p l a c e ’.i^ The capitalist response to this problem, 
according to Harvey, is to ensure that ‘sensitivity to place’ is not allowed to
P125-64.
^^Ibid. p41, cf. ppl82-4.
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develop into a sensitivity to class. This is achieved through the creation of a sense
of community. In an early formulation Harvey puts it like this:
The stability of [working class] neighbourhoods and of the value systems that characterize 
the people in them have been remarkable considering the dynamics of change in most 
capitalist cities. The reproduction of such value systems facilitates the reproduction of 
consumption classes as well as groupings with respect to the division of labour while it 
also functions to restrict mobility chances. [...] The homogenisation of life experiences 
which this restriction produces reinforces the tendency for relatively permanent social 
groupings to emerge within a relatively permanent structure of residential differentiation. 
Once this is translated into a social awareness that has the neighbourhood or the 
community as the focus and once this focus of social awareness becomes the basis for 
political action then ‘community consciousness’ replaces ‘class consciousness’ [...] as the 
springboard for action and the locus of social conflict.^ ^
Ten years later the sentiment is the same:
The alternative to [residential] dispersal lies in the application of doctrines of community 
improvement. As early as 1812, the Reverend Thomas Chalmers proposed to mobilize the 
‘spirit of community’ as an antidote to class consciousness and its associated threat of 
revolutionary violence then engulfing the rapidly growing proletariat in British cities.^^
As industrial capitalism developed in the nineteenth century,
[b]ourgeois surveillance of the family and interventions in the cultural, political, and social 
milieu of the working classes began in earnest. Above all, the ruling-class alliance had to 
find ways to invent a new tradition of community that could counter or absorb the 
antagonisms of class.
The two inadequacies in Harvey’s approach, then, are these. Firstly, by 
continually emphasising the ways in which capital and the dominant political forces 
reimpose their hegemony over lost spaces, Harvey loses sight of the real gains that 
the working class can make (and historically has made). That attempts to privatise 
local services are strongly resisted in some areas, and that the lost spaces of capital 
are strongly defended against capitalist attempts to reoccupy them shows that the 
struggle to reimpose capitalist hegemony need not result in either socialist 
revolution nor capitalist success. It is possible (this study suggests that in some 
cases it may be probable) that trade union action can prevent the reimposition of
llHarvey D (1975) ‘Class structure and residential differentiation’ in Peel R, Chisholm M and 
Haggett P (eds) Processes in physical and human geography: Bristol essays (London: Heinemann) 
pp364-5.
^^Harvey (1989) The urban ..., op. cit. p87.
^hbid. p31.
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capitalist social relations and that this need not lead directly, or even at all, to a
revolutionary situation. Indeed the history of the labour movement in Britain has
precisely involved the extraction of real material gains from capital and the state,
Wr/zowf a socialist transformation.
Secondly the strength of many of those defensive struggles stems precisely
from that insistent reassertion of place which Harvey sees as all to easily overcome
by capital through the construction of community. To be fair, Harvey points out
that ‘the principle of community is not a bourgeois invention. It also has its
authentic working class counterpart as a defensive and even offensive weapon in
class struggle’. 14 However for Harvey, this formulation is entered as a caveat,
almost as an afterthought. For the most part it is not his aim to demonstrate how
class consciousness could or should be generated, rather he seeks to show how,
once emergent, it is neutralised by the imperatives of capital accumulation.
In the introduction to The urban experience, Harvey notes that,
the insertion of concepts of space and space relations, of place, locale, and milieu, into any 
social theory has the awkward habit of paralyzing that theory’s central propositions [...] 
Marxists, employing a vocabulary appropriate to universal class relations, find 
neighbourhoods, communities, and nations that partition class struggle and capital 
accumulation into strange configurations of uneven geographical development’.^ ^
While much of Harvey’s work is dedicated to showing how continued 
accumulation is possible not only in spite of such partitioning, but, through the 
mechanism of the spatial fix, actually by means of it, he fails to provide a similarly 
sophisticated analysis of the operation of class struggle. When discussing the 
nature of ‘place’, it is not class consciousness which springs first to his mind, but 
reaction and, in more than one instance, f a s c i s m ,  For Harvey, geography is 
almost always disabling of class struggle: the spatial fix works for capital.
I want to suggest that this pessimism is misplaced. The ‘urbanisation of
1 4 /w . p87.
^^Ibid.pS.
^^Ibid. ppl22-3 and 184; Harvey D (1989) The condition of postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell) 
p277.
Place and trade union power 241
capital’ which Harvey analyses so minutely should be seen as involving 
simultaneously the ‘urbanisation of labour’. Class is always constituted concretely 
— it simply never exists as ‘universal class relations’ —  and it is thus always 
articulated with other social relations such as racism and patriarchy, and mediated 
through a specific time-space context. This recognition has two consequences for 
an interpretation of the relationship between trade union practices and place. 
Firstly, the urbanisation of labour occurs within the patchwork of geographical 
differentiation generated, as Harvey sees it, by the operation of processes of capital 
accumulation. The inevitable relative fixity of this structure —  the outcome of the 
spatial fix — both enables and constrains continued accumulation. One of the 
constraints is the opportunity it opens up for what Harvey calls a “‘relatively 
autonomous” local p o l i t i c s a n  opportunity we may extend to the sphere of trade 
union struggle. Secondly, as I have shown in Chapter Six, the trade unionists 
engaged in such ‘relatively autonomous’ struggle actively exploit the characteristics 
of the settings (including their cultural resources) in which trade unionism is 
constituted. These settings (the pattern of locales) are in turn the product of the 
temporary stability after the spatial fix. One the one hand, therefore trade unionists 
have no choice but to develop their strategies in the circumstances bequeathed from 
the immediate past. On the other, it is precisely these circumstances which can in 
some cases provide the resources for the development of a progressive politics 
which monitors and seeks actively to mould the conditions of its own production.
The politics of ‘place’
I want to explore the first of these consequences through further consideration of 
Harvey’s work, and in particular his notion of ‘structured coherence’ and the 
second by linking this to my discussion in the previous chapter of the concept of 
locales.
^^Harvey (1989) The urban op. cit. pl25.
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Structured coherence and trade union power
Stung by the rebukes of those he regards as ‘defectors from the Marxist fold’,!^ 
Harvey insists that the diverse contradictory pattern of urban politics under 
capitalism can be accounted for within the ‘generalities of Marxist theory’. To 
demonstrate this he turns to the concept of the local or urban labour market. Now it 
is central to the argument that local labour markets are relatively isolated one from 
another, but this does not tempt Harvey to pursue the common empiricist approach 
to local labour market definition on the criterion of arbitarily determined degrees of 
‘self-containment’. Although the concept of daily commuting distance is seen as 
important since it determines the short-run options for employers for the exchange 
of labour power in terms of its quantity and quality, it is not thought helpful to 
attempt to draw definite lines on maps:
labor markets can overlap in space and tend in any case to fade out over space rather than
end at some discrete boundary. The urban labor market is better thought of as a complex
drainage basin with firmer delineations at its center than on its periphery. 19
Harvey’s argument is complex, but revolves around the notion of the 
‘structured coherence’ of urban regions. In the short to medium term capital in the 
urban region faces constraints from two sources. Firstly, the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the labour force are relatively stable (in terms of numbers of 
workers, mix of skills etc.). Secondly, in order to exploit that reserve of labour 
power, capital must invest in fixed capital (buildings and plant) and requires an 
infrastructure. Notwithstanding Marshall Berman’s powerful evocation^® of the 
creatively destructive power of capitalist modernisation, the relative spatial fixity of 
capital and labour power limits capital’s scope for action. In addition, the 
consumption patterns characteristic of each labour market area attain a degree of 
stability related to that of the labour force.
pl25.
1 9 /w . pl28.
^^Berman M (1982) All that is solid melts in to zzzV (London: Verso).
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Harvey argues that these processes have two effects. Firstly, the region 
exhibits a tendency towards a ‘structured coherence’ defined around a particular 
‘technology of both production and consumption and a dominant set of class 
relations’. (Technology here is defined in broad terms as systems of organisation, 
as well as machinery.) Secondly, the short-run relative immobility of both capital 
and labour power means that the urban region is not simply at the whim of the 
capitalist imperative, but contains ‘a political space within which a relatively 
autonomous urban politics can arise’. H a r v e y  argues that this politics operates 
by means of regional class alliances. A ruling regional coalition of interests then 
has considerable power to direct the development of the area in particular ways. 
According to Harvey, very often the means by which the ruling coalition gains 
power, maintains its position and seeks to develop the economy, is its ability to 
mobilise a spirit of geographical community.
Now it seems to me that precisely the same argument that Harvey makes as a 
means of deriving the necessity of a relatively autonomous urban politics can be 
used in respect of trade union action. Since the unit of trade union organisation is 
the workplace within a labour market, the same relative stability of that labour 
market and tendency towards ‘structured coherence’ of the urban region will tend to 
produce a relatively stable (at least in the short to medium term) pattern of regional 
trade union structures and practices. Over time these patterns will evolve, change, 
grow, decline and be disrupted, as the character of the region does. Similarly they 
will form one of the factors which determines how the region itself fares.
This means that the relative, and always provisional, fixity of relations of 
production and consumption in a particular labour market will necessarily give 
labour a degree of power: capital cannot up and off overnight (although it can move 
remarkably rapidly in a recession!). The ability of the labour to realise this power 
would seem to depend in part on the extent to which the unions are able to enter
^^Harvey (1989) The urban op. cit. p i26.
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in to ‘regional class alliances’.
The concrete research embodied in the local case studies discussed above 
supports this perspective. In all the case studies the relationship between the trade 
unions responding to the restructuring of local government and the ruling coalition 
has been paramount in influencing the union response. The ruling coalition is not 
limited to the formal local government machinery, although given the topic under 
consideration this is probably the most important part of it. In addition, however, 
the private sector contractors may be able to form their own alliances with the local 
authority (as happened in Wandsworth and Milton Keynes) and become partially 
co-opted to the coalition.
Thus in Newcastle, the ruling coalition is made up of the Labour Party and 
the GMB, with a secondary role for private capital such as huge Northern 
Engineering Industries. Here the union movement is not just in alliance with the 
coalition, but a part of it. However this is not true for all the unions. NUPE, for 
example, has a more marginal role in the formal politics of the region. But as I 
have suggested, the crucial factor here is the relationship herween these elements. 
The fact that the GMB is part of the establishment gave the unions crucial 
credibility, while the partial exclusion of NUPE allowed it to develop a radical 
response without frightening the local authority. Since the unions were cooperating 
with one another as well, these two elements came together to produce the sort of 
strategic and influential response detailed in the preceding chapter.
By contrast, in Manchester the public service unions were not part of any 
ruling coalition. The historically established separation between the Labour Party 
and the trade unions in the city led to the unions being far more junior partners than 
is the case in Newcastle. They are accorded less autonomy and less respect by the 
council, and have found it concomitantly harder to develop an independent 
response.
In Wandsworth the transformation of the ruling coalition following the
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change in local council control saw the complete marginalisation of the unions from 
influence with the authority. The new coalition was constituted of alliances of 
capital interests (local business, the private contracting sector and the Conservative 
Party). They were determined not merely to marginalise the unions, but also to 
break them up. In addition the alliance which previously existed between the 
Labour Group and the council unions broke down depriving the unions of crucial 
support.
In Milton Keynes the uneasy coalition of interests between the Borough 
Council Officers, the Development Corporation, local business, the Conservative 
and ‘centre’ parties found no room at all for the unions, who, with only limited and 
relatively uncommitted membership were unable to bargain their way to any 
position of influence. The securing of the refuse collection contract renewal by a 
company owned by the former Chief Executive and the leader of the Conservative 
group graphically illustrates in personal terms the way alliances between local state 
and private capital can operate, but of more significance for the unions today are the 
issues of recruitment and the establishment of proper union orgariisation in order 
that there is something with which to forge alliances in the future.
Locales and the (re)sources of radicalism
I have already described how the patterns of institutional networks in which trade 
unions are enmeshed may be seen as networks of locales which vary in their 
‘density’ from place to place. In one sense the network of locales makes up part of 
the ‘structured coherence’ of the urban region, and their temporary stability over 
time contributes to the development of the relatively autonomous politics to which 
Harvey refers. The regional class alliances discussed above are, after all, 
constituted through locales. The formation of these alliances where that is possible 
is one way in which the trade unions capitalise on the resources which their locales 
provide.
Alliances are not always with the already powerful, however, and locales
246 Responding to restructuring
can be empowering of the powerless. In the case studies, the locales within the 
local area were of particular significance for the transformation and radicalisation of 
trade union practices, because they involved the relations between the trade unions 
and the users of the services. These links also see the mobilisation of resources 
provided by their settings, and in ways which see the concept of place being used 
in rather different ways from those emphasised by Harvey.
For Harvey, ‘place’ under capitalism is first and foremost the basis for a 
conception of community. However, community is not (as Harvey intermittently 
admits) straightforwardly a reactionary or fascist concept. During the miners’ 
strike of 1984-5 the very word gained almost iconic power on the left in Britain. 
Defending mining jobs became synonymous with defending (working class) 
communities. Where unions are able to mobilise around concepts of community 
and (implicitly) of place they are able to construct themselves as representative of a 
general (rather than merely a sectional) interest. This may (depending on the 
circumstances) be a class interest as well. The advantages as well as the limitations 
of this strategy were demonstrated in the case studies.
In Wandsworth the refuse anti-privatisation campaign was largely fought on 
the basis of jobs. Only after that defeat was more than lip service paid to the 
problems of mobilising the public around a notion of community. The contrast 
with the GLC is striking. While the unions were losing the battle over privatisation 
in Wandsworth, the Labour-controlled GLC was successfully emphasising the 
particularities of the situation in London through a radical transport policy. It is 
possible that part of the problem for the unions in Wandsworth was the lack of a 
coherent ‘place’ around which to mobilise, and it may be the case that a London- 
wide strategy is required in these situations. Yet the Conservative leadership in 
Wandsworth found it useful to try to construct a sense of community which they 
could then represent themselves as defending against the trade unions.
Although it is only one of ten local authorities in the conurbation, Manchester
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City Council has the advantage of bearing the name around which any attempt by 
the unions to mobilise a sense of community would surely revolve. As the regional 
officers of NUPE pointed out, however, the fact that Manchester City Council is 
the authority for the employment and business centre of the conurbation means that 
many of the people using the council’s services do not live in the authority and 
would not necessarily identify with the area. In addition the close alliance which 
has been established in formal terms between the trade unions and the council has 
led the unions to neglect the formation of alliances with community and other 
groups, preferring to leave this to the council, where it happens at all.
The potential advantage of such an approach is exemplified by Newcastle 
where the strong Geordie culture and sense of place is paralleled by union attempts 
to involve users in defence of ‘their’ services. Although the use of a rhetoric of 
place is absent from the unions’ campaigns the rhetoric of ‘community’ is 
omnipresent. This is one of the principal sources of the political strength of the 
unions, assisted by a widespread acceptance of the trade union movement as part of 
the fabric of the regional scene.
The drive to create a sense of ‘community’ is expressed most starkly in 
Milton Keynes. In Milton Keynes all local institutions have an explicit interest in 
establishing the ‘New City’ as a ‘real place’. For the union movement this is 
doubly hard. Not only does it have to pitch into this struggle along with the rest, 
but it also has to break the traditional labour movement identification with two 
much older ‘places’, Wolverton and Bletchley. The problems involved in this are 
graphically illustrated by the refusal of the Wolverton rail unions to even participate 
in the activities of the Milton Keynes Trades Council. The NUPE full-time officer 
with responsibility for the area explicitly cited the lack of an pre-existing sense of 
community as one cause of the problems of developing a commitment to trade 
unionism locally. With most of the users of local services recent in-migrants with 
no particular historical attachment to the area it is difficult to see how the unions
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will be able successfully to compete with the far better resourced image makers 
employed by the local planning authorities to establish the sense of place of Milton 
Keynes through media advertising and glossy brochures. The resources provided 
by locales are thus objects of conflict in their own right. In principle there is scope 
for other agencies, such as the unions, to exploit the dissonance between the image 
and the experience of those who live in the area, but success again depends on the 
establishment of much stronger union organisation than exists at present.
Local union structures and practices thus draw a crucial part of their 
inspiration and strength from both the characteristics of particular places and the 
‘imagined communities’^  ^linked to them. This provides a general framework for 
thinking about both geographical variation in union power and the significance of 
place in the constitution of union power in general. Now it may be objected that 
this account contains a certain bias. Since the object of my empirical enquiry has 
been the union response to the restructuring of local government, there is bound to 
be a crucial role for geographical difference, since local government is so 
dramatically geographically differentiated. If I was looking at the automobile 
industry, for example, might I not find a much more homogenous union response.
There is some truth in this complaint. But I believe that the analysis in 
general still holds. That is, that grass-roots union action can only be theorised 
geographically. The geography of the car industry is different from that of local 
government, granted, but it has a geography none the less. Why, for example, are 
the workers at Ford’s Southampton plant so much less radical than those at 
Dagenham? Why do nurses in Scotland prefer to join NUPE? Why was the so- 
called Union of Democratic Mineworkers established in Nottinghamshire? Why
concept proposed by Benedict Anderson in his analysis of nationalism, but taken up more 
widely (for example in the work of Simon Duncan and Mark Goodwin) to refer to the political 
power of representations of ‘localities’ which might otherwise lack material coherence. See: 
Anderson B (1983) Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism 
(London: Verso); Duncan S and Goodwin M (1988) The local state and uneven development: 
behind the local government crisis (Cambridge: Polity Press) p51.
Place and trade union power 249
were ambulance drivers in London and Liverpool the last to return to work after a
strike? These question cannot be answered simply by reference to the geographical
distribution of members, essential though such information is.
Awareness of these geographies leads back to the question raised insistently
by Harvey as to how class (or other social stmggles) can be generalised. I take this
to raise a different issue than that of whether ‘place’ is reactionary. We may
conceptualise ‘place’ as potentially progressive, as I have tried to do here, but that
still raises the question of how radicalised workers in one area can act to change the
contexts of trade union action in others. Harvey provides his own answer:
Capitalists may appeal to capitalists in other regions or to state authority to put down labor 
unrest, while workers may likewise build coalitions across urban regions and seek 
command of central state power for their own advantage.^  ^ ;
And evidence of such developments are provided by my empirical research. 
A school dinner lady in Newcastle conveyed to me the excitement she felt about her 
discovery of other places where similar struggles were being waged and the 
importance she attached to the links she and her colleagues had made with trade 
unionists elsewhere. The activities of SCAT demonstrate the central importance of 
spreading information and advice between different localised organisations. And 
the national union organisations provide at least the potential that local struggles can 
be linked to provide the strength of a national campaign. Again these are all 
examples of the ways in which locales can stretch beyond ‘the local’ to enable (or 
constrain) what Giddens calls system, as opposed to social, integration.
The tendency that Harvey’s work exhibits to gloss over such activities and 
emphasise continually the actions and dominance of capital stems from the lack of 
an analysis of human agency. The dichotomy of outcomes expressed in his work 
of brutal capitalist repression or socialist revolution is a false one. The revolution 
may be a long way off, but the evidence assembled here suggests that the creative
Harvey (1989) The urban ..., op. cit. pl59.
250 Responding to restructuring
response of trade unionists to the threats they face can, under certain conditions, 
affect the form taken by those processes of continued capital accumulation and the 
nature of any resolution of the crisis of Fordism. The refusal to allow some spaces 
to be recolonised by capital and the commitment in some areas to push the 
boundaries of exclusion ever wider suggests that incremental change and the 
learning process which goes with it may ultimately be a crucial part of any putative 
transition to socialism. Seeing how that can occur must involve an examination of 
the practices of those who will bring it about, and of the geography of those 
practices.
8 Conclusion: trade unions and 
the transition from Fordism
In this study I have tried to develop an account of trade union action in local 
government which is sensitive to the geographical contexts in which its day-to-day 
practices take place, but which also relates the development and potential 
transformation of those practices to wider shifts in the nature of public service 
provision and the role that it plays in the regulation of the social system. By doing 
so, I wanted to challenge the dominant representations of trade unionism as 
irrelevant to contemporary British society, and provide some limited additional 
resources for the future trade union struggles.
These are ambitious aims and I have no doubt fulfilled them only 
inadequately. Nonetheless they still seem to me to be worthwhile and in this brief 
conclusion I want to draw these themes together and consider what they suggest for 
the future.
I showed in Chapter 6 how attempts to restructure the provision of local 
government services in Britain have been subject to trade union struggles. As I 
suggested in earlier chapters, this attempted restructuring may be seen as an attempt 
by the Thatcher governments of the 1980s to chart a ‘British road to post-Fordism’. 
As regulation theory stresses, any such attempt will be subject to social and political 
struggle as different social groups attempt to influence the direction of the 
transition. However, most writing in the regulation tradition does not investigate in 
any detail the content and substance of those struggles. Since it is their outcome 
which will determine the character of any successor to the mode of regulation of 
Fordism, it seems appropriate to try to investigate the nature of these conflicts, and 
the research presented in this thesis has been an attempt to do just that.
As the transition from Fordism has worked its way across the economic and
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political landscape of Britain it has generated changes in both the localities and the 
locales through which trade union action is constituted. It is these changes to 
which trade unions are responding: changes to their immediate political and 
economic environments, whether at the local, national or international level. In 
each case, trade unions and their members try creatively to respond to the changes 
they face, drawing as they do so on the resources provided by the contexts in 
which they are located. Since the transition from Fordism does not merely affect 
those contexts, but actually occurs through them, the responses that trade unions 
make can potentially materially affect the course of the transition.
As I showed in earlier chapters, for regulation theory the transition between 
different modes of regulation involves the development of new institutional forms 
which emerge and may then either stabilise and become part of a new mode of 
regulation, or prove ‘unsuccessful’ and end up among Alain Lipietz’s ‘undeveloped 
prototypes’. The components of Britain’s neo-liberal course to post-Fordism may 
thus be challenged and disrupted in their very emergence. Bob Jessop's 
characterisation of the neo-liberal path to post-Fordism which was discussed in 
Chapter 3 has a number of key elements which are being directly or indirectly 
challenged by trade union action in local government services. Of the principal 
characteristics of the path which Jessop identifies at least four are particularly 
relevant to the present discussion. These are the legislative and political attacks on 
the trade union movement; the attempts to increase the flexibility of labour markets; 
the recomposition of the welfare state; and the prioritisation of private provision and 
quasi-market forms of public services, especially through contracting out and 
competitive tendering.!
All these aspects have been challenged by the trade unions. These challenges
! Jessop B (1989) 'Conservative regimes and the transition to post-Fordism: the cases of Great 
Britain and West Germany' in Gottdiener M and Komninos N (eds) Capitalist development and 
crisis theory: accumulation, regulation and spatial restructuring (New York: St Martin's Press) 
pp261-299.
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have not, however, been a matter of simple defence of the old, 'Fordist' forms. 
Rather, and as I have tried to show in detail in the account of my empirical 
research, they have involved a (usually unacknowledged) attempt to influence the 
course of the transition and to chart a rather different path to post-Fordism.
Attempts to restrict local government expenditure may be resisted by councils 
and unions; the privatisation and commodification of local services can founder on 
a combination of the relative autonomy of local authorities and the development of 
alternative policies and strategies for service delivery proposed and implemented by 
the trade unions. The attempt to make the local authority labour market more 
flexible and deregulated can be challenged by the determination of unions to retain 
nationally agreed levels of pay and conditions and bolster membership through new 
recruitment and the revitalisation of union organisational structures. The 
commercialisation of the relationship between public services and their users has 
been challenged through the development of very different forms of user 
involvement based on the direct participation of users with the workers in the 
elaboration of new models of public service provision.
A whole series of new forms are arising, from the establishment of an 
‘industrial union’ for all local government employees (the result of a forthcoming 
merger between NUPE and NALGO) to the growth of these new alliances between 
service users and local trade unionists and from the ‘no-strike’ deal in Milton 
Keynes to the joint working arrangements in Manchester. Some of these new 
forms may have effects beyond the intentions of those involved in their 
establishment. Others are more likely to arise as a deliberate strategy, perhaps even 
where the unions perceive and understand the current changes as precisely the sort 
of structural changes’ discussed in Chapter 2. In this case union struggles can 
become quite self-conscious attempts to exert control over the future development 
of public sector services and to retain and defend them as a desirable part of any 
new political and economic landscape.
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In all cases, however, and for the reasons elaborated at length in Chapters 6 
and 7, the struggles and changes will be highly geographically differentiated. The 
question of the political predominance of the new forms is also in part a question of 
their geographical predominance, not only in terms of their simple extensiveness, 
but also as a consequence of the significance of particular strategic places. This is 
why the struggle for the large cities is so crucial: they are both significant in terms 
of population and symbolic of the old Fordist order. To reiterate, the defence of 
their public services by trade unions is not a simple resistance to change, however, 
but a deliberate attempt to turn the path of change in a particular direction.
This means that precise nature of the ‘post-Fordist’ mode of regulation 
remains highly indeterminate: the components of the Thatcherite strategy are well 
known, but their imposition is by no means a foregone conclusion. The uneven 
development of the new forms is fundamental to their success or failure. The way 
unions are able to handle this uneveness, perhaps to turn it to their advantage by 
developing new strategies in particularly symbolic places, or by concentrating 
resources on the winable battles, will be an important influence on the outcome of 
the struggles. To retain the ‘battle’ metaphor, there is in one sense a ‘front line’ 
along which the alternative futures embodied in different strategies meet. In those 
areas where the unions have been able to develop particularly innovative responses 
(in part because of the nature of the locales in which they are located) there is a 
‘leading edge’ of change which may either emerge and develop elsewhere or wither 
if the Thatcherite strategy becomes more powerful. The character of the leading 
edge responses indicates the far reaching nature of some of the unions’ attempts to 
deal with the changes facing them, suggesting that the even if the ‘fundamental’ 
nature of the transition is not always explicitly accepted by the unions, it is 
implicitly embodied in the new practices and structures.
Some of the ‘leading edge’ responses — those that are seeking in a 
particularly reflexive way to develop new and radical strategies —  seem to have a
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number of common characteristics, which emerge from the case studies. First, 
they involve the development of different forms of union organisation. For 
example, although women workers have long formed a large proportion of public 
service employees, the forms of trade unionism which they were offered were often 
dominated by the priorities of men. There are now signs that in at least some 
unions the organisational forms are beginning to change to allow women greater 
participation. More women are becoming active in unions and more women are 
gaining positions of power in unions (most noticeably, but still importantly, at the 
grassroots). One of the consequences of this change is that sections of the 
workforce, like cleaners and catering staff, who are often marginalised in the union 
movement, as well as in employment, are now in some places being listened to and 
involved in the development of union policy. I don’t want to sound complacent 
here, as it is clear that at this stage change is limited and sporadic, but in at least 
some places it is there.
Second, the leading edge has seen connections being drawn far more between 
the production and consumption of public services. It was increasingly recognised 
that whatever the merits of the organisation of production typical of the public 
services in the 1960s and 1970s, the implications of them for service users were 
often that services were bureaucratic, poorly managed and unsuitable. Furthermore 
if ‘user’ was not be translated into ‘customer’ through the wholesale import of 
market-derived criteria for provision, the dislocation of production from 
consumption had to be repaired. Leading light in this manoeuvre was SCAT 
which, because of its base in both the trade unions and user groups (a legacy of the 
Community Action campaigns of the 1970s) was ideally placed to develop new 
strategies. The ‘Seven-point Plan’ explicitly emphasised the need to generate joint 
approaches between workers and users. This sort of approach has begun to be 
adopted more widely, starting in the aftermath of the defeat of the refuse collectors 
in Wandsworth and being taken up by the anti-compulsory tendering campaigns in
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Newcastle and elsewhere.
Thirdly, the leading responses tend to stress the requirement for an 
independent trade unionism based on the participation of the workforce. In local 
government this is straightforward where the employer has no desire to incorporate 
the unions. In areas where incorporation is a possibility and where the council 
concerned is pursuing policies with which the unions are politically in sympathy, 
contradictions arise. The dilemma is starkly posed in Manchester where joint- 
working to deal with CCT has led to a degree of alienation of the rank and file 
activists. In Newcastle, by contrast, the unions have sought deliberately to 
maintain their independence and to base their strategy on grassroots mobilisation. 
On the other hand they were never offered a joint-working arrangement. Both 
approaches thus try to some extent to make a virtue out of necessity by taking 
advantage of the opportunities offered by their particular circumstances.
Fourthly, and related to this, the development of new strategies has largely 
been a matter for local action. Certainly there have been national policies developed 
and national resources put into new initiatives and I don’t wish to suggest that these 
are unimportant. However, the reduction in union power at the national level by 
virtue of the ending of corporatist structures within the state and the legislative 
onslaught against union organisations, combined with the relative autonomy of the 
local branches and districts has meant that it is at the local level that change has 
often first occurred.
For regulation theory, a new mode of regulation will be established if a whole 
series of the new forms which are emerging in the transition combine in a mutually 
reinforcing way to stabilise the political and economic contradictions of the 
capitalist system. If this does happen it will be because certain forms and the 
relationships between them did eventually gain political predominance. Thus the 
struggle in which the unions are engaged is a struggle to make certain forms 
(perhaps those in the ‘leading edge’) predominant. Whether or not it is always
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recognised by the individual participants, this represents a struggle over the future 
nature of public service provision in Britain.
The unions’ responses, therefore, represent a series of attempts to redefine 
public service trade unionism and break with some of the ‘orthodoxies’ established 
during the 1970s. As I showed in Chapter Two, the public service unionism of the 
1970s was forged during the development of the crisis of the Fordist mode of 
regulation and this resulted in the development of strategies and tactics appropriate 
to the defence of wages and jobs against quantitative reductions in the resources 
allocated for public services.
With the more qualitative changes involved in the Thatcherite attempt to find a 
way out of the crisis, this ‘defensive militancy’ became increasingly inappropriate. 
The neo-liberal version of ‘post-Fordism’ involves a radically different relationship 
between labour, capital and the state in the provision of public services: 
Privatisation and the deregulation of the labour market are key components. New 
forms of trade union action therefore are required to make the case not only for no 
reduction in the level of resources allocated to public service provision, but also for 
the principle of public provision itself. This implies addressing the relationship 
between users and producers at the local level, and trying to ensure independence 
from the local state which was increasingly losing its relative autonomy and 
consequently its ability to produce anything resembling a ‘restmctuiing for labour’.
Thatcherite ‘post-Fordism’ might involve a frontal assault on the 
organisations of the labour movement, but it can never abolish labour relations as 
such. Labour is always involved in production and changes in the processes, 
organisational stmcture or role of production always have consequences for labour. 
Therefore, where trade unions at the local level find themselves in the right sort of 
contexts, the conditions exist for a challenging response to this restructuring. The 
processes of restructuring are thus rarely one sided, they always involve the 
activities of labour.
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The necessary geographical differentiation of the trade unions’ response thus 
implies a simultaneous differentiation in the process of restructuring. The 
establishment of a post-Fordism mode of regulation will be both contested and 
uneven. Although regulation theorists emphasise the central role of social and 
political struggle in determining the potential for and form of any resolution of 
crises in the mode of regulation, they do not, by and large consider the nature, 
causes and consequences of those struggles in detail. Regulation theory can 
explain why, once new institutional forms emerge, they are successful or otherwise 
in stabilising the pattern of accumulation. It is less clear when it comes to the 
reasons for the emergence of the new forms themselves, and all but silent on the 
geography of the processes involved.
In this report, I have tried in a limited way to show how these gaps might be 
filled. The attempts by trade unions to resist the neo-liberal path, and to develop 
qualitatively different forms of trade union action mean will influence the transition 
from Fordism. The ‘public sector cities’ and their ‘spaces for labour’ will be a key 
battle ground; some territory will be reclaimed, some successfully defended. The 
geographical outcome of these struggles will be part and parcel of any new 
stabilisation of the regime of accumulation, as will the institutional forms developed 
by the trade unions in the process. The geography of post-Fordism may look very 
different from that of its predecessor, but it will be a political geography, 
nonetheless.
9 Appendices
Appendix A: The Local Government Act 1988
The Act first identifies which institutions are covered by the rules. It then lists the 
seven services which are subject to CCT. These are refuse collection, building 
cleaning, other cleaning (mainly street cleaning), school and welfare catering, other 
catering (eg staff canteens), grounds maintenance and vehicle maintenance. The 
Act gives the Secretary of State the power to add more activities to the list at any 
time, and the management of sports facilities has since been added.
Under the Act, a local authority may not carry out these services in-house 
unless it abides by six conditions. The conditions are as follows:
1 The local authority must publish a notice in the local and trade press. The 
notice must state: (i) what work is involved, (ii) when and where a detailed 
specification can be inspected, (iii) that a copy of the specification may be obtained 
at a stated price, (iv) that those wishing to tender should notify the council, and (v) 
that the council will invite tenders to carry out the work.
2 The times, places and price for inspecting and obtaining the specification 
and tendering for the work must be ‘reasonable’, and the authority must actually 
make copies of the specification available. The specification must state when the 
contract wiU operate.
3 If any companies express interest, the council must invite at least three of 
them to tender for the work. If less than four companies are interested they must all 
be invited. The invitation must be issued between three and six months after the 
press notice was published.
4 The authority must prepare a written bid from its direct service organisation 
(DSO).
5 The authority must not act in an ‘uncompetitive’ or ‘anti-competitive way’.
260 Responding to restructuring
6 The direct service organisation must follow the specification.
There are three main exclusions to the legislation. The rules do not apply 
when the work is a minor part of the job of someone who mainly does other things, 
or when the work is done in an emergency, or if the value of the work is below a 
certain limit. The last exclusion (known as the de minimis rule) has the effect of 
exempting quite a number of small, mainly rural, authorities from CCT for at least 
some of the services.
The Act also insists that authorities set up separate trading accounts for the 
various services, and that they operate according to certain financial targets 
specified by the Secretary of State. In the case of building cleaning the target is to 
break even, while the other services have to produce a return on the capital they 
employ. This has two implications. The first is that since companies have no such 
compulsory targets, they can undercut local authorities by reducing their profit 
margins, at least for a period. The same option is not open to the DSO. The 
second implication is that financial criteria are accorded priority in assessing the 
work of DSOs, and that questions of employment practice, democratic control over 
services, social desirability and effectiveness are subordinated to those of financial 
efficiency.
Finally, local authorities are not allowed to take ‘non-commercial’ criteria into 
consideration when awarding the contracts. For example they may not insist that 
the workforce be paid at nationally-agreed wage rates, nor that it be unionised. 
Neither may they write equal opportunities clauses into the contract, nor decline to 
award a tender on the grounds that the company is South African owned.
When the CCT proposals were originally drawn up, the private contractors 
likely to bid for local authority contracts put pressure on the government not to 
flood the market. This resulted in a phased introduction. For grounds 
maintenance, each authority had to put at least 20% of its work out to tender by 1 
January 1990, and a further 20% by the beginning of each year until 1 January
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1994. (Note that these are minimum proportions. Some authorities have already 
tendered all their grounds maintenance work.) For all the other services tendering 
is being phased-in over a three year period. Local authorities have been randomly 
allocated to different groups. A timetable has been drawn up for each group, 
detailing which services must be put up to tender at which point. Contracts start at 
six month intervals. The first contracts began on 1 August 1989, the second ones 
on 1 January 1990, and so on until 1 January 1992.
Contracts are usually awarded for a four or five year period. This means that 
in many authorities as soon as the first phase of CCT has been completed in 1992 
or 1993, it will be time to start all over again with second contracts for the services 
which were first to be put up to tender. It may also be significant that (with the 
exception of the final two phases of grounds maintenance contracts) all the initial 
contracts will have been awarded before the date by which the next general election 
must be held. Implementing the provisions of the Act involves a seven-stage 
procedure on the part of the authorities concerned. Each of the stages must be gone 
through for each six-monthly round or ‘tranche’ of contracts. ^
Stage one: prepare service profile Although it is not a requirement of the Act; 
this initial stage is important because it allows the local authority to make a 
comprehensive assessment of the service it currently provides, and thereby to 
identify where improvements can be made. To ensure that all views are 
considered, councils may wish to involve groups of users and trade union 
representatives in this review.
Stage two: prepare specification Nine months before contracts are due to start 
the local authority draws up a specification describing in detail the work involved. 
For example in the case of a refuse collection contract, the specification is likely to 
cover how often dustbins must be emptied, what type of bin should be used, where 
it should be collected from and so on. Some authorities have used the specification 
to raise the standards of service currently being provided.
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Stage three: advertise for interested contractors About eight months before 
contracts start the authority must place advertisements in the local press and the 
trade press relating to the service in question as described above. Some authorities 
may then choose to vet the interested contractors and draw up a select list of 
approved companies.
Stage four: issue invitations to tender Between six and three months before 
contracts start the local authority must invite at least three contractors to tender for 
the work. If fewer than four are interested then all must be invited, however in this 
case the authority is allowed to inform a company that it does not reach the 
standards for select listing and qualification for tender. The companies concerned 
will then (if they choose) submit a bid to carry out the contract according to the 
specification.
Stage five: prepare and submit in-house bid At the same time, the council’s 
own DSO must draw up its bid and submit it to the ‘client side’ of the authority.
Stage six: evaluate bids and award contract When the deadline for the receipt 
of bids has passed, the Chair of the relevant committee in the authority opens the 
tenders and evaluates them according to various criteria. These include the 
accuracy of the arithmetic, the ability of the contractor to carry out the specified 
work, whether the bid matches the specification and so on. The client department 
should also evaluate in detail the overall effect on the authority’s finances of 
awarding the contract to an outside agency. Following evaluation, the contract is 
awarded. The authority does not have to award the contract to the lowest bidder, 
but it must have ‘good reasons’ for failing to do so.
Stage seven: monitor contract Finally the contract starts and the client 
department monitors the work to ensure that the specification is being met. This 
monitoring occurs whether the service is contracted-out, or retained in-house.
Each of these stages must be gone through for each six-monthly round or 
‘tranche’ of contracts.
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Appendix B: Case study selection criteria
(i) Political control
This refers not only to whether the council is Conservative or Labour, but also to 
the attitude of the elected members to the processes of restructuring. For example, 
some councils may be keen to involve the private sector heavily in the provision of 
services, while others will wish to defend the status quo. Still others may be 
opposed to privatisation, but seek to prevent it through the radical development of 
new forms of public service delivery.
(ii) Trade union - council relations
The quality of the relationship between local unions and the council is seen by 
unions at the national level as a key determinant of the unions’ ability to influence 
the restructuring. This is because the national joint-union policy agreed between 
NUPE, NALGO, the TGWU and the GMB is that unions should cooperate with 
local councils in an effort to retain control over the production of services. There is 
a predictable tendency for differences in the quality of relations between councils 
and trade unions to reflect differences in political control, but there are many 
exceptions. Some Conservative-controlled councils have relatively good relations 
with their unions, while a number of Labour councils have bad ones.
(iii) Local labour movement traditions
This includes the local structure of trade unionism in the services concerned (that is, 
which unions organise which workers), as well as the local political culture of the 
labour movement. Is it dominated by full-time male workers from the refuse 
collection service? Or has it been influenced by demands from part-time dinner 
ladies for greater priority to be given to the issues which concern them? In some 
areas to be a member of a trade union is to participate in the locally dominant 
culture. In others it is the opposite. Thus the concept of a union’s ‘heartland’ is 
associated not only with a concentration of membership, but also with a set of
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cultural and political traditions.
(iv) Relations between unions
Relations between different unions at the local level are also important. This again 
is the view of national union policy-makers, who regard grass-roots cooperation as 
an important aspect of generating an effective response. In some areas unions 
work very well together, while in others relations are more strained. This is related 
to local union traditions, of course, but also to objective conditions. Thus one 
union might find itself in a position where the interests of its members conflict with 
the interests of the members of another union.
(v) Significance of public sector services in the local economy
The international recession in the early 1980s, and the effects of the policies of the 
Conservative government led to widespread deindustrialisation in the major 
industrial regions of the country, and in the inner cities. New growth industries 
have in general been concentrated away from these areas. The resulting 
concentrations of high levels of unemployment have a number of consequences. 
First, in areas of high unemployment, the threat of losing one’s job is taken more 
seriously than in places where there is less difficulty in getting another. The 
implicit or explicit use of this threat by managers makes it easier for them to carry 
through unpopular processes of restructuring.
Second, the demand for local government services grows as social needs go 
unmet from other sources. Third, the significance of local government employment 
grows as the local private sector declines. As a consequence of these factors, a 
greater proportion of the population in these areas rely directly or indirectly on local 
government to meet their needs. Hence how councils provide services, and what 
services they provide varies widely from authority to authority. The impact of local 
government restructuring is thus relatively greater in areas of deindustrialisation 
than elsewhere. In turn this will influence both the nature of the unions’ responses 
and the support they receive from users of the services.
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(vi) The local labour market
Related processes are important in the specific area of competitive tendering for 
council contracts. The characteristics of the local labour market (its turnover, wage 
levels, and gender and racial segmentation) affect how easy it is for private contract 
service companies to meet tender specifications, and at what cost. Some areas may 
not have a large pool of ‘unskilled’, unorganised, casualised workers from which 
companies can recruit cleaners and catering staff.
Bibliography
Aglietta M (1979, French edition 1976) A theory o f capitalist regulation: the US 
experience (London: Verso)
Aldridge M (1979) The British new towns: a programme without a policy (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul)
AMA, LGIU, LSPU and ADLO (1988) Don'tpanic! (London: AMA et al.) 
Anderson B (1983) Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread o f 
nationalism (London: Verso)
Ascher K (1987) o/privûir/j'û'tioiî (London: Macmillan)
Bassett P (1986) Strike free: new industrial relations in Britain (London: 
Macmillan)
Bassett P (1988) ‘Less policy, more action’ Financial Times 22 July 
Bassett P (1989) ‘All together now?’ Marxism Today January pp44-7 
Beaumont PB (1987) The decline o f trade union organisation (Beckenham: Groom 
Helm)
Beaumont PB and Harris RID (1989) ‘The north south divide in Britain: the case of 
trade union recognition’ Ojford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics 51:4 
pp413-428
Benlow D and Scott I (1983) Fighting privatisation: the struggle for Wandsworth 
(Nottingham: Institute for Workers’ Control and NUPE)
Benlow D, Ramage P, French M, Simmonds D and Whitfield D (1983) Public jobs 
fo r  private profit: fighting contractors in Wandsworth (London: Wandsworth 
Trade Union Publications)
Benn T (1985) ‘Who dares wins’ Marxism Today January ppl2-15
Bibliography 267
Beresford P (1987) Good council guide: Wandsworth 1978-87 (London: Centre 
for Policy Studies)
Berman M (1982) All that is solid melts in to air (London: Verso)
Beynon H (1984, first edition 1973) Working fo r  Ford (Harmonds worth : Pelican 
Books)
Beynon H and Wainwright H (1979) The workers* report on Vickers (London: 
Pluto)
Boddy M (1984) ‘Local economic and employment strategies’ in Boddy M and 
Fudge C (eds) Local socialism? (London: Macmillan)
Boddy M and Fudge C (1984) Local socialism (London: Macmillan)
Borough of Milton Keynes (1989) Annual report 1988189 (Milton Keynes: 
Borough of Milton Keynes)
Borough of Milton Keynes (1989) Facts and figures 7959/90 (Milton Keynes: 
Borough of Milton Keynes)
Boyer R (1990) The regulation school: a critical introduction (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press) %
Bradbury JH (1985) ‘Regional and industrial restructuring processes in the new 
international division of labour’ Progress in Human Geography 9:1 pp38-63 
Byrne D (1989) Beyond the inner city (Milton Keynes: Open University Press)
Central Statistical Office (1981) Key statistics fo r  local authorities (London: 
HMSO)
Champion AG, Clegg K and Davies RL (1977) Facts about the new towns: a 
socio-economic digest (Corbridge: Retailing and Planning Associates)
Clarke A and Cochrane A (1989) ‘Inside the machine’ Capital and Class 37 pp35- 
61
Clarke S (1990) ‘New utopias for old: Fordist dreams and Post-Fordist fantasies’ 
Capital and Class 42 pp 131-155
268 Responding to restructuring
Coates K and Topham T (1988, first edition 1980) Trade unions in Britain 
(London: Fontana)
Cochrane A (1989) ‘Restructuring the state: the case of local government’ in 
Cochrane A and Anderson J (eds) Politics in transition (London: Sage) pp95- 
140
Cockbum C (1977) The local state (London: Pluto)
Cockbum C (1983) Brothers: male dominance and technological change (London: 
Pluto)
Cockbum C (1987) ‘Women, trade unions and political parties’ Fabian Research 
Series 349
Community Action (1983) ‘Muck, money and mass sackings in Milton Keynes’ 
Community Action ppl6-26
Cooke P (1989) Localities: the changing face o f urban Britain (London: Unwin 
Hyman)
Cousins C (1987) Controlling social welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf)
Dobbs SP (1928) The clothing workers o f Great Britain (London: Routledge)
Doherty J (1989) ‘Britain in a changing international system’ in Cochrane A and 
Anderson J (eds) Politics in transition (London: Sage) pp7-33
Duncan S and Goodwin M (1988) The local state and uneven development: behind 
the local government crisis (Cambridge: Polity)
Dunford M and Perrons D (1983) The arena of capital (London: Macmillan)
Edwards PK and Bain GS (1988) ‘Why are trade unions becoming more popular? 
Unions and public opinion in Britain’ British Journal o f Industrial Relations 
26:3 pp311-326
Engels F (1973, first German edition 1845) The condition o f the working class in 
England (London: Lawrence and Wishart)
Bibliography 269
Foord J and Gregson N (1986) ‘Patriarchy: towards a reconceptualisation’ 
Antipode
Forsyth M {19^1) Re-servicing Britain (London: Adam Smith Institute)
Fothergill S and Gudgin G (1982) Unequal growth (London: Heinemann)
Gallie D (1987) ‘Patterns of similarity and diversity in British urban labour 
markets: trade union allegiance and decline’ paper presented at the Sixth 
Urban Change and Conflict Conference UmvQxsity of Kent 20-23 September 
Gamble A (1988) ‘On, and on, and on...?’ Marxism Today November ppl2-15 
Gamble A (1988) The free economy and the strong state (London: Macmillan) 
Geddes M (1988) ‘The capitalist state and the local economy: “restructuring for 
labour” and beyond’ Cf l p / r a / C / a y ^  35 pp85-120 
Giddens A (1979) Central problems in social theory: action, structure and 
contradiction in social analysis (London: Macmillan)
Giddens A (1981) A contemporary critique o f historical materialism. Vol. 1: 
aW r/zg jmre (Basingstoke: Macmillan) -
Giddens A (1984) The constitution o f society (Cambridge: Polity)
Giddens A (1987) Social theory and modern sociology (Cambridge: Polity)
GMB (1984) Privatisation: GMB policy statement (Esher: GMB)
GMB, NUPE, NALGO and TGWU (1988) Who cares wins: a trade union guide to 
compulsory tendering for local services (London: GMB et al.)
GMWU (1982) Privatisation and public services (Esher: GMWU)
Gough I (1979) The political economy o f the welfare state (London: Macmillan) 
Gregory D (1978) Ideology, science and human geography (London: Hutchinson) 
Gregory D (1982) ‘Solid geometry: notes on the recovery of spatial structure’ in 
Gould P and Olsson G (eds) A search fo r  common ground (London: Pion) 
ppl89-219
270 Responding to restructuring
Gregory DJ (1986) ‘Realism’ in Johnston RJ, Gregory DJ and Smith DM (eds) 
The dictionary o f human geography (Oxford: Blackwell) pp389-90
Griffiths M and Johnston R (1991) ‘What’s in a place? An approach to the concept 
of place, as illustrated by the British National Union of Mine workers’ strike, 
1984-85’ Antipode 23:2 ppl85-213
Gyford J (1985) The politics o f local socialism (London: Allen and Unwin)
Habermas J (1976, German edition 1973) Legitimation crisis (London: 
Heinemann)
Haggett P (1965) Locational analysis in human geography (London: Edward 
Arnold)
Hall S (1983) ‘The great moving right show’ in Hall S and Jacques M (eds) The 
politics o f Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart) pp 19-39
Hall S (1985) ‘Authoritarian populism: a reply to Jessop et al.’ New Left Review 
151 ppl 15-124
Hall S (1988) The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis o f the left 
(London: Verso)
Hall S and Jacques M (1983) ‘Introduction’ in Hall S and Jacques M (eds) The 
politics o f Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart) pp??-??
Hall S and Jacques M (eds) (1989) New Times: the changing face o f politics in the 
1990s (London: Lawrence and Wishart)
Hamnett C (1990) ‘London’s turning’ Marxism Today July pp26-31
Harris L (1985) ‘British capital: manufacturing, finance and multinational 
corporation’ in Coates D, Johnston G and Bush R (eds) A socialist anatomy 
o f Britain (Cambridge: Polity) pp7-28
Harris L (1988) ‘The UK economy at the crossroads’ in Allen J and Massey D 
it&s) The economy in question (London: Sage) '
Bibliography 271
Harvey D (1975) ‘Class structure in a capitalist society and the theory of residential 
differentiation’ in Peel R, Chisholm M and Haggett P (eds) Processes in 
physical and human geography: Bristol essays (London: Heinemann) pp354- 
69
Harvey D (1982) The limits to capital (Oxford: Blackwell)
Harvey D (1985) ‘The geopolitics of capitalism’ in Gregory D and Urry J (eds) 
Social relations and spatial structures (London: Macmillan) pp 128-163 
Ksrv&y D (19S5) The urbanization o f capital (Oxford: BlackweU)
Harvey D (1987) ‘Flexible accumulation through urbanization: reflections on ‘post­
modernism’ in the American city’ Antipode 19:3 pp260-86 
Harvey D (1989) The condition o f postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell)
Harvey D (1989) r/ze expenewce (Oxford: Blackwell)
Hastings S and Levie H (1983) Privatisation? (Nottingham: Spokesman) 
Hetherington P and Robinson F (1988) ‘Tyneside life’ in Robinson F (ed) Post­
industrial Tyneside (Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and 
Arts) ppl 89-210 *
Higgins J, Deakin N, Edwards J and Wicks M (1983) Government and urban 
poverty : inside the policy making process (Oxford: Blackwell)
Hobsbawm E (1981) ‘The forward march of labour halted?’ in Jacques M and 
Mulhem F (eds) The forward march of labour halted (London: Verso) ppl-19 
Hoggett P (1987) ‘A farewell to mass production? Decentralisation as an emergent 
private and public sector paradigm’ in Hoggett P and Hambleton R (eds) 
Decentralisation and democracy: localising public services (Bristol: School of 
Advanced Urban Studies) pp215-232 
Hudson R (1986) ‘Producing an industrial wasteland: capital, labour and the state 
in North-East England’ in Martin R and Rowthom B (eds) The geography o f 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan) .
272 Responding to restructuring
Hudson R (1989) ‘Labour market changes and new forms of work in old industrial 
regions: maybe flexibility for some but not flexible accumulation’ 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 7:1 pp5-30 
Hyman R (1985) ‘Class struggle and the trade union movement’ in Coates D, 
Johnson G and Bush R (eds) A socialist anatomy o f Britain (Cambridge: 
Polity)
Jessop B (1982) The capitalist state: marxist theories and methods (Oxford: 
Blackwell)
Jessop B (1986) ‘Der Wohlfahrtsstaat im Übergang vom Fordismus zum 
Postfordismus’ 65 pp4-33 
Jessop B (1986) ‘Thatcherism’s mid-life crisis’ New Socialist M?v:ch. ppl 1-15 
Jessop B (1989) ‘Conservative regimes in the transition to post-Fordism: the cases 
of Great Britain and West Germany’ in Gottdiener M and Komninos N (eds) 
Capitalist development and crisis theory: accumulation, regulation and spatial 
(New York, NY: St Martin’s) pp261-299 
Jessop B (1989) ‘Thatcherism: the British road to post-Fordism’ Essex Papers in 
Politics and Government 6^
Jessop B (1990) ‘Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect’ Economy and 
Society 19:2 ppl 53-216 
Jessop B, Bonnett K and Bromley S (1990) ‘Farewell to Thatcherism? Neo­
liberalism and “New Times’” New Left Review 179 pp81-102 
Jessop B, Bonnett K, Bromley S and Ling T (1984) ‘Authoritarian populism, two 
nations and Thatcherism’ New Left Review 147 pp32-60 
Jessop B, Bonnett K, Bromley S and Ling T (1985) ‘Thatcherism and the politics 
of hegemony: a reply to Stuart Hair iVew 153 pp87-101
Jessop B, Bonnett K, Bromley S and Ling T Thatcherism: a tale o f two 
nations (Cambridge: Polity)
Bibliography 273
Kelly J (1988) Trade unions and socialist politics (London: Verso)
Kelly J (1989) ‘British trade unionism 1979-89: change continuity and 
contradictions’ paper delivered to the Work, Employment and Society 
Conference, Durham, 14-15 September
Lane T (1982) ‘The unions: caught on the ebb tide’ Marxism Today September 
pp6-13
Lash S and Urry J (1987) The end o f organized capitalism (Cambridge: Polity) 
Lawless P and Brown F (1986) Urban growth and change in Britain (London: 
Harper and Row)Milton Keynes Development Corporation (1970) The plan 
for Milton Keynes: volume one (Milton Keynes: MKDC)
Leborgne D and Lipietz A (1988) ‘New technologies, new modes of regulation: 
some spatial implications’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 6 
pp263-80  ^A r
Leys C (1989, first edition 1983) Politics in Br/ram (London: Verso)
Leys C (1990) ‘Still a question of hegemony’ New Left Review 181 ppl 19-128 
LGIU (1988) Involving unions in compulsory tendering (London: LGIU)
Linton M (1990) ‘If I can get it for £148 why pay more?’ The Guardian 16 May 
Lipietz A (1984) ‘Imperialism or the beast of the apocalypse’ Capital and Class 22 
pp81-109
Lipietz A (1988) ‘Reflections on a tale: the Marxist foundations of the concepts of 
regulation and accumulation’ Studies in Political Economy 26 ppl-36
Machines J (1987) Thatcherism at work (Milton Keynes: Open University Press) 
Manchester Planning (1987) Manchester’s population in the mid 1980s 
(Manchester: Manchester City Council)
274 Responding to restructuring
Manchester City Council (1987) Manchester: a nuclear free city (Manchester: 
Manchester City Council)
Manchester City Council (1988) Official handbook 79S5/59 (Manchester: 
Manchester City Council)
Manchester City Council (1989) A-Z information guide to council services 
(Manchester: Manchester City Council)
Manchester City Council (undated) Equal opportunity in employment - policy 
statement (Manchester: Manchester City Council)
Manchester City Council Enforced Tendering Team (1989) Team profile 
(Manchester: Manchester City Council) mimeo 
Marshall M (1987) Long waves o f regional development (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Education)
Martin R (1988) ‘Industrial capitalism in transition: the contemporary 
reorganization of the British space-economy’ in Massey D and Allen J (eds) 
Uneven re-development: cities and regions in transition (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton) pp202-231 
Martin R (1988) ‘The political economy of Britain’s north-south divide’ 
Transactions o f the Institute o f British Geographers 13:4 pp385-418 
Massey D (1984) Spatial divisions o f labour: social structures and the geography of 
production (London: Macmillan)
Massey D (1991) ‘The political place of locality studies’ Environment and Planning 
A 23:2 pp267-281
Massey D and Meegan R (1982) The anatomy ofjob-loss: the how, why and where 
o f employment decline (London: Methuen)
Massey D and Meegan R (eds) (1985) Politics and method: contrasting studies in 
industrial geography (London: Methuen)
Massey D and Miles N (1984) ‘Mapping out the Marxism Today May
ppl9-22
Bibliography 275
Massey D and Painter J (1989) ‘The changing geography of trade unions’ in 
Mohan J (ed) The political geography o f contemporary Britain (London: 
Macmillan) ppl 30-150
Millward N and Stevens M (1986) British workplace industrial relations 1980-84 
(Aldershot: Gower)
Millward N and Stevens M (1988) ‘Union density in the regions’ Employment 
Gazerre May pp286-295
Mitchell JC (1983) ‘Case and situation analysis’ Sociological Review 31:2 ppl87- 
211
Mohan J (1988) ‘Spatial aspects of health care employment in Britain: 1 Aggregate 
tïQXiàs? Environment and Planning A 2Qi:l ppl-2?> tg
Morgan K and Sayer A (1985) ‘A “modern” industry in a “mature” region: the 
remaking of management-labour relations’ International Journal o f Urban and 
Regional Research 9 pp383-403
NALGO (1986) Fighting privatisation in local government (London: NALGO)
NALGO (undated) Fighting privatisation in local government: campaign handbook 
(London: NALGO) looseleaf binder
North Eastern Regional Joint Trade Union Group (1988) Trade union strategy to 
combat statutory tendering (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: NUPE, NALGO and 
GMB)
NUPE (1982) ‘Report of national conference’ in NUPE Report (London: NUPE)
NUPE {19%2) Defend direct labour (Lon&on: NUPE)
NUPE (1982) Keep your council services public: say no to private contractors 
(London: NUPE)
NUPE (1985) Evidence submitted by the National Union o f Public Employees on 
the Consultation Paper ‘Competition in the provision o f local authority 
services’ (London: NUPE) mimeo
276 Responding to restructuring
NUPE (1986) Local services: the case against privatisation (London: NUPE)
NUPE (1987) Better services (London: NUPE)
Offe C (1984) Contradictions o f the welfare state (London: Hutchinson)
Offe C (1985) Disorganised capitalism (Cambridge: Polity)
Painter J (1990) ‘Seconds out, round two: the first round of compulsory 
competitive tendering’ CLES Research Study Series 6 (Manchester: Centre 
for Local Economic Strategies)
Painter J (1991) ‘Regulation theory and local government’ Local Government 
Studies 11 \6pp23-AA
Painter J (1991) ‘Trade union responses to local government privatization’ 
Transactions o f the Institute o f British Geographers 16:2 pp214-226
Pelling H (1987, first edition 1963) A history o f British trade unionism 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin)
Rex J and Moore R (1967) Race, community and conflict (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press)
Ridley N (1988) The local right: enabling not providing (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies)
Robbins S P (1987) Organization theory: structure, design, and applications 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.)
Robinson F (1988) ‘Industrial structure’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial 
Tyneside (Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) ppl2- 
61
Robinson F (1988) ‘Introduction’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial Tyneside 
(Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) p p l-11
Bibliography 277
Robinson F (1988) ‘The labour market’ in Robinson F (ed) Post-industrial 
Tyneside (Newcastle: Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Libraries and Arts) pp62- 
85
Saunders P (1979) Urban Politics: a sociological interpretation (London: 
Hutchinson)
Savage M (1989) ‘Whatever happened to red Clydeside’ in Anderson J and 
Cochrane A (eds) A state o f crisis: the changing face o f British politics 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton) pp231-243.
Sayer A (1984) Method in social science: a realist approach (London: Hutchinson) 
SCAT (1989) Public service practice 1: tender evaluation (London: SCAT)
Sherman A and Mallam D (1976) Waste in Wandsworth: how direct labour 
squanders ratepayers’ money and the nation’s resources (London: Aims for 
Freedom and Enterprise)
Southall H (1988) ‘Towards a geography of unionization: the spatial organization 
and distribution of early British trade unions’ Transactions o f the Institute o f 
British Geographers 13,4 Vp466-4S3 
Stoker G (1988) The politics o f local government (London: Macmillan)
Stoker G (1989) ‘Creating a local government for a post-Fordist society: the 
Thatcherite project?’ in Stewart J and Stoker G (eds) The future o f local 
govemmewr (London: Macmillan) ppl41-170 
Sunday Correspondent (1990) ‘Why Manchester must pay more for its past’ 14 
January
Sunley P (1990) ‘Striking parallels: a comparison of the geographies of the 1926 
and the 1984-85 coalmining disputes’ Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space %:lp^35-51
278 Responding to restructuring
Taylor R (1980, first edition 1978) The fifth estate: Britain’s unions in the modern 
world (London: Pan)
Thrift N (1983) ‘On the determination of social action in space and time’ 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 1:1 
Thrift NJ (1989) ‘New times and new spaces? The perils of transition models.’ 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 7:2 ppl27-9 
Towers B (1987) ‘After Blackpool: the wider questions’ Industrial Relations 
Journal pp239-243 
TUC (1984) Privatisation file I  (London: TUC)
TUC (1984) Privatisation file 2 (London: TUC)
Wainwright H (1987) Labour: a tale o f two parties (London: The Hogarth Press) 
Wainwright H and Elliott D (1982) The Lucas Plan: a new trade unionism in the 
making? (London: Allison and Busby)
Wandsworth Borough Council (1982) Report by the Director o f Technical Services 
to the Policy and Finance Committee (mimeo)
Ward M (undated) Municipal monetarism: a study o f nine years o f Tory rule in 
Wandsworth (London: Greater London Labour Party)
